With comments by PROFESSOR P. R. ALGER, U.S.N., and COMMANDER B. A. FISKE, U.S.N.
The means of attack and defense of a battleship are: the gun, the torpedo, and the ram; the last two, of course, are only occasional weapons; a special importance must not be denied to the ship's engines, for only engines of high power can assure an effectual use of the weapons. If the conning tower represents the brains of the ship, the engines may with equal justice be called its heart.
The chief weapon of the battleship was, and still is, the gun, at present the heavy 30.5-cm. gun—the more of these guns a battleship has, the better.
The leading aim in battleship construction is to obtain the maximum effective fire of the entire battery on the broadside. Tactically this effort may be thus expressed: The enemy will be kept abeam when possible, to obtain the best use of this battery.
Within the broadside arc of train of 90° (eight points), 450 forward and 450 abaft the beam, the maximum number of guns Can be brought to bear; this fact influences every tactical maneuver. If either of these extreme bearings be passed during an engagement a part of the battery must cease firing, which is naturally equivalent to lessening one's own fire.
Keeping the enemy abeam is, however, not only the best Offensive, but also the best defensive position. The longitudinal and vertical errors of guns are much greater than the lateral errors; a ship with the enemy on the bow offers a target of greater height than on the broadside on account of the conning tower, bridges and other upper works.
In this position, as the middle of the target presented will generally be aimed at, the longitudinal and vertical dispersion will have a larger area for accidental hits, for shots will hit that would otherwise pass over the ship. The conning tower, in this case, becomes a "catchall." With the broadside turned to the enemy, this height and the depth in range of the target presented is less than with the enemy on the bow; and therefore chance hits due to longitudinal and vertical dispersion will be reduced to a minimum. In broadside fighting, not only can the greatest possible number of guns be brought to bear, but the probability of chance hits is lessened.
[While it is true that under some conditions a ship bows-on offers a better target than when broadside on, it is thought that the author greatly exaggerates the disadvantages of the latter position. The bow presentation offers a higher but narrower target than the broadside presentation, and from that point of view is easier or harder to hit according to the relative values of the vertical and lateral mean errors of the gun, the relation between which errors varies with the range. When firing at a directly approaching ship the lateral errors of gun fire should be small, but, on the other hand, the range is changing most rapidly. Bows-on, the hits are much more likely to be glancing, and more- over a waterline hole near the bow is less important than one on the broadside. The conning tower, forward turret and fire control station as a group are the natural point of aim, and offer the same target whatever the presentation of the ship. This refers to gun-fire only; the broadside offers an enormously better target for torpedoes than the bow.]
The same thing holds true for several ships maneuvering in formation. The best battle formation is therefore the simple exact column; mass formations are fundamentally bad, because a compact mass is favorable to wild shooting by the enemy; and, besides, it would result in a reduction of one's own fire, on ac- count of the unavoidable masking of the fireof some of one's own ships while executing evolutions.
As victory is not won merely by shooting, but by hitting, it is essential to so maneuver as to avoid frequent changes of target— after the range has once been obtained.
This can most readily be done by taking up a position abreast the enemy, at a favorable range, on a parallel or nearly parallel course.
A restless conduct of a battle, caused by constant turns, or by the execution of maneuvers, which require large changes of course, makes it necessary to find the range anew, after every change; and thus prevents the attainment of what is wanted--a continuous and intense fire.
{FIG. 2.}
[Changes of range embarrass both sides equally, but changes of bearing caused by turning are detrimental only to the side turning.]
One's own fleet can always change the range by small changes of course not evident to the enemy, for example, one point at a time. These movements should be made without signals; the leader of the column turns gradually toward or away from the enemy; and the other ships follow in his wake.
As the change of distance is accurately known to the one making it, he can renew the engagement sooner than the enemy; he must merely to avoid "cease firing" carry out changes of course very gradually; the fire control stations, the battery or other gun commands will be informed of the desired changes of range at the proper time by a message "Range is increasing" or, "Range is decreasing." It is therefore evident that if A (Fig.2) is not to drop behind B in a broadside fight using broken courses, must have a slight advantage in speed.
[If B adopted the same tactics, no advantage would result to either side. The real usefulness of the plan of turning very slightly towards an enemy in parallel column lies in its preventing a faster enemy from increasing the range (see "The Fast Wing," United Service Magazine, Jan., 1907.)]
To obtain a certain distance, the side attempting to open distance must turn away from the enemy, and hold him within the after bearing (45° abaft the beam) of the forward turret, in or- der to keep up the fire from all his guns; to decrease the range, he must turn toward the enemy; but cannot get outside of the extreme forward bearing of the after turret, in order not to lose a large part of the effective fire from his own guns. These limiting bearings of 45° forward and abaft the beam impose the condition that the fundamental position (a course parallel to the enemy) must not be changed more than 45° (4 points) to star- board or-to port.
If A be faster than B, he can always regulate his range after getting it; the slower B, no matter how he maneuvers, cannot prevent A from carrying out his design. The greater A's superiority in speed, the sooner he can carry out his purpose. Even if B turns away eight points, A will follow, and over take him.
