Is it fantastic to assume that enough food could be loaded in a present day fleet submarine for a three-month cruise without using any extra storage space? Or that the weight of cold weather clothing could be reduced 35%? Or that combatant ship loading time could be reduced 50%? Or that the advantages of furnishing logistic support by means of ships as opposed to advanced bases can be obtained by precise analysis rather than by educated guess?
Not only have the above tasks been accomplished, but they represent the results of only four of many projects in the research and development program of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts—-a program that is being aggressively prosecuted with but one down to earth goal in mind: to increase our combat effectiveness.
In these days of considerable public discussion as to the value of theoretical as opposed to applied research, of criticisms in the Hoover report and elsewhere of the military services’ research programs, it behooves every naval officer to pause and consider what we have done in the past and where we are headed. Eliminating research and development funds from the budget means that the Navy will stagnate—forever afterwards fighting with weapons, and especially techniques, which put us at an increasing disadvantage against potential enemies. Allotting too great a portion of the budget to research and development may decrease our present combat effectiveness by concentrating too much attention on things other than present operations and present readiness for war. This is not to state that the nation can spend “too much” money on research—indeed there are many reasons to believe that from a practical standpoint in the foreseeable future we cannot even begin to spend enough because of shortages in trained personnel. But it is definitely to state that for the Navy operating within a limited total budget, there must be a point at which our potential future gains from research are offset by present losses in operational readiness. That critical point, unfortunately, has not yet been determined by rigid mathematical analysis. It is-set by the judgement of various budgetary review conferences, and that judgement can never be better than the information upon which the conferees act. In a very real sense every naval officer contributes to these judgements, for each, in his actions and opinions about the adequacy of the tools and techniques of his particular mission, adds his bit to that vaguely defined but powerful set of words, “it is the opinion of this Bureau,” or “it is the opinion of this Command that . .
Let us then consider the Supply Corps research program. What has been done with the money put into it so far? Do the results increase the combat effectiveness of the Navy? What actual tangible benefits are being made available to the fleet? Only with this background can we proceed to the core of our problem: what can be done to improve the present situation?
II
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts operates two research and development laboratories. The U. S. Naval Supply Research and Development Facility at Bayonne, New Jersey, has cognizance of food, logistics, and supply engineering research. At Brooklyn, New York, another laboratory, operating as a department of the Naval Supply Activities, conducts research and development in the fields of clothing, textiles, and unsupported film. Both of these laboratories are relatively new, the one at Brooklyn having been established during World War II and the one at Bayonne not until 1949 as an independent command. In spite of extremely limited budgets and considerable problems in initial organization and personnel recruitment, both these organizations have produced some remarkable results which will be considered below, and both have under way various projects which may result in truly revolutionary additions to the Navy’s stock of combat materiel and techniques.
Take submarines, for example. It is entirely possible that new developments, such as the nuclear powered submarine, will warrant using these vessels regularly on missions where it would be impossible to replenish stores for three months or even longer. In studying the problem of food storage, the Research and Development Facility at Bayonne was able to take a present day fleet submarine, which has allotted storage space for about 60 days’ rations, and load it with a 90 day supply. This was not done by using the despised dehydrated foods of World War II nor by changing the excellent quality and quantity of submarine food (as was testified to by the crew upon completion of the test program). The future in this type of work looks particularly bright: frozen concentrated juices, boneless veal, precooked frozen foods, and similar products have been developed for civilian markets and await only the small additional amount of development required to test and adapt them for naval use.
Merely placing food aboard submarines is only part of the problem of increasing combat effectiveness. Long cruises demand the very best in food preparation and service. As a result of studies made under contract with a consulting firm of industrial food service engineers, it has been found that considerable improvements can be made in present food service equipment and spaces—improvements that can have definite “tastable” results in future meals. Under another project the new Navy Recipe Service has been brought to fruition. More than 600 easy-to- follow recipe cards, developed and tested by some of the nation’s foremost food technologists, are already in use in the fleet. Many enlisted men, in commenting on food prepared according to the Recipe Service, have stated that one of its advantages over the old Navy Cook Book food is uniformity of seasoning. This can mean a lot on ships where one dish of soup is almost too salty to eat and the next is so hot that only those of Latin descent enjoy it.
