AS EACH fiscal year approaches the end, considerable interest is shown in the entire Navy as to the comparative standings of vessels in gunnery and engineering. As a consequence of this interest, there naturally comes a discussion as to the relative value or harm of this competition. Whether the methods used and rules promulgated are fair or not, it is a generally accepted fact that in all phases of life, competition and efficiency run hand in hand. This idea is embodied in the Rules for Engineering Competition, wherein it is stated: “The true objective of competition in engineering, whether on land or sea, is to obtain from the machinery installation the maximum efficiency, having due regard for the kind of service performed and consequent restrictions and regulations imposed by the nature of that service.”
For the purpose of illustrating the definite and specific results obtainable by a consistent attempt to carry out the idea of real competition, which is the progressive improvement of the standard of operation of a particular unit, use is made of the data available from the engineering record of the U. S. S. Oklahoma. No comparison is made with other vessels.
Coincident with the winning of the White “E" for excellence in engineering in 1924- 1925, the U. S. S. Oklahoma received a rather drastic, although natural, reduction in fuel allowance. The immediate effect of this cut in fuel allowance was that the Oklahoma was “finished” as far as further competition for engineering honors with other vessels was concerned. This feeling permeated to such an extent that it was discovered that the engineering plant, instead of improving, was actually becoming less efficient. That is to say, in addition to a lower comparative score with respect to other vessels, more fuel was being used than under similar steaming conditions the year before. This feeling of “We’re finished” is the reason for several ships winning engineering prizes one year and being looked on as wrecks the next year. As interest is lost in the score, the score goes down. Then bad machinery condition is not so noticeable. So the score goes down still further and efficiency is no more. Similar conditions on the Oklahoma quickly showed deterioration. So a new and double system of record of operation was started—a record of scores based on the new allowance as required ; but, also, and more important, a record of actual results of improvement as compared with the results obtained in previous years. The result was that, instead of going down with the “We’re finished” flag flying, the plant actually improved with such startling results that it was thought they might be of interest to the service in general. The actual figures are shown in the table on the following page.
To eliminate the idea that these figures are just statistics, the engineering record of the Oklahoma shows that during the latter months of the year, just before the vessel went into the navy yard for modernization, the oil consumption was 70 gallons per mile and 112 gallons per hour, as compared with 123.8 gallons per mile and 211.8 gallons of fuel oil per hour. So that in spite of the expected deterioration with age, the engineering plant operations gave promise of a still greater saving of fuel possible in future operations.
That this improvement of an engineering plant and consequent immense saving of oil has a decided value is shown by a consideration of the effect on the following phases of naval life:
(a) The military value is apparent when it is realized that the cruising radius of the vessel has been increased over 30 per cent. The period of training or activity of the vessel with the fleet is increased so that in three years only 73 days are spent in a navy yard, as compared to 219 days for the previous three years. The mileage during the period of improvement was 76,675 miles, as compared to 46,800 miles in the previous three years. This bears on the point that a superior armament is of no value unless you have the engineering plant to get the vessel into position and keep it there. More reliability of ships in time of war is assured as a result of engineering competition. Given a definite amount of fuel allowed for the whole fleet, the greater the competition and incidental saving of fuel that is accomplished, the greater is the amount of cruising and training for the fleet.
The training of engineers incidental to a strict observance of the rules and spirit of the engineering competition ensures analysis of all engineering problems and suggestions for improvements on new design, so that the U. S. Navy may always have the finest engineering installations possible and the engineers capable of running these installations economically.
(b) The economical or financial value of competition is immediately apparent from the fact that a saving of 3,281,660 gallons of oil represents the fuel bill of a full average year of steaming for a battleship at an estimated cost of $80,000. The larger and possibly greater financial factor is the saving effected in regard to navy yard overhaul. Any officer who has been through the experience of having a considerable portion of his important navy yard requests turned down on “account of lack of funds” must realize what a potential help comes from a vessel that is able to cut her time in the navy yard in half through competitive methods. Commercial concerns anticipate depreciation of power plants, but all large corporations work on a competitive basis, with installations and engineers being juggled around as a direct effect of results obtained. This competition is justified by the immense saving effected by keeping their power plants in the best possible condition. And so in the Navy an immense saving in material and replacements is effected by the incidental high standard set by competition.
