Now that attention is being concentrated throughout the service on developing a high degree of skill with the guns of the ship; now that routine drills have largely given way to loading drill, Morris-tube, and fire-control exercises; now that we are daily getting nearer and nearer to the day when every drill on a ship of war will be of a thoroughly practical nature, designed to perfect us in the actual duties which the navy is required to perform, it is pertinent to inquire whether we are not still unconsciously carrying out a number of obsolete drills and wasting time in training ship's crews with weapons which the navy neither would nor should ever have occasion to use? In other words, not only is it pertinent to inquire whether or not the considerable time which is necessary to render a ship proficient in small-arm work is justifiable from a point of view of naval efficiency, but also, whether for naval requirements the entire branch of small-arm training is not obsolete and unnecessary.
Small-arm work, though generally understood to embrace practice with the rifle and revolver, is here used with a much more comprehensive meaning. Manifestly, the skill developed in firing rifles and revolvers on a range cannot be fully utilized unless the men who undergo this training have been so drilled that a body of them can be brought into action in an approved military manner. Furthermore, the instructions for small-arm practice for the navy include, in addition to ordinary range-firing, practice With the 3-inch field pieces, boat guns, etc. We are thus forced to consider small-arm training as including not only all forms of firing prescribed in the instructions, but also all drills which are required to utilize them in actual service. This includes infantry, both close and extended order, landing force, artillery, skirmish runs, armed boat drills, etc., etc. It is evident that either the drills without the firing-practice, or the firing-practice without thorough drills, will not produce the desired degree of efficiency, because these are interdependent, one upon the other.
It is therefore evident that in a consideration of this question, it is illogical to temporize with the problem; if we carry these weapons, and instruct the crews in their use in a perfunctory manner, if we devote only a small amount of time to range-firing, an occasional drill period to infantry, artillery, or landing, it will result in obtaining a body of men which through lack of skill is comparatively inefficient, and hence dangerous in the same sense that an unreliable revolver is a danger to the man that carries it. Therefore, a half-hearted attention to small-arm work is not only very inadvisable but is dangerous in that it may lead us to .depend at some critical moment on a body of men who are insufficiently trained for the function they may be called upon to perform. Hence it would seem that we should take up small-arm training seriously, and render this branch as efficient as possible.
This subject is brought up for discussion at the present time because a marked diversity of opinion in the service seems to exist on this point, and it is believed that only by a careful analysis of the whole question can we arrive at a correct conclusion.
At the present time a unanimity of opinion exists that greatgun work is everything; that a ship is built to carry and fight her great guns; that without skill in gunnery the function of the ship cannot be fulfilled, and that anything which interferes with this training should be discarded; but nevertheless our ships continue to carry small arms, field pieces, and machine guns which cannot be efficiently utilized elsewhere than on shore; we devote hours to training with them, though frequently the training is only half-hearted and not of a really practical nature, and for this very reason results in the various armed detachments being inexpert in their actual duties. Manifestly this is illogical. Small arms either have a definite place on board ship and merit a loyal support, or else they are obsolete as naval weapons, out of place on board ship, and should be removed, thus permitting us to devote our undivided attention to great-gun work.
The question then resolves itself purely into a consideration of what duty the navy is required to perform.
This may be sub-divided into:
(1) Duties in peace.
(2) Duties in war.
In considering each of these conditions it is well to further sub-divide our consideration of the question under the general headings:
(1) Duties of gunboats and small cruisers.
(2) Duties of heavy vessels.
DUTIES OF THE NAVY IN PEACE.
(1) Gunboats and small cruisers.—As a general rule (and this paper is intended to deal only with average conditions), it may be said that during times of peace these vessels perform police duty; a number of them are kept in commission on each station for this purpose alone; their function is to visit and afford protection to American citizens and American interests at any place in which trouble threatens. Gunboats and cruisers are engaged on this duty almost constantly in the small turbulent republics in the West Indies, Central and South America, as well as in Chinese ports, and from time to time in other remote countries.
(2) Heavy vessels.—These are, generally speaking, engaged in drills and fleet maneuvers during peace, but in case of an uprising of importance in any foreign country, even vessels of this class are ordered to the scene of disturbance for the purpose of protecting American interests.
DUTIES OF THE NAVY IN WAR.
(I) Gunboats and small cruisers.—This may be considered to be confined to blockade duty, cutting out and minor operations against isolated vessels, ports, etc.
(2) Heavy vessels.—Duties in squadron chiefly against similar ships of the enemy, but at times in cooperation with the army ashore in repelling a siege.