Submarine food and storage problems are only a part of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts’ research and development responsibility. For example, one might well ask, “What specific accomplishments in the field of submarine clothing can be demonstrated so far?” For years the men of the silent service have endured the discomforts of both inadequate foul weather gear and general purpose uniforms that were not warm enough for arctic cruises. Both of these problems have been vigorously attacked with very encouraging results. For arctic cruises a lightweight, durable uniform has been developed that can be easily laundered and dried aboard ship. Both shirt and trousers are lined with nylon fleece and are designed to be worn directly over the underwear to provide all required warmth during the coldest operations. For complete protection against water a coverall with detachable insulated boots and mittens can be donned. An outstanding feature of this garment is a soft, expanded plastic facing that provides an effective seal around the face and neck against the entrance of water. This product, trade named “Ensolite,” is honeycombed with millions of tiny nonconnecting air cells, and will undoubtedly find a large civilian market. The suit can and has doubled in an emergency as an exposure suit to provide personnel washed overboard with some protection against the ice laden arctic waters. The old problem of keeping an unconscious man from floating upside down has been partially met by designing the insulated boots with a specific gravity of more than 1.0 and by making the life preserver an integral part of the hood.
Such are a few of the results of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts’ research and development program designed to increase the combat effectiveness of submarines. Let us now turn to the other units of the fleet, the amphibious forces, and the shore establishment, and see what is being done on either an individual or a Navy wide basis to further our combat readiness.
It is generally conceded that the next war, unlike all those previously, will be one fought with an industrial economy of scarcity rather than plenty. In the last war we manufactured something like 21 million tons of ammunition of which only half got overseas and only 4 million tons were ever shot. No one believes for a moment that even the most technically perfect supply system will enable every shell to be fired at the enemy—but the past ratio of 1 in 5 does seem a little wasteful. The basic research on the mathematics of logistics is complex and still very much in the stage where radically new mathematical approaches are required to solve many problems. Research in the fields of applied mathematics and digital computers is a function of the Office of Naval Research, but in order to translate this work into an actual increase in combat potential, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts’ applications program in the field of logistics has a considerable job both ahead of and behind it. Out of the Logistics Research Division at Bayonne have so far come the now familiar publications Logistics Glossary, Logistics Reference Data, and A Standard Form of the Naval Logistics Annex, to mention a few. A very active project at the moment is a study of potential physical capacities of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts activities. By developing measurement standards by which we can know precisely the maximum number of tons that can be handled by a supply depot or what have you, great savings in personnel and physical plant may be possible at times when our absolute maximum effort must be exerted. Another project of the Logistics Division has been a study of the relative advantages of supporting a carrier task group from advanced bases and from mobile support squadrons. The potential increase in combat effectiveness if we can avoid the necessity of seizing, building, and defending a large chain of advance bases is quite obvious, but it is clear that only through a sound logistics research program can the relative costs and advantages be soundly assessed. Only through such a program can we determine the type, construction details, and number of support vessels that the Navy will require in tomorrow’s fleet. Only through such a program will we win any war which turns out to be primarily one of logistics.
The Supply Engineering Research Division has been very much concerned with logistics from the practical operating standpoint. For example, the threat of submarines and of atomic attack on our port facilities poses a very grave problem. We simply cannot afford the luxury of tying up ships for 5 to 7 days or longer for loading and discharging, and practical engineering methods must be developed to reduce this time. By applying advanced materials handling techniques, the Supply Engineering Division was able to accomplish an experimental loading of provisions aboard the U.S.S. New Jersey in less than half the time that would ordinarily be required. Extension of this investigation into improved ship-loading methods is a project of the highest priority and one that would be difficult to overemphasize. No matter what form any future war takes there is one thing obvious: shipping will be an acute shortage. If we can cut our loading and discharge time in half, and if we continue our historical program of developing faster merchant ships during each war, the potential capacity of our merchant fleet will be doubled. Or phrased differently, we need only put half the quantity of materials and man-hours into shipping as would be otherwise required— and the half that is freed can be very, very useful elsewhere in the battle. This weapon of logistics to counter a potential enemy’s submarine threat can be just as valuable, if not more so, than a radical new escort vessel or submarine hunting airplane.
Pilferage of supplies can become a serious problem in logistics planning. Losses during the past war reached incredible proportions in some ports. The Research and Development Facility at Bayonne has developed and completed tests on two metal containers of 150 and 275 cubic foot sizes that will not only reduce pilferage practically to zero but will also speed up the handling of supplies to a considerable extent.
