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There Are Alternatives to the Third Seawolf
Although attack submarine force levels are being reduced, the value of a third Seawolf is being questioned, and the cost of the Seawolf program continues to climb, the U.S. Congress now is considering the funding of a third nuclear-powered attack submarine of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class in the fiscal year 1996 budget. The principal reason for pursuing this submarine is to keep the submarine construction line open at the General Dynamics/Electric Boat yard. However, there may be more constructive ways to keep the yard “hot” while providing the fleet with more submarine capability.
The recent Department of Defense-sponsored Bottom-Up Review concluded that by 2000, the Navy’s attack submarine (SSN) requirement will be 55 submarines, thereafter possibly declining to 45 SSNs. There are now 84 attack submarines in commission—some already inactive and being prepared for disposal—and 8 SSNs under construction (see Table 1). Thus, by 2000, the Navy will have to discard at least 35 SSNs to meet the 55-submarine force level. The newest of these submarines being discarded was completed in 1981—a submarine with a 30- year service life that could be retained in service until about 2011. The result will be a tremendous loss of capital investment.
In this context, it “pays” to build new submarines only to advance our technology base or to preserve the industrial base. Two Se<m’o//-class submarines now are under construction and will not add significantly to the submarine technology base. A third Seawolf (the SSN-23) will not further that, and there is no need for an additional SSN to meet force-level goals. Rather, the third Seawolf is wanted to keep the submarine production line at Electric Boat "hot" until the planned New Attack Submarine (NSSN) is authorized in fiscal year 1998. (The Navy is allowing Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia to go out of the submarine business; that yard will retain a nuclear capability through its aircraft carrier work.)
In his briefing, “Reconstructing Naval Forces,” on 18 January 1994, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso stated that $900 million already had been made available for SSN-23 and that $1.5 billion was required to complete construction—an estimated total of $2.4 billion. The cost of the first
The Navy has a history of converting its submarines for different roles. The first U.S. ballistic-missile submarine, the George Washington (SSBN-598), was converted on the drawing board in 1957 to a missile submarine with the insertion of a 130-foot section.
two SeawolJs, which already are under construction, has increased over the past year, and. given the Seawolf program's track record, there is reason to believe that the third unit (not yet started) will increase beyond that estimate. The latest Seawolf cost increases, announced in January 199J, led to the reassignment of two rear admirals at Naval Sea Systems Command.
There are alternatives to building the third Seawolf that would keep the Electric Boat yard active. One would be to make use of the remaining service life—in some instances, almost 15 years—of Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines that will be stricken. The conversion of several Los Angeles SSNs to special-mission submarines could:
121
Proceedings / March 1995
No. | Class | Completed | Status |
SSN-637 | Sturgeon | 1967-1975 | 24 active‘ |
SSN-642 | transport submarines | 1965-1966 | 2 active |
SSN-671 | Narwhal | 1969 | 1 active |
SSN-683 | Parche (special mission submarine) | 1974 | 1 active |
SSN-688 | Los Angeles | 1976- | 56 active* 6 building |
SSN-21 | Seawolf | 1996- | 2 building |
'Some currently being deactivated.
The attack submarine Parche (SSN-683) was converted during 1987-1991 to a deep-sea search/recovery submarine with the addition of a 100-foot section.
>■ Keep Electric Boat producing outfitted submarine hull sections > Increase fleet capabilities
>■ Recapture some of the tremendous investment in these submarines.
Various “inserts” could be made to SSN-688s to convert them to specialized submarines for Tomahawk missile launch, mine-laying, carrying underwater vehicles and recovery systems, and other combat or support roles. Such a program, at a cost of perhaps $500 million per submarine, could fund the conversion and refueling of three SSN-688s to specialized roles (i.e., using the $1.5 billion or more needed to complete the SSN-23). Three such specialized submarines would enhance U.S. submarine force capabilities far more than would a third Seawolf.
In addition, more than the $1.5 billion that has been identified as needed to complete the SSN-23 may be available for such an endeavor. Admiral Kelso identified $900 million as already having been spent on the SSN-23, but the Congressional Research Service has identified a formal obligation of only $678.7 million as of 1 January 1995.' Of that amount, only $382.5 million actually has been expended. Thus, another $500 million or more actually could be available—less some amount for contract cancellations—for SSN-23 alternatives.
The concept of converting submarines to different roles, including the insertion of major hull sections, has been used by the U.S. Navy for more than half a century. For example, at the end of World War II, several diesel-electric submarines were converted to the radar picket role by the insertion of 30-foot hull sections and other changes.
The best-known U.S. submarine “conversion” was the addition of a 130-foot section to the Skipjack (SSN-585) design to
produce the first U.S. ballistic missile submarines of the George Washington (SSBN-598) class. More recently, the attack submarine Parche (SSN-683) was converted in 1987-1991 to a deep-sea search/recovery submarine with the addition of a 100-foot section. The Soviet Navy also made major modifications to nuclear-powered submarines. For example, three of their early Polaris-type submarines of the Yankee (Project 667A) class were reconfigured as cruise-missile carriers with a new, elongated midships section inserted. These submarines each can carry some 40 of the SS-N-21 land-attack missiles, similar to the
U.S. Tomahawk (the Russian designation for the missile is RKV-500 Granat).
The SSN-688 design can accommodate conversion because of its large size and powerful nuclear propulsion plant. The design, development, and production of three (or more) such conversions could provide Electric Boat with significant work pending the New Attack Submarine project and would provide the fleet with more capabilities in several combat areas than would one additional SSN. Although considerable funds already have been expended on components and systems for the third Seawolf, much of that material could be employed as spares for the first two Seawolfs and for training.
The conversion of three specialized submarines would require higher operating costs than a single Seawolf, but a case should be made to Congress that the Navy requires more than 45 to 55 attack submarines in the post-Cold War era, that the conversions will enhance naval capabilities for a relatively small investment, and—perhaps most significant—that the Navy can make use of the remaining service life of at least some of the excellent SSN-688s that otherwise would be discarded.
'Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Issue for Congress,” CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 January 1995), p. 3.
“What If...”
Our ship’s safety officer was very diligent in his duties and enjoyed playing “what if’ as a teaching method. While in our steering room chastising a young petty officer for not having the proper fire watch equipment while using a cutting torch, he asked, “What if these rags caught fire and you didn’t have the extinguisher down here?’
“I’d go up the ladder and get one, sir,” was the petty officer’s reply.
“What if the ladder was blocked?” asked the safety officer.
“I’d use the escape trunk, sir,” came the reply.
The safety officer was becoming annoyed at this point. “What if this space didn’t have a damned escape trunk?”
“In that case, sir,” the petty officer remarked, lighting the torch, “you’d better show me where you want one.”
Randall L. Adkinson
122 Proceedings / March 1995
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