demonstrating power beyond the borders of a state, navies demonstrate that state’s economic potential, intimidate adversaries, and can provide direct aid to friends and allies. Gorshkov learned from Western examples that a government most frequently calls upon its navy to respond to a crisis or to make an overseas political-military statement. President Ronald Reagan stated that “the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union” is its belief that it has a “historic right to use force to export its ideology.”8
A fourth indirect influence of ideology is that it provides the historical setting for a regime that seized power in the Soviet Union, and the only real source of legitimacy for the regime that maintains control over an empire and
the leadership which used every cutthroat method mi nable to seize and maintain that power. By their own tions, the Russians who consolidated the gains ^rorn^ revolutions of 1917 have tied this ideology to a party then tied that party to their government.
Legitimacy depends upon the fulfillment of * e^ scriptive predictions contained in the ideology. 1 ‘1C P jy and the government must be seen as working continu0 toward the eventual fulfillment of those ideologic^ P.^ dictions. Those efforts must, by definition, resultin ^ tory. The Politburo cannot openly accept the interna ^ ^ status quo without undermining the very legitimacy regime itself.
The Soviet Constitution provides no guidance or n
After years of studying the design and operation of the Soviet military and its weapon systems, it is my opinion that communist ideology strongly influences the Soviets’ military doctrine and the design of their weapon systems.
In Soviet military doctrine, ideology fosters the concept of a “nation-in-arms” as a basic tenet of Soviet life (i.e., the entire population must assist in the defense of the state). This means
not just the maintenance °
large military force, but goCj- militarization of the who ^r. ety, as well. This view a -y tures an offensive revoiu ^ spirit and gives rise to t cept of “deep operations
42
Proceedings
anothe °F trans^er °f power from one state leader to cja]s L°r ^or the length of service for its major state offi- p0Wer1S results directly from the party’s prevailing than )a^Ver 80vernment and the use of ideology, rather some i ’ as a source of legitimacy. This system raises funist1?61^1'11^ questions for the West. Since the Com- iti ti^g arty has yet to explain how it picks its leadership during 0t Peace> would the resulting scramble for power lea(ieKu-War a P'us or m*nus for the West if the Soviet
Sovigj rP-*S tar8eted? If the West goes to war with the oVertn*on> should one of its fundamental goals be to WarSaw p current Soviet leadership or merely to defeat Postwar aCt miIitary f°rces? What should the preferred World look like, and how can we use military
forces to achieve those objectives?
A fifth indirect influence of ideology is that by accepting party dictatorship, the Soviet populace has given the Politburo virtually complete freedom in the conduct of international relations. The Politburo is neither subject to oversight by an equally powerful legislature nor to the scrutiny of a domestic free press. The man on the street does not openly question the government’s political-military policies. Where are the Soviet people’s outcries against genocide in Afghanistan and the inhuman use of chemical warfare? The Politburo simply does not have to contend with either the number or the quality of critics which Western governments face when attempting to implement or formulate policy.
war must be started suddenly, to take the enemy by surprise and impair his ability to forestall the disintegration of his social and military system.
In light of this military doctrine, it follows that Soviet prin-
'^ieuk °f his society. Thus ctnne teaches that a
quic^i
Sid defeating the enemy b Vts dncentrated military Ser teeP *nto his territory fk'SruPt kjJn<L'crni'ne his defense S faSicS0fC°nomy: and shat
A
(Retired)
Ideology is the driving force behind the Soviets’ military doctrine, which stresses offensive mobility. This is reflected, for example, in the Soviets’ investment in surface effect ship and hovercraft capabilities, far beyond U. S. efforts in these areas.
ciples of warfare would stress the primacy of the offensive in waging war. At the operational and tactical level, this view is reflected in the emphasis on mobility, maintaining a high tempo of combat operations— and in the design of vehicles (including submarines, ships, aircraft, tanks, and missiles) often able to achieve higher speeds than comparable U. S. systems. It is also reflected in the Soviets’ emphasis on military engagements that concentrate forces to attain local battlefield superiority at decisive times and places, and in weapon system designs that emphasize firepower and mass producibility.
Before retiring from the Navy in 1982, Captain Kehoe served in three destroyers and three aircraft carriers, including command of the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753). Currently a partner in Spectrum Associates, Inc., of Arlington, Virginia, Captain Kehoe has written many features for the Proceedings, examining Soviet weapon system design practices and military capabilities.
Ju|y 1986
43