The nation-wide leadership in materials handling achieved during the last war by the Supply Corps has not been allowed to detract from an aggressive and continued development program in this important field. Among the projects is one that with further development may eventually have as much impact on materials handling practices in the United States as did the fork lift. It is the recent development of a new size (40"X48") pallet that affords four way entry of both fork lift trucks and hand pallet trucks, and which should enable unit load shipments to be handled efficiently through all transportation phases including railroad box cars, highway trucks, and cargo vessels. Ship to ship cargo handling, amphibious cargo packaging and handling, pre-stocked portable storage bins, packaging and preservation of supplies, deterioration of supplies in storage, unit loads without pallets, glued unit loads, standard storage plans, and fork lift trucks are other subjects under study from which tangible operating materials and procedures have been developed.
The Commissary Research Division at Bayonne has been concerned not only with projects that directly increase our combat potential (such as the 90 day provision load list for fleet submarines) but also with projects that have indirect morale effects (such as those having to do with better preparation and service of food aboard ships). An important project in the former category is the study of landing force subsistence methods aimed at creating a packaged ration, prepared on a meal basis, that will enable a landing force to be fed hot meals very early in an amphibious operation. Unquestionably food types, packaging, menu planning, and food service organization in amphibious operations are capable of great improvement as practically everyone who participated in such operations during the past war will testify. The successful completion of the present project should provide a definite increase in the efficiency of future amphibious landings.
Plastic mess gear that compares very favorably with china has been developed. The new gear will not only reduce losses by breakage but should also make meals much more attractive. A new 16 ounce soup bowl, for example, has the top surface area reduced as much as possible and the sides kept perpendicular in order to prevent spillage in heavy seas. Work has been done to develop family style mess gear for use on shore stations, and results so far show that speed of service with the experimental items is comparable to that when using the present compartmented steel trays.
Radical improvements in food preparation techniques are promised if projects on electronic cookery are successful. Electronic cooking devices developed so far not only greatly reduce cooking time and loss of flavor and odor, but also are practically “heatless,” thus promising to eliminate forever the old “sweatshop” conditions in many shipboard galleys. Automatic pressure kettles for large scale food preparation are under active development and soon it may be possible to prepare Navy food with all of its original flavor intact.
A far reaching project, which is now in abeyance pending allotment of additional funds, is one looking towards the preservation of food by treatment with high speed electrons. If this project is successful, it may be possible to dispense with refrigerators for fresh meat and thus enable a considerable increase in the quantity of food that can be carried afloat. Some of the other projects being investigated by the Commissary Research Division are in the fields of tropical and arctic subsistence, precooked frozen foods for use afloat, industrial planning for galley equipment and spaces, in-flight feeding, frozen food handling, improved cooking equipment, etc.
At the present time the Navy spends about a hundred million dollars a year on clothing, and in time of full scale war expenditures will be far greater. An increase in the useful life of garments by a mere 10% would mean savings of millions of dollars and would certainly justify on a dollars and cents basis our expenditures for clothing research which amounted to $104,500 in the fiscal year 1950 and $204,000 in 1951. Even with the extremely limited budget some rather astonishing results have been achieved.
The new arctic clothing, for example, consists of just 13 garments, and yet these replace more than 40 different articles that were formerly required to be carried in the supply system. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the new clothing is a revolutionary new boot that has the insulation sealed in so that it can be destroyed neither by sea water nor perspiration—thus promising to put an end to the watch stander’s cold feet and the frostbite of the amphibious forces. Incidentally, the Marine Corps has adopted this boot for its own troops in Korea. To dress as warmly as possible in the new uniform, a man will be required to carry about 19 pounds of clothing. To dress similarly in the uniforms used during World War II would require more than 30 pounds of clothing. It would be hard to estimate the increase in combat effectiveness made possible by the lighter clothing with its greater freedom of movement and considerably increased warmth.
