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io\yn bv tu improvements may be Pected r hC ^0viets- The Soviets can be "^aidless ° caP'tahze on whatever U. S. fluently ,kS tPey have identified. Conse- 'istic Z e. ^ov’et nuclear-powered bal- n0vv could' 6 submarine (SSBN) force threat pose an even greater strategic
Th
variety (^avy s ASW effort relies on a s°rs in™ acoustic and non-acoustic sen-
subma
titers a, aC^ Hole’ 's defined by astrono- sPace or^h11^'*3*6 obiect which exists in only Snpa ,° e ln space. Astronomers can U. s. x,culate about their locations. The Marine ,fV^also uses tbe term- Antisubareas ,n ? are (ASW) tacticians refer to is limited 6 ocean where ASW detection DUrin ?r nonexistent as black holes, has g"®the Pas‘ decade the U. S. Navy 3 result -;hm,pr0Ved lts ASW efforts. As finding j’f 6 So.v’et submarine force is its missi lncreasingly difficult to perform thanks. °^ undetected. Unfortunately, assume th-o Cf,Walkcr sPy ring, we must ^n°Wn hv uttlese improvements may be
Drr|arin a variety ot surtace,
()f the pr;e’ anc* aviation platforms. One the p.j „nciPal platforms in this effort is 'A'e an(j n°n aircraft. Compared to sur- 'deaUy SUS, marine Platforms, the P-3 is ?farches hZ! for lar8e area, open-ocean Stati°n Qll T1USe °h its ability to get on !'lllt'erousIC^ ar|d its ability to monitor i'tge „ s°nobuoys located across a
khr°u8hom8ruPhical area- Operating °aSed pat ,tbe northern Pacific, land- c°Ver ne ° IAP) aircraft can effectively Ployed s'y 3,1 the transit routes of de- I,°tVpc°Vlet submarines. Whether or an get on top of Soviet submarines once they have completed their transits and have arrived on patrol depends upon the distance from the Soviet patrol area to the nearest VP operating site. For example, a submarine on patrol halfway between Hawaii and California, approximately 1,100 nautical miles from each, is within the range of a P-3 operating out of either location. However, a submarine operating mid-way between Hawaii and Ecuador, approximately 2,200 nautical miles from each, and 1,400 nautical miles south of San Diego, would be able to minimize the on-station effectiveness of a P-3 operating from U. S. territory.
Soviet Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Trends: As the data in Table 1 indicate, successive generations of Soviet SSBNs have been equipped with increasingly longer range ballistic missiles. The relatively short range of the Yankee’s SS-N-6 missile requires it to come within range of existing VP operating sites in order to target the continental United States (ConUS). This is not true of the Delta class or the new Typhoon class. The range of the missiles carried by these later generation Soviet submarines permits patrol areas beyond P-3 range.
The P-3 is not the U. S. Navy’s only ASW search platform, but it is our most mobile one. The few remaining dedicated ASW platforms, such as our 44 Pacific Fleet SSNs, are unable to monitor all the possible operating areas of the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s 130-plus submarines.1 As a result, an ASW black hole has been created in the lower latitudes of the Northern
Pacific.
Soviet SSBN Patrol Areas: Until recently, there have been two good reasons for Soviet SSBNs to avoid the equatorial regions of the Pacific:
- Since the area is a long distance from home port, the SSBN spends more time in transit than actually on patrol
- There is no access to a friendly port in the event of an engineering casualty Events such as the September 1984 fire on board a Golf class SSB in the Sea of Japan and last year’s sinking of a Yankee class SSBN in the Atlantic are the most recent in a long series of major malfunctions afflicting the Soviet submarine force.2
The U. S. Navy’s improved ASW capability may force the Soviet SSBNs to look for new patrol areas which will increase their time away from home port. For example, a Soviet Delta sub which is within range of many CONUS targets immediately after leaving home port has limited effectiveness if our ASW forces are able to quickly detect and track it. In such a situation, the Delta’s best bet would be to transit to an area where U. S. naval forces have the least ASW capability. The Delta then could conduct at least a portion of its patrol undetected. The lower latitudes of the Northern Pacific provide the Soviet submarine with the opportunity to avert detection. The location of our existing VP bases, each with approximately a 1,200-nautical mile operating radius, leave the area relatively unguarded, thus attractive to Soviet SSBNs.
