The rapid progress of diplomatic actions, made possible by the cable, makes the probable period of strained relations between nations of short duration.
The preparation of the fleet, commissioning ships, establishing the train, etc., that is to say, mobilizing, will fully occupy such period.
There is no time after war is probable to study theory or to test the practicability of methods of using the various types of ships.
This is particularly true of scouting and screening operations, for these are the first operations and continue until the end. Upon the successful performance of these duties may rest the fate of the nation.
The reconnoitering forces will generally be under the direct control of the commander-in-chief, for he alone can give them such instructions as will best aid him in accomplishing the end in view.
In such an important service, coordination of effort is imperative, and the commander-in-chief should give the necessary instructions to ensure cooperation. The amount of detail contained in the instructions to the reconnoitering forces will vary with the conditions and the difficulty that may be encountered in coordinating their operations.
In order that these instructions may be reduced to a minimum we must use a common nomenclature for types of operations. We must understand and have names for common methods of procedure. These methods, based upon theory and past experience,1 “ will prevent errors, omissions and negligence.”
It must always be remembered that “ the most perfect reconnaissance is of no value if the report is not received in time.”1 Information to be of value must be recent and accurate.
We must be prepared, when war breaks out, to proceed on scouting and screening service with faith in our common knowledge of its necessities and possibilities.
We have no war service to guide us and little experience gained from actual scouting operations in maneuvers. We must, therefore, turn to the chart maneuvers for guidance.
Having mastered the theory we must depend upon peace maneuvers on a large scale to test the practicability of theoretical methods.
Transmission of information is one of the greatest elements of successful scouting and every endeavor should be made to determine ranges and rates of transmission by radio.
Types of Naval Campaigns.
The end in view in naval warfare should be the destruction of the enemy’s naval force. Clausewitz’ universally accepted doctrine of war1 2 “ was based on the principle that the destruction of the enemy’s main army is the one true goal of all warlike effort, and that it is to be brought about by the application of superior force, at the decisive point, at the decisive time.”
To most naval men, seeking the enemy to destroy him appears to be the normal line of action, and yet in only one war since the battle of Lepanto in 1571 has this been the guiding principle of the naval operations of both belligerents.
In many cases this has not come about so much through disparity of forces as through failure to abstain from minor operations, the value of which was insignificant in deciding the war.
The aim of every naval commander should be to engage the enemy on terms favorable to himself, but this desire to gain an advantage has often caused a false attitude with respect to fighting and furnished weak minds with an excuse for minor operations, the anticipated value of which must have been looked at through magnifying glasses.
1 Bernhardi.
2 Edinburgh Review, April 1911, page 327.
As has been said, only one war, the third Dutch-English war, furnishes an example of both belligerent nations exerting all their naval energy to crush the naval force of the enemy.
Destroying the main force of the enemy, the idea so long the guiding principle of land warfare, has become recognized as proper for naval warfare and in the future will undoubtedly be the controlling principle.
The adoption of this principle does not necessarily imply that each fleet is to immediately seek battle no matter how unequal the forces. It merely implies that all naval energy should be exerted to create a favorable opportunity for engaging the enemy, and not frittered away in operations, the value of which in deciding the war, will be negligible.
In case of war between two powers situated so close to one another that both naval forces can act freely in the theater of operations without a train, if the forces are approximately equal, we might expect that both fleets would put to sea with the idea of testing their strength in a decisive battle.
The attack by the Japanese destroyers at Port Arthur before the declaration of war is, however, the most likely example of the commencement of hostilities.
The days of chivalry in war are past. The sacrifices made in order to assure preparation must not be wasted. To defeat the enemy fleet is not enough. It must be annihilated. A slight preponderance of strength at the commencement of a battle will eventually become great.
In these days of steam, pursuit is not so difficult as in the sail era. Up to the present all naval battles under steam, with the exception of the reckless retreats of the Italians at Lissa, Russians on August 10, and Turks in the recent war, have ended with the practical annihilation of one force.
Naval strength cannot be measured solely by numbers of ships, of guns and weight of armor. The morale, and the preparation of the fleet for war, are still the dominating factors.
Assuming that each of the belligerent fleets remains intact until the declaration of war, it is reasonable to suppose that the fleets, if approximately equal in force, will seek each other to engage in a decisive action.
What then will be the duties of the reconnoitering forces? To prevent surprise? To gain information of the approach of
the enemy in time to enable one’s own fleet to assume a battle formation before meeting the enemy?
Yes, both of these are duties and many such examples can be found in history. But there is a previous duty.
In considering this duty we pass from history to theory; to the era of torpedoes, floating mines and steam propulsion.
Before the torpedo era, daylight and darkness were equally favorable or unfavorable to each belligerent fleet, but to-day daylight favors the naval force superior in capital ships and submarines, while darkness favors the force superior in destroyers and mine layers.
As we are assuming for the present that the belligerent fleets are approximately equal, it is probable that each fleet will endeavor to decrease its opponent’s day strength by a night attack by destroyers and mine layers.