WHAT DOES THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ABOVE DUTIES INVOLVE?
Gunboats and small cruisers in peace.—An uprising breaks out, and these vessels hasten to the scene. Their orders are to protect American interests. Their actual duties vary with each occasion; sometimes the moral effect of their presence is alone sufficient; sometimes the ship's battery may be brought into service; but more frequently the protection consists in landing a force of men to guard the consulate or other house or compound in which American citizens seek asylum from the irresponsible insurrectionists. One thing is certain, however, namely, that when such orders are received by a vessel of this class and she sails on her mission, if she exerts any active protection other than moral suasion, it is vastly more probable that she will use her landing force and small arms than that she will use her ship's battery. In fact, so important is this feature that it would be no exaggeration to say that a gunboat or small cruiser which did not have a landing force ready to throw ashore in a moment's notice would be unfitted to perform duty of this nature. Therefore, whether a force is actually landed or not, the ordinary peace duty of gunboats and small cruisers renders a landing-force not only desirable, but entirely necessary. Hence it is clear that these vessels could not concentrate attention exclusively on their battery and be efficient for the duty which they may have to perform.
In order that the importance and amount of this duty may not be underestimated, I have compiled the following data from the reports of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for the past fifteen years. The data is incomplete, as the nature of the duty performed is frequently not described in the cruising-reports, and I have endeavored to include only the instances in which vessels were engaged in actively protecting our interests.
The following table does not therefore include all vessels cruising in the waters indicated, but only those specially mentioned as being engaged in the protection of American interests during unsettled conditions.
1890.—Haytian waters, 2 vessels.
Honolulu, 2 vessels.
Central America, 3 vessels.
Samoan waters, 2 vessels.
1891.—Central America, 1 vessel.
Chilian waters, 3 vessels; landed 102 men.
The following is quoted from the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation:
"The constant demand for vessels to protect American interests makes it necessary that our squadrons in foreign waters be in creased as rapidly as the vessels now under construction become available."
1892.—Report not available.
1893.—Venezuela, 2 vessels.
Brazil, 1 vessel.
Hayti, 2 vessels.
Central America, 1 vessel.
Hawaii, 3 vessels.
Samoa, 1 vessel.
Yangtse River, 2 vessels.
Korea, 1 vessel.
1894.—Korea, 1 vessel.
Rio de Janeiro, 4 vessels.
Central America, 5 vessels.
Uruguay, 1 vessel.
Yangtse, 1 vessel.
1895.—Honolulu, 1 vessel.
Zanzibar, 1 vessel.
Syria, 1 vessel.
1896.—No report available.
1897.—Syria, 2 vessels.
China, 2 vessels.
Uruguay, 1 vessel.
1898.—Spanish-American War.
1899.—Samoa, 1 vessel; landed and engaged natives.
China, 2 vessels.
Central America, 2 vessels; landed 2 companies.
Philippines. Large number of gunboats landed repeatedly.
1900.—China. Boxer rebellion. Large number of vessels, including all nations and all classes of vessels, landed and constantly engaged for weeks.
Philippines. Continuation of operations afloat and ashore. Practically every vessel on Asiatic Station either landed men during the year or stood in constant readiness to do so.
Central America, 3 vessels.
Venezuela, 1 vessel.
Santo Domingo, 1 vessel.
The following is quoted from the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation:
"At least two gunboats on the Atlantic and one on the Pacific are always necessary in connection with disturbances in the countries bordering on the Caribbean."
1901.—Philippines. Nature of service in .Philippines in which all had almost daily use for small arms, continued. Many landing forces during year.
China. Troubled conditions in South, three vessels stood in readiness to land.
1902.—Philippines Constant operations afloat and ashore.
La Guayra. 1 vessel.
Colombia, 1 vessel.
Panama, 2 vessels.
The report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation states that "The Department found it necessary in the spring of 1902 to prepare a group of vessels to be in readiness to meet the frequent calls made for the services of our navy in different quarters of the Caribbean and West Indies"; also, "It is necessary to have a sufficient number of small vessels attached to this (Pacific) Station, to insure frequent relief for vessels at Panama, and adjacent ports on the coast of Central America."
1903.—Santo Domingo. 2 vessels.
Venezuela, 1 vessel.
Honduras. 3 vessels; two heavy vessels.
China, 3 vessels.
Philippines. Continued operations though less active than
preceding years.