[But unless the difference of speed is beyond probability, the slower fleet can maintain a constant range by the method just mentioned for a period long enough to produce decisive results.] It is essential, in carrying out the scheme of evoluting in exact column as a battle formation, that the commander-in-chief shall be at the head of the column; he leads his fleet to and regulates the most favorable range for battle, in the manner already explained. He would not be able to do this from a position near
the middle of the column; in this case, he would be just as much under the enemy's fire as at the head of the column, with the additional disadvantage that be could not make his plans known to the head of the column fast enough; and, in case a lucky shot carried away his signal mast, he would lose command during the rest of the action. From a position abreast the column on the side opposite the enemy, he would not be able to control his fleet much better; and, eventually, on account of smoke from his own column, he would lose sight of the enemy. It is absolutely essential in a naval battle, where events follow each other so quickly, and every movement of the enemy must be observed and answered with the greatest accuracy, that the commander-in- chief should be at the head of the battle column.
[There is room for question as to the best position for the commander-in-chief in action. From the point of view of the preservation of the flagship it would be advantageous to have her lead in the case of the faster fleet and be the stern most ship in the slower fleet.
The author's objections to having the flagship abreast the column instead of in it do not seem to be of controlling force, as the commander-in-chief could probably see better from a point out- side the smoke of the firing ships than if his were one of them; certainly the other ships could see him better. The real question seems to be whether or not it is worth while to provide a special ship for this purpose.]
A fundamental principle of battle command is to use one's own fighting strength in its widest possible development; that is, to develop the strongest possible gun-fire while permitting the enemy to keep up the fire from only a small number of guns. To obtain this, an effort must be made to rake the enemy's column; for this, the T position is best suited.
From the T position, or one approximating to it, Fig. 4, the entire fleet can keep up a concentrated and continuous fire on the enemy's leading ship.
If the fundamental position (both lines parallel to each other) be not maintained, and the faster A wants to get ahead of and rake the slower B, B simply turns away; this results in both sides turning in concentric circles, the circumferences and radii of which are proportional. A, not with standing his superior speed, can never reach the T position. If A be only slightly superior in speed, the radii of both concentric circles are very large and only differ slightly from each other.
[This argument does not take account of the possible, or even probable, proximity of land, which might prevent the slower fleet from turning away.]
If A, however, be 6 knots faster than B, the radii will be smaller, and A can force B to make a loop. Such a marked difference in speed between modern fleets engaged in battle could hardly exist; nothing remains for A, therefore, but to bring about a great difference in speed, by attempting, on opening the engagement, to destroy the enemy's smoke pipes by a dense fire from his intermediate battery. If these be destroyed, or damaged, the boiler draught is lessened, the steam pressure falls; and the speed therefore decreases. If the head of the column stops, so must the following ships; in this way, one's own fleet might be able to reach the T position. It is quite possible that, by the development of the maximum intensity of fire at the very beginning of the battle, the opposing tactical formation may be entirely or partly broken up by a shower of hits. Even the slower B might do this, in so far as he shoots better.
[Funnel damage is not important so much because of its effect upon speed, which with forced draft would be but little affected thereby, but because of the effect upon the personnel of the escaping smoke and gases.]
As the moral effect of the first hits will surely be decisive, it must be accepted that the intermediate battery is still far from having played out its part in naval warfare. On the contrary, the gun of intermediate caliber, which, for example, can fire three shots (hardened common shell) of go to 100kg each in a minute, just at the opening of the engagement, even at 8000 yards distance, will have, not a perforating, but a decisive smashing effect.
The high rate of fire of this gun assures a quick determination of the range, by means of which the condition to get the range first is more nearly fulfilled.
Experience has also shown that a battleship with 22 knots trial speed may not be much superior tactically to a ship of the same sizewithabetterbatterybutwithaspeedofonly20knots. Superiority in gun power must be sought; a slower battleship can, by a more accurate and a more rapid fire at the very beginning of the fight, so injure a more rapid enemy that no further use can be made of a superior trial trip speed. The result of this is that, in new construction, too many sacrifices should not be made for speed. It is surely no disadvantage to provide a superior battery for a ship which has from 1 ½ to 2 knots less speed than
That of a probable enemy. For example, the battleship A, with a superiority in speed of 2 knots over B, will run about 60 m. more than B every minute; in ten minutes it will be ahead of B by about 600 meters, in an hour by about 3600 meters; the change is therefore very slow, during which B, by turning very slowly, can keep the faster A on the same bearing, and even win by more accurate shooting. A superiority in speed of even two knots is far from assuring success. Of two battleships of the same displacement, of which one is two knots slower than the other, the advantage rests with the slower one if it have a correspondingly better battery.
An increase in speed of two knots in a large ship requires an increase of machinery weights of about 600 tons—about the same as the weight of two 30.5-cm. turret guns with their ammunition. Superiority in speed is not decisive even from a strategic point of view. Suppose that the coastline of a sea power is 300 knots long, and the enemy's fleet suddenly starts to steam from one end of the coast to the other, it will mean a trip of is hours at 20 knots, and 13 ½ hours at 22 knots. Now, is it better to arrive 1 ½ hours sooner, or to have a corresponding superiority of gun power in place of this advantage in time? Surely superiority in gun power will be worth more in the following battle than two knots superiority in speed.
However the attack be commenced, whether on opposite courses (Fig. 6), or at an angle (Fig. 7), the opposing fleets will generally find themselves parallel to each other after the preliminary evolutions. By a frontal attack (in line), one has the advantage of turning one's broadside sooner than an enemy approaching in column from the opposite direction; this has the disadvantage, however, of only too easily keeping the commander-in-chief of A in the rear, in case B in Fig. 9, for example, should turn to starboard at the right time, and thus anticipate A's intention.