The old black cotton and plastic laminated enlisted man’s raincoat, remembered for its stiffness and uncanny ability to stick together at the wrong time, has now been replaced by a lightweight cotton coat that will probably wear twice as long as the old coat. Officers (who have heretofore had to wear a heavy woolen black raincoat or nothing) now have a nylon-viscose khaki raincoat that weighs only a pound and a half. A similar coat has been developed for Waves and Nurses. The development of this coat has an interesting history, for at the time the problem was attacked by the Naval Clothing Depot prevailing opinion in civilian markets was that summer rainwear was best made of plastics and lightweight coated fabrics. The only trouble with them (and one totally unacceptable for Navy purposes) was that the wearer would get as wet from perspiration as from the rain. A fabric that would “breathe” and allow perspiration vapors to escape and yet keep out rain was not developed until a great many theories had been explored and problems overcome. The new coat has a special viscose rayon yarn for its filling or crosswise threads, and nylon in its warp or lengthwise threads. The filling yarn is stretched during manufacture so that after it is woven into the cloth it shrinks up and makes a very tight or dense fabric that effectively prevents the passage of large drops of water. The nylon gives the cloth amazing strength for its light weight. After weaving, the cloth is treated to repel water, but the treatment (unlike many commercial types) is relatively permanent and does not require a new application after every dry cleaning. Incidentally, both the enlisted men’s and the officers’ coats can be laundered or dry cleaned, and it is hoped that eventually all clothing can be similarly cleansed.
Very high on the list of clothing projects is one to develop a fabric for enlisted men’s dress blue uniforms that will overcome the disadvantages of wool melton which is now used. The new cloth should be launderable, wear well, and present a good appearance. If possible, the amount of wool in it should be reduced, as the price of wool has now risen so high that garments made from it are entirely unreasonable in cost. A fabric to replace the tropical worsted used in officers’ uniforms and shirts is also being developed under a project with the same general goals as the one for enlisted men. Both projects are very near to being completed.
A great many other clothing projects are under development, including a mildewcide for Navy shoes, shipboard footwear, cold weather hand coverings, auxiliary heating units for cold weather clothing, water repellent thread, and shrinkage control of woolen fabrics, to mention but a few. However, the amount of available funds only enables a few rocks to be knocked off the mountainous problem. Even so, this phase of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts research and development program is paying enormous dividends in both actual dollar savings and the great immeasurable benefits of increased morale and combat effectiveness.
III
So much for a brief résumé of the developments that have come out of the research program since 1945. Due to the difficulty of extracting accounting data prior to 1949, it is not possible to state accurately how much has been spent since the conclusion of the war, but the following gives an indication of the effort in recent years:
1952 |
$1,008,000 (requested) |
1951 |
475,000 |
1950 |
205,000 |
1949 |
400,000 (estimated) |
And for our first consideration: “Have the results justified the expenditure,” there can hardly be any other answer than “Yes, overwhelmingly.” The estimated dollars and cents savings in clothing expenditures alone more than justify the whole program. The increase in combat potential that may result from any single one of the supply engineering projects would justify many times the expenditures on the whole program.
The pertinent management problem thus becomes one of how much, if any, the research and development program should be expanded. Let us compare estimated 1951 Navy wide expenditures in various fields with the dollar value of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts research and development budgets in those fields:
Field of Activity |
Estimated Total Expenditures 1951 |
Research & Development Expenditures 1951 |
R&D Per cent of Total |
Clothing |
$75,000,000 |
$204,000 |
0.27% |
Food |
167,000,000 |
77,000 |
0.05% |
Supply Operations |
380,000,000 |
194,000 |
0.05% |
Total |
$622,000,000 |
$475,000 |
0.08% |
Admittedly the above figures are somewhat understated because they do not include the vast program of basic research carried on by the Office of Naval Research. In the many branches of that program (organic materials, applied mathematics, medical sciences, etc.) are many projects that directly further the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts program. However, basic research is usually cheap when compared to development, for the former frequently requires only brains and laboratory instruments, but the latter may require extensive tooling and production costs. It is scarcely possible to determine how much of our basic research budget can be legitimately allocated to the fields of activity listed above; however, it seems safe to assume that the percentages expressed above would in no case be increased more than 100%.
In a report prepared by Dr. Karl Compton for the National Research Council several years ago, an analysis was made of the relation of research expenditures to annual gross sales income of 181 companies. The median expenditure for research and development was 2% of gross sales income. The rates varied from 1% or less for textile and petroleum concerns to 3-4% for chemical companies. In 1950 E. I. du Pont de Nemours reportedly spent 2.9% of its gross sales income on research.