Destroyers to be effective must act in numbers. Their radius of action at high speed is small. If we separate them to find the enemy we may not be able to concentrate them to attack in force. If we use their fuel in an unsuccessful search, we may be without them at the desired moment. The destroyers must be led to their prey.
Who will lead them? The reconnoitering forces. What force of the enemy will attempt to prevent our reconnoitering forces gaining the necessary information? The reconnoitering forces of the enemy.
This shows the value of the reconnoitering forces, which is too seldom taken into account. Their first duty is to seek out the enemy in order that their destroyers may act to the best advantage in reducing the enemy’s daylight strength. Their second duty, the protection of the main force from observation by the enemy.
In order to gain a decided advantage over the enemy, the reconnoitering forces must be successful in each duty. The two duties are distinct.
General Bernhardi says, “ For however important it may be to gain early information of the enemy, it is naturally just as important to deprive him of this advantage.” This saying was made with regard to land warfare but it is equally true with regard to naval warfare.
With modern speeds, fleets approach rapidly and, in order to gain the advantage of a destroyer night attack, the enemy must
be located at some distance, while similar information of our main force must be denied to him.
In this phase of naval warfare, both fleets approaching with the intention of engaging, considered normal but seldom so found in practice, we recognize two lines of effort of the reconnoitering forces. Scouting, operations to gain information for offensive action. Screening, operations to deny similar information to the enemy.
A second general form of operations: Oversea expeditions with an immediate mission of arriving at, or seizing an advanced base, is a result of steam propulsion.
Oversea expeditions of one hundred years ago could be undertaken without the many difficulties of supply that now beset a naval force.
In an account of Nelson’s chase after Villeneuve to the West Indies, we read that he took on five months provisions before leaving Europe and, with the exception of water, received practically no stores until his return to Europe.
In these days of steam such a cruise would require a well equipped base in the West Indies or an enormous train of colliers and supply ships. Strict neutrality and the necessity for coal have greatly reduced the time during which a ship can remain selfsustaining.
This factor, necessity for supplies, affects naval campaigns in a much different manner than it affects land warfare. The naval force is accompanied by non-combatant ships carrying supplies. The land force receives its supplies by constant transportation over the lines of communication.
In land warfare two contending armies of approximately equal strength approach each other with the idea of fighting at the earliest possible favorable moment. They are in a state of equilibrium until one commander, through information received concerning the opposing force, decides to assume the offensive. The principal factors in making the decision are: composition of enemy forces; relative positions of the force as regards terrain : relative location of the two forces with regard to their respective lines of communication; relative states of efficiency and morale.
An army acting on the strategic offensive will almost surely act on the tactical offensive also. An advance into an enemy’s territory necessitates a longer line of communication with the
attendant difficulties of supply and of reduction in force, caused by the necessity to guard this line. Seldom can an army benefit itself by avoiding the enemy during such an advance. Knowledge of the location of the enemy force is a necessity, for otherwise the enemy might cut the line of communication with ease.
In land warfare information of the enemy’s location is absolutely necessary. Such information will be determined by recon- noitering parties from the independent cavalry. The two opposing cavalry forces are almost sure to meet with the result that the weaker will be seriously handicapped in gaining information.
In naval warfare a fleet making an oversea passage will usually find it necessary to carry its provisions in accompanying ships. The immediate line of communication is the line between the train and the main body, which, in most cases, will be so short as to be negligible.
The location of the enemy main body, some distance on its flank, is no immediate menace to such a naval force.
This is one great difference between land and naval warfare and it is because of this difference that the location of the enemy force is, in naval warfare, less of an immediate necessity to the force acting upon the strategic offensive than it is to an army so acting.
The disadvantage of carrying provisions in a train is felt by the serious handicap of guarding such a large assemblage of vulnerable ships, and in the reduction in mobility occasioned by numerous slow moving, indifferently handled auxiliaries.
Although the line of communication practically does not exist during the passage of a naval force through the theater of operations, the difficulties of guarding one’s provisions during a battle, in the presence of a train, is much more serious in naval warfare than is the guarding of the line of communication during battle, in land warfare. An army can retreat upon its line of communication ; a naval force may be unable to retreat if its train is destroyed. .
This tactical handicap imposes upon the fleet making an oversea passage, the necessity of acquiring an advanced base in which the train may be deposited in safety before joining battle. To the force accompanied by a train, evasion, or at least denying information to the enemy, becomes of first importance.
In view of the great distance that separates the United States
from any probable enemy, this form of campaign will almost surely be found in any future war in which we may engage.
As the fleet accompanied by a train is at a great tactical disadvantage, the opposing fleet must endeavor to bring it to action in the presence of its train.
Again are seen two distinct lines of effort of the reconnoitering forces : Scouting; operations to locate the enemy and furnish information for offensive action. Screening; operations to deny information or to destroy or deceive the enemy’s reconnoitering force, in order to aid the main body in evasion.
It must be understood that a force accompanied by a train is not necessarily limited to defensive operations. The relative strengths of the forces may make the handicap of the train inconsiderable. Under normal conditions, however, the main force of the fleet accompanied by a train, will only take the tactical offensive when evasion is no longer possible.