[In Figs. 8 and 9 B is capped and must complete his turn before A's gun-fire becomes effective or he will be under a great disadvantage. This illustrates the advantages which a frontal approach may have under certain conditions.]
Take two fleets A and B, of which A is the faster. Steering parallel to, and abreast of each other, A after a certain time will pass B, and will try to obtain the T position. If B does not turn away, but keeps straight on, and goes ships left about just as A has gotten well ahead and means to rake him, the two rear ships will be at the head of the columns, and B will now have the advantage in regard to getting the T position. Therefore even here, A's superiority in speed gives him no special advantage.
The A admiral can employ this maneuver in the example given in Fig. 9, in order to avoid holding a fatal position at the end of ins own column; he orders "slow speed, "lets B get ahead, and goes ships about, whereby he remains in the lead, while the B admiral will find himself at the rear of his column.
[Whichever fleet turns as suggested is under a tremendous disadvantage during the 3 or more minutes required for the maneuver.]
Eventually, an important part is played in battle by the rear Ships in exact column; therefore just as powerful ships should be placed in the rear as at the head of the column; in all cases, the weaker ships present must be placed in the center, if provision has not been made to group them in a separate formation. It seems essential that the rear ship should be a flagship, as its position is next in importance to that of the guide; therefore it must have the second in command aboard. This also facilitates a frontal attack (in line), as there is now an admiral in each wing.
If we consider the results of the already discussed tactical evolutions, it is evident that, while maneuvering in exact column on parallel courses, no advantageous tactical position can be gained merely by superiority in speed.
[The author does not take into account torpedo fire, which would certainly be most effective from the leading fleet.]
As the defeat of the head of the enemy's column is the first and chief aim of the attack, such a distribution of strength must be resorted to, in applying the principles of broadside fighting, that the head of the enemy's column will be held in a cross fire. For this, an effort must be made to sustain only a scattered fire from the enemy, while making use of one's own position to pour in a concentrated fire. For this purpose, armored cruisers can be used.
In doing this, however, the guns on the unengaged side of the enemy must not be given any opportunity to fire; one's own di- vision detached to surround the enemy must not go to the unengaged side of the enemy, but must try to obtain a cross raking fire by taking up a position either ahead or astern of the opposing column (for example, as in Figs. 11 and 12).
If the enemy be reported by the scouts, the problem of the armored cruiser division is to drive back the enemy's vedettes and eventually, after the battle with the scouts, to get into touch with the enemy's main body. The armored cruisers ought to have great speed, and if possible, have batteries superior to those of the opposing armored cruisers; therefore, guns of the heaviest caliber should be carried by these ships, of course in less number than on battleships.
The armored cruisers, united in a "flying division," can now prepare for their own attack, as, when the enemy is sighted, they can take up their most favorable battle position.
If the flying division should happen to be on that side of the enemy's main body which lies opposite to the intended direction of attack by its own main body (Fig. II), it must go, after the enemy turns to starboard (Position 2), or to port (Position 3), either to rear of or ahead of the enemy. The last change carried out by the enemy might be induced by an intention to attack the weaker part of one's own fleet (flying division). In both cases the enemy runs into a cross fire, and the flying division become "spotter" for its own main body at the same time; for example, hoisting a single flag might mean "Range too great," a flag of another color "Range too small." In Fig.11, also in those following, Position 1 shows the situation when the two main bodies sight each other, Positions 2 and 3, the situation on opening fire.
If the armored cruiser division should happen to be on the same side of the enemy as that from which its own main body attacks, it must never go ahead of the enemy after the latter turns away; passing ahead would require a long time; and, in addition, as its course would cross that of its own main body, would result in a masked fire. The flying division could, in this case, attack and rake the enemy from the rear. If, during the course of the battle, the ships go about, it again is ahead of the enemy. The flying division can do valuable service as spotter from the rear also. If the enemy detaches his rear ships to drive off the harassing flying division, he weakens his own main body; besides, the flying division can easily escape this attack on account of its superiority in speed.
If the entire enemy's fleet should turn away from "own main body" eight points, more or less, she will be now flanked by the armored cruisers in her rear (Fig. 12).
Similar conditions hold in Figs. 13 and 14,in which both main bodies sight each other dead ahead; and the flying division, after finishing its scouting work, finds itself ahead of the enemy.
If the flying division be not sent out on scouting duty, it can steam in column abreast the main body (Fig. 15); and, at the very beginning of the engagement, pass ahead in order to rake the enemy's head; to do this, it must have superiority in speed of 5 knots and over. Therefore, while speed is not tactically important to the battleship, it is of great value to the armored cruiser.
The purposely assumed opposing formations in a single column show the risk a fleet runs in not thinking out favorable tactical positions. A fleet is also at a great disadvantage, which has no armored cruisers to shake off the attacking armored cruisers.
[The foregoing arguments suppose one fleet to be superior to the other, since only one has a "flying division." If each fleet has the same number of ships, the one composed only of battleships must be regarded as the stronger. The scheme of spotting by a detached squadron in battle seems utterly impracticable. For a discussion of the possible use sofa detached squadron see "The Fast Wing," United Service Magazine for Jan., 1907.]
If both fleets have armored cruisers, a separate battle between these divisions is not improbable; this separate battle would probably precede the great tactical battle as a "scouting fight."