^akee
°elta I )c'ta li Qelta in
Number
Table 1 Soviet SSBNs and Associated Missile Ranges
In Operational
Range
"otal | (PacFlt) | Commission | Missile | (nautical miles) | |
18 | (9) | 1967 | SS-N-6 | Mod 1 | 1,300 |
|
|
|
| Mod 2 | 1,600 |
|
|
|
| Mod 3 | 1,600 |
18 | (9) | 1972 | SS-N-8 | Mod 1 | 4,240 |
|
|
|
| Mod 2 | 4,950 |
4 | (0) | 1974 | SS-N-8 | Mod 1 | 4,240 |
|
|
|
| Mod 2 | 4,950 |
14 | (7) | 1975 | SS-N-18 | Mod 1 | 3,530 |
|
|
|
| Mod 2 | 4,350 |
|
|
|
| Mod 3 | 3,530 |
2 | (0) | 1985 | SSNX-23 |
| 4,500 |
4 | (0) | 1982 | SSN-20 |
| 4,500 |
0nc‘°ssified Communist Naval Order of Battle, April 1986, page 1. Soviet Military Power 1987.
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CUPPERTON ISLAND (FR.)
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SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1987
The pictured ASW “Black Hole” lies beyond the range of California and Hawaii-based P-3s. If upgraded, Corinto, above, Nicaragua’s largest port, could become an emergency base in support of Soviet SSBN operations in the Black Hole. To cover this area, the U. S. Navy needs VP bases along the west coast of Mexico or Central America.
Soviet SSBNs operating in equatorial Pacific waters would still need a base for emergency repairs. There is strong evidence to indicate that this problem has already been partially solved. The value of having such a facility was demonstrated in November 1983 when a Victor III SSN surfaced off the southeastern coast of the United States after an emergency and was towed to Cuba for repairs.3 The Soviet Navy still has not gained access to an emergency base in the
equatorial regions of the Mid- or Western Pacific, although the Soviet government has been pursuing commercial fishing agreements since 1984 with the strategically located island states of Kiribati and Papua, New Guinea.4
Soviet Naval Expansionism: The Soviet Navy could gain access to its first emergency base in the Eastern Pacific— Nicaragua’s port of Corinto—owing to the consolidation of the pro-Soviet communist revolution in Nicaragua. Although there is yet no physical evidence that Corinto is now supporting Soviet naval operations, this appears inevitable. Soviet bases will be created in Nicaragua just as they were established in other Third World countries as a result of communist revolutions. Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and South Yemen are each examples of this Soviet expansionism.
Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay was converted into a fully operational Soviet naval base. Recently declassified aerial reconnaissance photos of this base, taken in December 1986, reveal the presence of one nuclear-powered submarine, two diesel-powered submarines, three surface combatants and four naval auxiliary vessels. Since the Communist takeover in
- CLfF*
d the
1975, the Soviets have increa^, number of piers from two to sc jets The United States expects, will be slightly slower in taking ^ in advantage of their political sUC , Nicaragua, because of Nicaragua ^1 imity to the United States. Betwe ^ 10 and 1984, the United States re*.^eS to direct military intervention 7/ 6
maintain its influence in the aIlA ( port At present, Corinto is a nio ^ to facility capable of
servicing Jjshed
medium-draft ships. A recently P . photograph of the Corinto ^ je(J showed the presence of three 5o^ gri merchant vessels, each displaC1l3A)OXv-tO' thousand gross tons, and moore gVj- stern along the wharf.7 From ^.^ul dence it may be concluded tha • any modifications, Corinto c013 jgS the bly accommodate Soviet auxi1
" ' " rePa,r
size of an Altay-class oiler, a class fleet tug, or an Amur-c a
Ship’ , f nnrt on
As Nicaragua’s largest por
coast, Corinto’s strategic
,bl°c
eitl>er
the
location t°onrfU-
Pacific makes it a likely jjng
ture
iu 11 idi\.CN n a uivvij — ^
Soviet construction and UP^
The first step in what promises^ slowly but steadily increasing
be 1
19»1
late |Q»4SenCe 'n Nicaragua occurred in ■he rnnf ’ Wjlen a 8ovict freighter began
CorintomndeliVery °f military carg° t0
these del- Unng the past 18 months, of Mi.n'Ver'es ^ave included shipments Prior to ins? Ml~25 armed helicopters.8 Were °4, most deliveries to Corinto ^ recent«y Eastern-bloc ships. Since out anv it °V'et ^Nivcries passed with- escalatin Puh>lic reaction, the next by a c n may he scheduling a port call or sendin'6' Intelligence Collector (AGI), supply ® an 0i*er out of Corinto to re-
Gastern Pacific61 AGI operatinS in the
8°viet fjCd *98(a '■ was reported that the SuPplier Hf011- ^ad become the principal NicaraSl]0, od ,0 Nicaragua because of its bad it j3 S. Inahility to pay for oil from Whether^3 ^at'.n American suppliers.9 deliverje • ° 8oviet ships making these Civilian”SmCe March 1984 are more hno\vn10 °r naval associated is untile a ay ^ difficult to demonstrate to bni°n • r'can public that the Soviet dava] e. ’vering oil to Nicaragua in Vesse|s J'CIate<J rather than “civilian” ■hay no( j. Cn again, the American public Wonted bh threatened, even when con- 8°viet i rd ev>dcnce. Therefore the an°ther (yCa at'°n might proceed until - ___ ype °f unarmed naval auxiliary, a submarine repair ship or ocean-going tug, shows up one day in Corinto. At this point the Soviets would probably stop escalating, congratulating themselves on their new ability to operate SSBNs in the Southeastern Pacific without ever introducing a naval combatant into Nicaragua.