Comparisons between Navy research and development expenditures and those of industrial concerns must be taken with very great reservation for in both cases classification of expenses into “research” and “operating” categories are arbitrary and vary from company to company and from naval activity to naval activity.
Nevertheless, a further examination of the compilations submitted by Dr. Compton shows that in no instance is there a commercial company comparable to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts devoting as little as 1/13th of 1% of its gross income to the research into and development of its products and techniques. The figure in these instances closely approximates ½ of 1%. It therefore concluded that the present program of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts should be given enough funds to enable at least a six fold expansion.
As has been previously pointed out, the “research” budgets of the various Navy bureaus are mainly for “development.” Basic research is carried on by the Office of Naval Research. A very real problem arises because of this split responsibility: the funds allocated to each are mutually interdependent—and in fact there is a theoretical point at which the Navy will realize optimum benefits from its over-all program. For example, it is useless to allocate funds tor the development of techniques to apply an electronic computer to supply demand control point problems when the basic research to work out the mathematics of those problems has not yet been done. On the other hand it may be very poor administrative practice to work out a complete theory of fabric abrasion resistance and then fail to put that theory into practice because of inadequate funds for development.
It is almost impossible to determine precisely how many dollars should be put into basic research and how many into development in order to realize the maximum increase in combat potential. It is known that basic research is comparatively cheap (Du-Pont last year devoted 15% to 20% of its funds to basic research and 80% to 85% to development), but it is almost impossible to allocate on a legitimate basis the funds the Navy spends on basic research to the same problems on which it spends money for development. We can definitely say, however, that there is a large body of basic knowledge that has not yet been applied to the development program of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and in this respect our budgetary allocations are out of balance.
Let us turn from the fiscal aspects of research to other questions that the Navy as a whole must answer with unassailable logic if the goal of maximum combat effectiveness is to be realized.
The most frequent question propounded by the average officer has to do with consolidation of effort by the military services. Clothing research, for example, is carried on by the Army at Philadelphia and Lawrence, Massachusetts, by the Air Force at Wright Field, and by the Navy at Brooklyn and Philadelphia. Why not, one might ask, combine these activities into one central laboratory with its resultant advantages of more extensive equipment and personnel resources?
There is no simple answer. Increased laboratory size brings increasing efficiency of equipment and personnel utilization—but not necessarily increased output. If the laboratories to be combined are in themselves large enough to have all required laboratory instruments and specialized personnel to accomplish their mission, combining them may seriously cripple the individual programs. To the evils of greater administrative paperwork and pyramiding of personnel is added the loss of morale as the individual scientist becomes a smaller and smaller cog in a larger and larger machine. But the greatest disadvantage is loss of contact with operational requirements and problems. In fact, the greatest single problem facing most military research laboratories today is that of understanding the requirements of, and maintaining contact with, operating forces. Up until three years ago it was customary for the Naval Clothing Depot to manufacture experimental garments in the laboratory, send them out on field expeditions, and then in corporate into next year’s improved models the comments made by the operating forces. Captain Walter F. Prien, (SC), USN,(at that time Supply Officer in Command of the Depot) recognized the fallacies in this approach and took action to see that the great gap between laboratory development and operational testing was practically abolished. Since then clothing technologists have worked with the operating forces, developing garments on the spot and altering them where necessary. Operating forces have actually assisted in these developments, with the net result that the time required for evolution of practical garments has been cut by years. It has already been found that the Navy is so large an organization that we must have clothing specialists if the research program is to meet operational requirements. A submarine clothing technologist may have a general knowledge of aviation clothing, but could scarcely understand all the problems of the operating forces. Remembering that these technologists must be under the supervision of someone with a good knowledge of all the problems involved, it is clear that if we combine the laboratories of all the military services the problems of each will become so complex that no one man can effectively administer the whole. Research must be responsive to, and thoroughly cognizant of, operating problems—and it will not be and cannot be if we require all military clothing research to be carried out in one laboratory under the direction of one man.
The same thing holds true in supply engineering, commissary, and logistics research. Movement of materials to a task force is totally different from movement to an infantry regiment on the battlefield; feeding a submarine crew is quite different from feeding that of a battleship, or a bomber, or a field headquarters company.
At the present time we prevent duplication of research effort by assignment of responsibilities through the Research and Development Board. With increasing experience it is natural that these cognizance assignments will become more and more realistic and efficient—that individual problems will be severally handled while joint problems are attacked in central laboratories.