Light cruisers, and torpedo boat flotillas take up a position far in the rear before the battle; they serve as a support for their own damaged ships which fall behind, as well as to entirely destroy the enemy's damaged ships which have fallen out. If the battleships go about, these light divisions again take up a position in the rear (Fig. 16). If there be hostile light divisions within the battle area, their chief problem, is to destroy them.
It is not improbable that during the action between the two main bodies, separate fights will take place between the cruiser divisions; the battle of Tsushima offers an example of this, during which the Japanese main body fought the Russian battleships while the Japanese light divisions attacked the Russian cruisers and transports.
If, in the first attack, the enemy is caught in a cross fire, he will hardly be able to again escape from this position. Every movement he makes to escape the cross fire is repeated by all of one's "own divisions" simultaneously, following the motions of each division or squadron commander without waiting for a signal, in this way carrying out the plans of the commander-in-chief (Fig.17). The separate divisions, while remaining true to the principle of concentration of fire in connection with a scattered hostile fire, must not get too far away from each other; and must not take up positions in which they would be firing toward each other. The complete destruction of the enemy's ships which have fallen out must be entrusted to one's own light cruisers; in this way, an increased superiority in fire is obtained over the remainder of the main body.
If, for example, one's own main body, consisting of three divisions, should find it self in a position to rake the enemy (Fig. 18), and the latter should turn toward one's own rear, in order to double on it, it would seem more advantageous for only the two leading divisions to go ships about, and for the third division to keep straight on, thus covering one's own turn by its fire, as firing cannot be kept up during the turn; in this way, a pause in firing will be prevented. When the two first divisions hay, formed again, the third division joins by a simultaneous turn. It is therefore recommended that the commander of the second division designate the proper place for the third division when the ships form.
The enemy would never head as supposed, as he would thus be assuming a "capped" position.]
The exact column and the temporary line or echelon arising from simultaneous turns amply suffice for carrying out battle tactics in conformity with the explained principles. If the leading and the rear ships be flagships, they are in the wings during temporary formations.
The only evolutions needed are countermarches and simultaneous turns; extended formations, additional columns, double echelons, wedge formations, double line and squares are rendered unnecessary. Naturally, these battle tactics demand continuous practice in time of peace.
The freedom of method of evolutions in exact column offers the additional advantage that very few signals will be needed. Countermarches require no signals; these are only necessary for simultaneous turns. Special formation signals are not required, as all formations are temporary, resulting from simultaneous turns from exact column. Besides, special signals would only be necessary to transmit special orders to the division commanders; even here only a few would be needed, as such orders are general, such as "Attack the van, rear, right or left wing, Circle, etc." For this, hoisting a single flag or a pennant suffices; in exceptional cases a two-flag hoist might be needed. No rare position signals necessary; the division commander receives an order and takes up the bearing and position which he considers most favorable for carrying out the battle plan. If the personnel of the fleet be properly trained, the purpose of the commander-in-chief is inferred from a brief order of this kind.
[Signals may not be required when the countermarch is made from the head of the column, but it would seem dangerous to countermarch simultaneously from the heads of the divisions, without some preliminary signal or notice, especially if the formation is a close one.]
It is a fundamental principle in the formation of divisions and squadrons that all ships which are to maneuver together should be of the same type in the greatest possible degree, so as to have no appreciable difference in battery effect, division speed, and steering qualities. Types of ships which are out of date should form a reserve squadron.
With reference to the number of battleships to be assigned to one division, a narrow limit need no longer be continued, be- cause many formations are no longer required; and with evolutions in exact column, in connection with countermarches or simultaneous turns, it is quite indifferent whether three or more ships make up a division.
England has in her maneuver squadrons from four to five ships in a division; the United States of North America, generally four. Germany formerly built four ships of the same type; but has always built five since the adoption of the latest naval program. Italy, judging by her new construction, has raised the number of ships in a division from three to four. A certain number of battle- ships of the same type exist today; if it be desired to increase the number of ships in a division, it would be a mistake to add older ships. Armored cruisers of the same building period, with the same thickness of armor and armed with the same caliber of, but less guns, as the battleships at present under discussion, offer a remedy to a limited extent. An eventual, slight superiority in speed of these armored cruisers over battleships of the same age is not of so much importance. In accordance with this principle, the St. Georg would be placed in the Erzherzog Karl division, but the Kaiser Karl VI would be in the Habsburg division.
With reference to the battle range, it should be stated that this generally depends on the effective range of guns and torpedoes.
The least range that can be used is that a little in excess of the range of the enemy's torpedoes; the maximum range of the enemy's type of torpedo is therefore the minimum battle range to be used in a fleet action. According to present conditions, this should be fixed at 3500 meters; but in the near future it will probably reach 4000 meters.
[It must not be forgotten that for fleets on parallel-courses, effective torpedo range is very much greater for the leading fleet than for the rear one. Also the range assumed by the author is that of the torpedo at a speed near its maximum; at reduced speed the torpedo range is very much greater, and advantage can be taken of this fact by the leading fleet.]
It is not so easy to decide upon the maximum fighting range; this is limited, in the first place, not only by the distance at which good spotting is possible, but also by the distance at which the range finder still gives reliable readings; the practice is, to Place this at from 7000 to 7500 meters. The effective ranges of guns are also most important; the following table shows this for the 30.5-cm., 45-caliber gun, with a projectile weighing 445 kg., initial velocity 800 m., and a muzzle energy of 14,700 mt.