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation states:
"This (Caribbean) squadron is to provide at all times a force in Caribbean waters which can proceed quickly whenever needed to such points as may demand protection for American interests. This squadron is composed of cruisers * * * The vessels of this squadron were also engaged at various times in protecting American interests in Venezuela, Hayti, Santo Domingo, and Honduras."
1904.—Panama. Revolution; whole Pacific and Caribbean squadrons.
Santo Domingo, 1 vessel.
Chemulpo, 1 vessel.
China, 5 vessels.
Philippines, various gunboats.
1905.—Santo Domingo, 4 vessels.
Chemulpo, 2 vessels.
Panama. 2 vessels.
Syria, z vessel.
China, 2 vessels.
Philippines, small gunboats.
1906.—Philippines, small gunboats.
Santo Domingo. constant operations.
The above is a partial list of the actual duties which the navy has been called upon to perform in the past fifteen years, which, whether it resulted in the actual use of small-arms or not, anticipated their use, and in the majority of instances the ships would have been ineffectual for the duty without them.
The following is a partial list of the actual landing operations since the Spanish War.
1898.—Bluefields. Marietta and an English cruiser.
1899.—Samoa. Philadelphia. Gunboats in Philippines. Frequent landing parties.
1900.—Philippines. Frequent landing operations, Olongapo, Iloilo. Zamboanga, Aparri, Vigan, Kabalete, Sikogan Island.
China, Boxer trouble. Landed from various ships. The combined fleet probably landed 5000 men in all.
1901.—Philippines. Don Juan de Austria. Isla de Cuba and other gunboats landed frequently.
1902.—Philippines. A continuation of above.
The above represent actual, not theoretical conditions. The data show what has occurred, and what will probably recur. Nor, is this use of small-arms confined to our own service. Though data in regard to foreign services is incomplete, the records show that in the last few years every first rate navy has had frequent occasion to land naval forces for actual shore service. The British in the Bemi Expedition, in South Africa, and in Somaliland; Germany in the Herrero uprising in Southwest Africa, also last year in Southeast Africa: the French in Madagascar, and all nations in China in 1900, are the most noteworthy.
Heavy vessels in peace.—The use of small arms by heavy vessels is unusual in peace, still the above table shows that, in any extensive uprising, large vessels are used to protect American interests, and that on such occasions as the trouble in Panama, Central America, and China, when they are so employed, it is the small-arms rather than the heavy guns which afford the protection. The extensive landing in China in i9oci, at which time every nation found it necessary to land a force from their heavy ships, and the sending of heavy ships to Honduras and to Panama, proves that if these vessels are to do their whole duty, even they cannot discard their small-arms.
Gunboats and small vessels in war.—The nature of the duties would probably be such as to necessitate frequent use of armed boat-crews, cutting-out parties, and doubtless occasional landings, such as at Guantanamo in 1898. All of these duties require small-arms, for it must be remembered that except against small or unprotected vessels or block-houses, the battery of a gunboat is of little value in war.
Heavy vessels in war.—It is clear that, unless the duties of the navy change completely, small-arms are necessary on gunboats and cruisers both in peace and in war, and on heavy vessels in peace. It follows, therefore, that the frequent statement that small-arms are out of place on board ship can only apply to heavy vessels in war. But is it true in this case? Undoubtedly the primary duty of a heavy ship is to fight the enemy's ships, but without theorizing let us examine the records of heavy vessels in recent wars. It is well known that at Santiago the Spanish. Fleet landed and assisted the army both with great guns and with small arms. In South Africa the British navy made lasting fame by its operations on shore. In Port Arthur, as at Santiago, the crews fought with the army to repel a siege. It, therefore, follows that small-arms are indispensable even on heavy vessels during war, for, though these weapons might be unnecessary, the fact that they have been used in three successive modern wars would indicate their.utility, and in fact their necessity, under certain conditions, even on the heaviest vessels.
It, therefore, seems fair to conclude that the opinion that attention should be devoted exclusively to great-gun training, and that small-arms have no place on board a modern man-of-war is fallacious. Undoubtedly the relative importance of the two compares as does the sun and the moon, but the rising sun in rendering the moon invisible does not annihilate it; neither can the increased skill and enthusiasm in great-gun training remove the necessity for carrying small-arms on every ship of war, and hence of training men to use them; and the fact that the use of weapons of war in actual service involves life and death, prohibits perfunctory training with them, and requires thoroughness both in training the individuals in range-firing and in drilling the various units under practical conditions so that officers may be able to handle, to the best advantage, bodies of men who have been thus trained.