(c) The moral value of competition is of an indefinite nature, as this subject gives rise to most discussion. It is rather difficult to conceive that the education and training of personnel incident to competition can have other than a highly beneficial effect. The enthusiasm of a unit that is on the job and out to win is so contagious that even those who by natural inclination would take no part in competition are dragged along. The result is that a generally higher standard of personnel is developed with the improvement in mechanical efficiency.
(d) The advertising or propaganda value of competition cannot be overlooked, as it is the general public to which the Navy must look for support. The man who pays the taxes must be made to know that he is getting his dollar’s worth of insurance and security. The concerns that try to sell their goods to the Navy realize this, as they are all on a competitive basis and “none but the best will do.” So there can be no better advertisement of the Navy than the man who goes out after several years in the service during which time he has been one of the factors in competition. He tells the world how they saved fuel and material in the Navy. The man may do this in ordinary conversation or in the idea of getting a job. It is the author’s experience that a great many men have referred to their records in engineering as their best bet in getting a job on the outside. At this point, it seems well to mention a plan that the author followed as a result of numerous requests for endorsements or recommendations for men who had served under him and who were now applying for a civilian job. In answering these requests from concerns for endorsements, a notation was always put on the bottom requesting that the author be informed after a definite period as to the man’s suitability and worthiness from the civilian company’s standpoint. This is thought to give the endorsement more value, as it shows an honest desire to give conscientious endorsements. The response has been very good. This plan is also known to the men before they leave the ship, so that they are under a double charge to continue making good.
In conclusion, it is thought that these facts presented have a definite bearing on the most common criticism of the Rules for Engineering Competition. In that no comparison is made with any other vessel and no reference is made to the bugaboo “allowance of fuel,” it may be that some scheme could be proposed whereby a ship would be assigned a competitive factor based absolutely on actual results and entirely eliminate the seemingly unsatisfactory “fuel allowance” problem.
It stands to reason that a ship should be marked on her potential value in regard to saving in actual fuel consumption and reliability, which counts in peace training as well as in war, instead of on a rather ephemeral curve of fuel allowances, which has been the apparent cause of a ship’s steaming well one year and being looked on as a wreck the next year. It is in the actual saving of fuel and improvement of reliability that the real value of engineering competition lies.
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
Eng. Year |
Miles steamed |
Fuel used under way |
Fuel per mile |
Hours not under way |
Fuel used not under way |
Fuel per hour |
1923-1924 |
11,646.6 |
1,440,762 |
123.8 |
5,357.9 |
1,134,338 |
211.9 |
1924-125 |
19,467.9 |
1,948,949 |
100.2 |
6,308.1 |
1,048,526 |
165.8 |
1925-1926 |
34,554.8 |
3,434,733 |
99.4 |
4,466.0 |
662,587 |
148.1 |
1926-1927 |
22,654.5 |
1,930,478 |
85.2 |
6,072.1 |
753,729 |
124.1 |
Under war |
Not under way |
|||
Fuel nec. under 1923-24 std. of operation (Col. 2X123.8) |
Fuel saved (Col. 8-Col. 3) |
Fuel nec. under 1923-24 std. of operations (Col. 5X211.8) |
Fuel saved (Col.10-Col.6) |
Total fuel saved for year under improved std. |
1,440,762 |
0 |
1,134,338 |
0 |
0 |
2,410,126 |
461,177 |
1,536,056 |
287,530 |
748,707 |
2,477,884 |
843,151 |
945,899 |
283,312 |
1,126,463 |
2,804,627 |
874,149 |
1,286,070 |
532,341 |
1,406,490 |
|
Total |
3,281,660 |
Eng. Year |
Miles Steamed |
Days at Navy Yard |
1921-1922 |
18,715 |
42 |
1922-1923 |
16,439 |
89 |
1923-1924 |
11,646 |
88 |
Total |
46,800 |
219 |
1924-1925 |
19,467 |
0 |
1925-1926 |
34,554 |
51 |
1926-1927 |
22,654 |
22 |
Total |
76,675 |
73 |