Distance in Meters Final Velocity in Meters Penetration of K.C. Armor in mm.
4000 633 351
5000 594 311
6000 558 283
7000 520 251
It is evident that, with this powerful type of gun, capped shell can be used with advantage at even over 7000 meters, as even beyond that distance the final velocity is somewhat greater than 500 meters. With reference to the penetration of an enemy's armor belt 250 mm. thick, 7000 m. seems the maximum battle range. If it be considered that the thickness of the armor belt of the ships being built is from 270 to 300 mm.; further, if oblique impact be considered, the practicable maximum fighting range becomes from 5500 to 6000 meters, in order to still expect good results from armor-piercing projectiles of a 30.5-cm. gun.
If perforating effects be abandoned, hardened common shell, with their large bursting charge, would have a powerful smashing effect even at a far greater distance; and the effective fighting range could, in this sense, be increased even to 8000 m; the question must be asked, however, whether this great range can bring real advantages. It is well known that the errors of guns increase with the range; and small unavoidable errors—for instance, that due to the rolling of the ship decrease the probability of hitting more and more as the distance increases. Inaccurate spotting accompanies inaccurate shooting; so that, besides the necessarily slow fire from heavy guns, getting the range will take so long, that not only is a long time required, but also a great expenditure of ammunition. So that even for smashing effect it is an advantage not to get farther away than 6000 meters, in order to waste as little time as possible.
In order to obtain the greatest number of hits possible, it is necessary to envelop the enemy in a continuous shower of shots, for it is only through accurate observation of a continuous fire that conclusions can be reached about the certainty of hitting; that is, it can then be decided whether the range has been found or not. Take, for example, a ship which can use eight 30.5-cm. guns (Dreadnought type) on the broadside, and whose aimed regulated rate of fire is one shot every two minutes, in ten minutes after opening fire 40 shots will be fired; allowing JO per cent of hits—a very high rate for war time – 4 hits are made in the first ten minutes of battle. Now, compare with this an equally large and just as strongly armored ship, which carries on the broadside six 30.5-cm. and six 19-cm. guns. With the same rate of fire from the heavy guns, and a rate of 5 shots in two minutes for a 19-ciTh gun in aimed and regulated fire, in ten minutes after opening fire, 30 shots from the 30.5-cm. and 150 shots from the 19-cm. guns will be fired. Allowing to percent of hits with both classes of guns, three hits with the 30.5-cm. and 15 hits with the 19-cm. guns will be obtained. But if the 30.5-cm. gun actually makes 10 per cent of hits, no mistake will be made in giving twice that percentage to the 19-cm. gun, because, on account of the higher rate of fire, the range can be obtained more rapidly, and the tune up to the next change of distance could be better used; we can, therefore, in our case, take, instead of 15, possibly 30 hits with the 19 cm. gun.
[The assumption that the 19-cm. gun fires five times as fast as the 30.5-cm. is entirely untenable,— twice as fast is very much nearer the truth. Neither is it correct to allow twice as great a percentage of hits for the 10-cm. as for the 30.5-cm., even supposing, as the author does, that the fire of each class of gun can be regulated separately. At such ranges as the author is considering, the accuracy of the larger gun must be the greater of the two.]
It must also be remembered that the ships' crews are not dummies, but are made up of men with nerves and a decided instinct of self-preservation; the moral effect will therefore be vastly different, whether the ship is hit only four times or thirty-three times in the first ten minutes of battle. Their-cm. hits will, of course, mean no catastrophe; and no armor penetration must be expected from these guns at a range of 6000 m.; therefore, by raising the mean point of impact, an endeavor must be made to obtain a smashing effect against the control stations, the smoke Pipes, and the superstructures.
In twenty minutes of battle, the first ship would make 8 hits with her 30.5-cm.guns, the second, 6 hits with her 30.5-cm., and 60 hits with her 19-cm. guns. It would be hard to decide whether two hits more with the heavy guns would be worth more than
60 hits with the 19 cm. guns. It is certain that, as far as moral effect is concerned, the numerous 19-cm. hits would have a very demoralizing effect. The ship with an intermediate battery also has more chances of damaging the enemy's control stations, telegraph and telephone apparatus at the very beginning of the fight.
[The comparison should be between eight 30.5-cm. hits on the One hand and six 30.5-cm. and less than twelve 19-cm. hits on the other. The fact that exposed positions and apparatus can be disabled by small projectiles is a better argument for the retention Of the small R. F. guns on battleships than for the use of guns as large as the 10-cm. It must also be considered that the greater the number of guns the greater the complexity and consequent liability to damage of the fire control system.]
With regard to the maximum battle range of about 6000 yards for the 30.5-cm. gun, it will be necessary, even for a ship mounting only heavy guns, to rather lessen than increase the range, in order to increase the probability of hitting, and to defeat the enemy quickly, for the stronger will avoid a long and halting battle with the weaker so as not to give the latter much opportunity for chance hits. At 6000 meters and less, the intermediate battery is offered many targets, not to perforate but to destroy, which affect the enemy's fighting capacity. For this required quick and complete destruction, the 12-cm. and 15-cm. guns no longer serve; the best for this purpose is the 19-cm. gun; greater calibers fire too slowly. If it be desired to lower the enemy's speed by damaging his smoke pipes, as was mentioned in the be- ginning when treating of tactical advantages, mounting intermediate batteries on battleships is absolutely essential. The following tables show, for a 19-cm., 45-caliber gun, with a projectile weighing 90 kg., 870 m. initial velocity, and a muzzle energy of 3600 nit., no useful penetration at 6000 m., therefore hardened common shell, with their large bursting charge (6.5 kg.) are of great service as smashing projectiles.