The ASW "Black Hole”: The establishment of a submarine repair or rescue facility in Corinto would facilitate Soviet submarine operations in Pacific equatorial waters, but only in part. Because of the vastness of the Pacific—which is more than 5,000 nautical miles wide at the equator—even Corinto might be too distant to assist a Soviet submarine stranded in the equatorial regions of the Central or Western Pacific. Since the Soviet Navy does not have access to port facilities in that area of the Pacific, the next area most likely to be exploited for future SSBN patrols is off the coast of Central America in the Eastern Pacific. This area, located south of 10° north latitude and east of 130° west longitude, merits description as the U. S. Navy’s ASW “Black Hole.” The area is more than 1,000 nautical miles from the nearest sites capable of supporting VP operations in ConUS or Hawaii. However, from this area ConUS and Hawaii are both within range of the Delta I’s SSN-8. Although the P-3’s advertised combat radius is approximately 2,400 nautical miles, any operations near such a range would not leave sufficient time on station to conduct an ASW mission.11
Recommendations: Considering the possibility that Soviet SSBNs could patrol off the western coast of Central America within the next five years, the U. S. Navy should take several steps to strengthen our ASW capability in this area.
We need to obtain access to one or more sites along the west coast of Mexico or Central America for VP operations. The political sensitivities in this region to the presence of U. S. military forces dictate that such an arrangement would have to maintain a low profile. Several islands in the region could serve as alternatives. The Mexican territories of Guadalupe, Cedros, and Revillagigedo, the French island of Clipperton, Costa Rica’s Coco Island, and Ecuador’s Galapagos Islands would all be suitable locations. Both Revillagigedo and the Galapagos have existing airfields that may be suitable for P-3 operations. The Pacific VP community is accustomed to maintaining, supplying, and operating aircraft from such remote locations. For example VP aircraft have continuously operated at Diego Garcia and Cocos Island in the Indian Ocean and Midway and Wake Islands in
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the Pacific Ocean.
the
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The quality of relations between U. S. Navy and the host navies w affect our ability to establish sites, the military leaders exert great in in all Latin American governments, F ticularly in Central America. An ev sion of navy-to-navy personnel eXC j0ll programs with countries in the would also be appropriate. at.
Until access is gained to a vbeS ing site in the region, refueling P^j should be installed on all Pacl ^ area P-3s to facilitate operations into from ConUS and Hawaii.
As soon as possible, we
should beg‘n
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re-
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gion—involving surface ships, .[jy
ASW aircraft, submarines, and ? (0 the VP. Such exercises would lea oll
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the
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The Soviet Union has gained a t]
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a port on the Pacific coast o ^ .^g, America, and is using this port
used to
cofl'
duce weapons that are being goViet, solidate the power of a Pr° ^ ^t- Marxist-Leninist regime. It is °n ' gf the ter of time until the military ro 0it port of Corinto is broadened to ^ceSs the Soviet Navy. With additiona ^ to Corinto, the Soviet Navy in ^ area> five years might modify the P;*tr . je to of its Pacific fleet SSBNs and eaI]d reduce their vulnerability to detec c0uld tracking. Later, the Soviet [ike
establish a full fledged naval ujlity
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1Navy Times, 16 March 1987, p- 3t-
2Time, 1 October 1984, p. 40. ts0n '
2Facts on File Yearbook, (New York- '
1983 p. ^
4Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washing1-^
U. S. Government Printing Office). P- sNavy Times, 16 March 1987, p- 3 ■ ^ of1
6Richard R. Kolb, ‘“Restoring Order j
Border,” Proceedings, July 1984, PP- p.
7Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washing ^
U.S. Government Printing Office). P- jujy 19 'Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Advertiser’* w ' p. A-17. Honolulu Advertiser, 12 p. A-10.
9Time, 31 March 1986, p. 23. l0Newsweek, 2 April 1984, p. 40. World ii “Jean L. Couhat, Combat Fleets oft ^ x n. 6 - 87 (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval '
C-
Commander Hopkins is currently assig vflj fhg Squadron 17 as Tactics Officer. He is jn th£ Officer who has served operational {0 ^ 6u3.e
cific with Patrol Squadron 4 and in ^ gra<^ . with the Patrol Wing 1 Detachment. ,uated if of the U. S. Naval Academy, he also g ^ the Venezuelan Naval War College m
166
Proceedings
I Octobef