Table for a 24-cm., 45 caliber gun.
Distance in Meters Final Velocity in Meters Penetration against K.C. Armor in mm.
4000 558 120
5000 494 102
6000 439 86
7000 390 72
If, instead of the 19-cm. gun, a 24-cm. gun be used as an auxiliary, great disadvantages result. As a heavy gun, the 24-cm., in comparison with the 30.5-cm. gun, is far too weak; as an intermediate gun, it is too unwieldy and fires much too slowly, with the result that getting the range is as tedious as with the 30.5-cm. gun.
[The author's ideas as to relative rapidity of fire are wholly at variance with the results of recent experience.]
Table for a 24-cm., 45-caliber gun with a projectile weighing 215 kg., 800 m. initial velocity and 7000 mt, muzzle energy.
Distance in Meters Final Velocity in Meters Penetration against K.C. Armor in mm.
4000 583 167
5000 531 150
6000 494 132
As the table shows, the 24-cm. gun can be used at the close distance of 4000 m., but can no longer be used against a modern armor belt at a battle range of 5500 to 6000 m.; but, at the very best, against casemate armor. Now then, the question arises, whether it would be well to introduce, to solve special problems of this kind, a special heavy gun, which does not fire much more rapidly than the 30.5 cm. gun.
In order to obtain the greatest possible number of hits with the 30.5 cm. gun against the enemy's armored belt, the waterline must not be aimed at, because half of the shots, even with the right range, will fall short in accordance with the laws of dispersion; it is far better to aim at the middle of the whole target presented. There will be as many hits above as below the mean point of impact; that is, the hits with the 30.5 cm. guns will fall, on ac- count of the dispersion, not only on the armor belt, but also on the casemate armor. Bearing this in mind, the 24-cm.guncan be abolished for the destruction of casemate armor; and, in its place, the 19cm. gun, which is much more handy, and fires more rapidly, can be brought into use as a smashing gun.
The conclusion to the discussion of the effect of guns of different calibers at the most favorable ranges is that the most favor- able future battle range—with the condition that the introduction of heavier guns will also bring about heavier armor—will always be within the limits of good spotting, and favorable penetration, but outside the torpedo range; therefore it will be from 4000 to 6000 meters. Fighting at close range, by which is meant about 4000 meters, in order to avoid being hit by torpedoes, will also assure more speedy success to the side which has the more powerful battery. The battle of Tsushima offers the most recent and the best example of this. Although the English armored cruiser divisions, during the last fleet maneuvers, fought a battle lasting two hours at very large ranges, the mistake in this fight was that the firing, for this very reason, was wild; there is no proof here of the necessity of great battle ranges.
If the sketches of the batteries (Fig. 19) of the most recent types of large battleships be considered, it will be seen that England, Germany, and North America excel in heavy guns. The of the French Danton will be seen to have been unfortunate, according to the above-developed ideas, in the choice of the gun for the intermediate battery. The abundant use of the 20 cm. gun on the proposed Russian battleship is very striking. It is to be inferred that the Russians have adopted this battery as the result of their experience in the battle of Tsushima,
In which they learned the smashing and demoralizing effect of the intermediate battery. The information at hand about the new Japanese 19,000-ton battleships is of no value; it is rumored that the 30.5-cm. gun will not be the only one installed; and it is therefore possible that the Japanese will also adopt a large intermediate battery for their new ships.
[The assumed battery of the new Russian ship seems to be quite as hypothetical as that of the Japanese ship.]
(Note.—The latest information about the Japanese 19,000-ton ships, Satsuma and Aki, is that they will carry four 3o.5-cm. and twelve 25-cm. guns; the large armored cruisers Tsukuba and Ikoma have four 30.5-cm. and twelve 15-cm. guns; both types, besides, will be armed with 12-cm. guns, and five torpedo tubes each.)
If we now turn to the question of the batteries of battleships and armored cruisers, we must, in addition to the many arguments in favor of the principal gun, consider the armaments of the battleships of neighboring states, in order at least to aim at equality.
As a heavy gun, only the 30.5-cm. need be considered at present; for the enormous effect of this gun justifies its widest use. The question now arises, whether to install only heavy guns, or an intermediate battery as well.
Let us compare three ships of the same size, and same thickness of armor, but with different batteries (Fig.20). The total weight of the battery is the same in each case. It is easy to see the superiority in battery of B over A, also that of C over B. or A. Type A shows the most unfavorable battery scheme.
Type C has the following advantages:
1. The number of heavy guns that can be used on the broadside is the same in B and C; with reference to A, the number is also the same, as one 30.5-cm. gun is equal to, if not superior to, two 24-cm. guns.
2. In place of the heavy useless turret on the unengaged side, a considerable intermediate battery can be mounted on C without any increase in weight.
3. There are no high outboard turrets, whereby the ship gains in stability.
4. In a fight between B and C, C cannot only bring into action the same number of heavy guns as B, but four 19-cm.guns in addition: C, therefore, has a superior battery.
[If it is advantageous to exchange the two after broadside 30.5-cm. guns of B for the pair of 30.5-cm. guns in a turret on the middle line as in C, an equal advantage would result from putting the two forward broadside guns in another turret on the middle line forward. The comparison should therefore be between eight 19-cm. guns, four on each broadside, and two 30.5-cm guns in a middle line turret. Thus modified C would have a broad side fire greater than that of B by two 30.5-cm. guns.]
There are no special technical difficulties to be overcome in mounting three turrets in the keel line on a correspondingly long modern ship. The longitudinal framing suffers just as little as by the installation of two turrets in the keel line. With reference to the distribution of space below, the narrow ammunition passage of the middle turret can be located between the boiler and engine rooms, without making the steam piping too long.
The principal advantage of the three-turret system lies in the fact that every heavy gun can be used on the broadside (the chief battle direction); and it seems advantageous to obtain this to sacrifice a little in the distribution of space below. The bow and stern fire, which would have no value in the development of battle tactics, is, as before, represented by only one heavy turret. With reference to the arc of train, it is entirely satisfactory if the middle turret can be worked within the above discussed limiting bearings of the forward and after turrets; that is, from 450 forward to 450 abaft the beam.
[By raising the level of the two center middle line turrets, bow and stern fire may be doubled, as in. the South Carolina design, without diminishing the broadside fire.]
Four thousand to six thousand m. was decided upon as the most favorable battle range; the necessity of a close action (about 4000m.) was also shown. Both of these conditions justify the installation of an intermediate battery. Thus, if, as sketched in Fig. 20, the number of heavy guns can be reduced, without any loss of heavy broadside fire; and a numerous intermediate battery
be brought into action in addition, without increasing the dis- placement of the ship, superiority must without question be yielded to type C (Fig.20).
[No adequate proof of the necessity for close action. (about 4000 m. range) has thus far been given.]
The control stations, smoke pipes, super structures, boats, light bridge battery, etc., offer the 19-cm. guns a wide usefulness at great distances; at 4000 m. they will attack the least protected Parts of the enemy. Only hardened common shell must be used with this gun to produce its maximum destructive effect; for in that way penetration will be more advantageously replaced by the smashing effect.
[It is presumed that by the words translated "smashing effect" the author means the effect of the fragmentation of the shell on impact.]
In an interview, Admiral Rojestvenski stated that his crews Were totally demoralized by the fire from the Japanese intermediate guns. Hits in quick succession splintered and destroyed everything in their path, innumerable fires broke out, even the coat of paint began to burn; and the Russian ships looked more like seas of flame than fighting machines.
The Japanese are convinced by this that they owed a good mare of their victory to the success of the intermediate guns; they declare that at short range (3500 m.), there were no misses. It is of interest to mention here that the Japanese 15-cm. guns are not trained by a hand wheel, but by a special transmission through two pedals—as in a bicycle. The gun pointer sits in a spring saddle, with his feet bound to the pedals; one hand is on the elevating wheel, and the other on the firing key; his fore- head is pressed against a strong rubber buffer on the telescope; it is thus readily seen why these pointers did such splendid work; they were not only well drilled, but also bound fast to and formed one person with their guns.
[In considering the value of intermediate battery guns, the character of the probable target is of controlling importance. Against a properly armored ship of the design low generally ap- proved, having a homogeneous battery of 12" guns in turrets, intermediate battery guns would be quite ineffective.]
The 47-mm. and 37-mm. rapid fire and machine guns were not found efficient as torpedo boat defense guns in the Russo- Japanese war; the Russians stated that their effect was too small —their projectile was too light. Both the Japanese and the Russians consider that the 7-cm. gun will be the smallest that will be mounted on ships in the future; in fact, the new Japanese 400 ton destroyers will be armed with six 7.6-cm.(two long and four short) rapid fire guns.
Defense against the enemy's torpedo boats by means of shrapnel from the intermediate guns is very unsuccessful, because the range changes so rapidly that it is almost impossible to accurately set the fuse; and, besides, the fragments have even less effect thanwiththe47-mm.gun. The torpedo boat must therefore be attacked with effectives hell from rapid fire guns. The 7-cm. gun with a projectile weighing 5 kg. is the lowest limit; the highest is determined by the handiness of gun and projectile. The 15 cm. and the 12-CM. guns need no longer be considered, because their fixed ammunition was too heavy; and for service and safety reasons, they became again separately loaded guns. The proper anti-torpedo boat gun, however, requires fixed ammunition, as well as semi-automatic breech closure, in order to maintain a rate ofabout20shotsaminute. The largest caliber which fulfills these conditions is the 10.5-cm. gun; with a projectile weighing 18 kg-, the fixed ammunition would weigh about 25 kg. It is well to remember that this weight of fixed ammunition might be too heavy for a long continuance of fire; and the gun's rate of fire might easily be decreased on account of the weariness of the loaders.
It can be safely said that a shell weighing 10 kg., with an initial velocity of goo m. will suffice for defense against torpedo boats for a long time; it is therefore reasonable to give the preference to this particularly handy ammunition. A caliberof9cm. corresponds to this weight of shell; the fixed ammunition would weigh 15 kg.
[The use of shrapnel, or even possibly canister, from the heavy guns as a defence against attacking torpedo boats, seems worth consideration.]
Destroyers will continue to be built larger and stronger; and must, in a short time, merge with the Scout Type; the inter- mediate battery (19 cm.) will serve to attack these ships which are provided with a protective deck. The io.5-cm. gun is too weak as an intermediate gun; and too heavy for an anti-torpedo boat gun; it has the same thankless role as the 24-cm. gun. If there are 19-cm. guns aboard, the anti-torpedo boat guns need no longer play an auxiliary part as intermediate guns, and—as already explained—the particularly handy 9-cm. gun can be installed as an anti-torpedo boat gun in place of the 10.5-cm. If as many 9-cm. guns were mounted as 10.5-cm. were proposed, the saving in weight would permit a double allowance of ammunition to be carried. The existing data on these two light calibers are given for comparison.
10.5 cm., 45-Caliber 9 cm., 45-Caliber
Caliber 105 mm. 90 mm.
Weight of gun 2000 kg. 1600 kg.
Weight of carriage and shield 2800 kg. 2300 kg.
Weight of projectile 18 kg. 10 kg.
Weight of fixed ammunition 25 kg. 15 kg.
Weight of allowance (200 rounds) 5000 kg. 3000 kg.
Initial velocity 850 m. 900 m.
Seven-cm., 45-caliber (66 mm.) guns belong on the bridge decks and in the tops; in future, guns of less caliber will not be used.
Fig. 21 illustrates a type of modern battleship in accordance With the ideas herein developed; both torpedo tubes and ram are retained, in order to permit the captain to use these weapons when possible.
Fig. 22 illustrates an armored cruiser; Fig. 23, a modern destroyer.
The use of the armored cruiser both before and during battle has already been explained; the supplementary type is the large
{Diagrams}
destroyer, which has not only its own special work, but must also be used as a scout and for general information service.
Armored cruisers should have a high speed above all things; their armor protection must be heavy enough to make it possible for them to take part in the general engagement. However, their batteries should only be of such a character as will permit them to act as a support to the battleships taking part in the action. As an example, the action of the second Japanese division, under the command of Vice-Admiral Kamimura, in the battle of the Sea of Japan is given: This division consisted of six armored cruisers (Asama class); and did not carry heavy guns; never- the less, they were kept in the formation on account of their defensive strength (178 mm. armor); and supported with great effect, by an overwhelming fire from their 20-cm. and 15-cm. guns, the fire from the heavy guns of Togo's battleships.
The intention has frequently been discussed to locate the principal guns of an armored cruiser aft; and, since the beginning of the year, various experiments have been made by England with the cruisers Crescent and Royal Arthur of the St. Georg type (7700 tons); two 15-cm.guns were mounted forward, in place of the 23-cm. gun; a 23-cm. gun was mounted aft. At about the same time, a 32-cm. gun was mounted aft on the Japanese cruiser Matsushima (4300 t.); and tore place it, two 12-cm. guns were mounted as bow chasers; the arrangement is just the opposite aboard her sister ships the Hashidate and the Itsukushima. The difference in the bow and stern guns of the Italian Garibaldi type is worthy of note; these ships carry one 25-cm. gun in the forward turret, and two 20-cm.gunsintheafterone. However, only these modest experiments have as yet been made. It seems logical to have equal strength forward and aft, as armored cruisers cannot only be chased themselves, but will have to chase at least just as often; in a broadside battle, bow and stern guns are equally serviceable.
In conclusion, one short remark will be made about the value of small and old armored cruisers.
Small, as well as armored cruisers of an old type, are generally designated as coast defense ships.
The ideal coast defense is to meet the attacking enemy at sea, and ward off his attack, in order to free one's own coast from all the horrors of war. But the small armored coast defense ship does not serve for such offensive work against modern sea-going battleships. A battle under one's own land batteries is hardly to be expected, as the enemy would not get so close to the land on account of the danger from mines; and can still retain command of the sea close by but beyond the range of the batteries. Even if a fight should take place near the land, within the range of the guns of the coast defense ship, the sea-going battleship would win very quickly on account of her superior battery. Therefore the small cheap armored ship deserves the name "coast defender" just as little as an old corvette deserves the name "cruiser." Only ships of the same displacement, with the same armament, and the same armor as sea-going battleships can be considered as coast defense ships. As the coal capacity of the coast defense ship need not be as great as that of a sea-going battleship, the saving in weight of coal may be used to strengthen the under water armor, or to make a treble bottom, in order to warrant a successful issue against mines and submarines, which now play such an important part in coast warfare. A small armored ship, on account of her less protected under water body, would be much more likely to fall a victim to submarine weapons than a large one. Only on a large battleship (17,000 to 18,000 tons) is it possible to assign such weights of construction as will result in an approximation to the ideal non-sinkable state.
[The author can hardly mean to advocate the retention of first- class battleships in home ports for coast defense.]
The use of old battleships as blockade ships for the purpose of harbor defense also seems doubtful. Generally moored head and stern, a blockade ship would be apt to fall a victim to the enemy's torpedo boats and submarines at the very beginning of the war.
It is also doubtful if such ships could withstand many shots from modern guns, on account of insufficient armor.
If, for various reasons, the guns of the harbor defense ship could not be spared, it would seem to be much more advantageous to land them, and mount them ashore behind earth works; in this way, the additional advantage is obtained that all the guns can be brought into action, while, on board, that part of the battery (in casemate ships, one-half) on the unengaged side could not be used. Besides, by giving up the use of easily destroyed harbor defense ships, the enemy is deprived of a chance of a cheap partial victory, leaving out of consideration the fact that such vessels can only have a demoralizing effect on their own crews.
E. v. Rz.