From the nature of the operations just described, it appears that there are two normal types of operations for a fleet: (1) Operations with the primary mission of engaging the enemy main force at the earliest possible favorable moment. (2) Operations with the primary mission of reaching a geographical objective before engaging the enemy.
Certainty of success in the first type requires early and almost constant information of the enemy. The reconnoiternig force of a fleet desiring to take the tactical offensive must (1) Locate the enemy. (2) Determine his strength and strategic objective. (3) Obtain constant information of his location, disposition and strength.
During these operations, however, the main force must be protected against surprise or observation; thus it is necessary to maintain with the main body a sufficient number of ships of the reconnoitering force for this duty of security.
In the second type, success depends upon avoiding the enemy. The reconnoitering force of the enemy is the principal obstacle to such success. In order to succeed the reconnoitering force of the fleet attempting to reach a strategic objective must (1) Destroy or draw off by deception the enemy reconnoitering force, or failing this (2) Deny the information desired by the enemy.
Before further discussion of the use of the reconnoitering forces,
definitions of the terms used in the discussion will be given in order that we may start from a common viewpoint.
Reconnaissance is the service, by forces within the theater of operations, of obtaining (1) Information of the enemy. (2) Information of local hydrographical or meteorological conditions. (3) Special information required by the commander-in-chief.
Aggressive Reconnaissance, or Scouting.—Operations of the re- connoitering forces with the mission of obtaining information for offensive action. It comprises three distinct types of operations:
(1) Search.—Operations to locate the enemy, more especially the enemy main force.
(2) Strategical Scouting.—Operations before the main bodies or destroyers are within striking distance, to determine the general direction of movement and strength of the enemy’s main body upon which information the commander-in-chief is to base offensive strategical operations.
(3) Tactical Scouting.—Operations, when the main bodies or destroyers are within striking distance, to obtain constant information of the enemy main body’s location, strength and disposition, upon which information the commander- in-chief is to base offensive tactical operations.
Protective Reconnaissance.—Operations to obtain such information of the enemy as is required to afford security to the main force, or upon which the commander-in-chief is to base defensive operations.
Offensive Screening.—Operations at a distance from the main body to obtain security for the main body by seeking out the enemy reconnoitering forces and defeating them, or deceiving them as to the location of the main body.
Defensive Screening.—Operations in the vicinity of the main body to deny information to the enemy, or by warding off the enemy, to afford security to the main body from minor attacks, surprise or observation.
Scouting.
The Search.—The object of the search is to locate the enemy, more especially the enemy main body.
The large area of the theater of operations of a war with an European power, in which we must search, requires the most efficient plan of operation, and coordination of effort of our forces.
Search operations cover a large portion of the theater of war and it is quite possible that such operations may extend over a period of several days without interruption or interference by the enemy.
In order to insure coordination between scouting ships, and to ensure that the proper areas have been searched, it will be necessary to adopt several standard methods of search.
The objection is sometimes raised that ships cannot in practice conform to the lines as given in geometrical methods, but it must be evident that an attempt to follow a system will, at least, give better 1 esults than if a system is lacking. Errors of navigation will prevent chart maneuver accuracy, but as the errors are indeterminate, plans must be made upon the assumption of accurate navigation.
The systematic employment of ships in the search, in chart maneuvers, has developed certain methods which have been called (a) The Out and In Method; (b) The Retiring Search Method; (c) The Trailing Method.
Out and In Method.
In the Out and In Method a line of scouts is stretched across the path of the enemy’s advance, each moving on a course parallel to the enemy’s assumed course, to the front by day and to the rear by night. The distance between scouts should not be greater than twice the range of visibility of the force for which the search is being conducted and should not, in the enemy’s most probable area, exceed four-thirds of such range of visibility. Spacing at four-thirds the range of visibility will permit the dropping out of one scout in three, due to accident or contact with the enemy, without seriously decreasing the efficiency of the scouting line, for, as soon as a scout finds it necessary to leave the line, she notifies the scouts on each side of her, each of which will incline towards the vacant space a distance of two-thirds the range of visibility; this reestablishes the line at distances of twice the range of visibility without serious danger of an enemy force having successfully passed the line.
In actual practice, weather conditions limit the scouting distance, and in case of fog or other weather conditions that seriously reduce the range of visibility, the scouting line should make a simultaneous movement to the rear. This must be effected by a radio signal.
This method of search is the most common. It is most advantageous in:
(1) Searching in a locality where there is reason to believe the enemy must cross the line of scouts ; as when leaving or approaching a known port.
(2) When the estimate of the enemy’s course will probably be more accurate than the estimate of his speed.
(3) When the enemy’s time of departure is uncertain.
(4) When the speed of the scouting force is low, or when it is necessary to avoid the expenditure of coal.
The scouting line should be normal to the enemy’s assumed direction of approach, in order to cover the widest front. Scouting should begin during daylight, at such point that had the enemy steamed direct from his last known position, at his assumed maximum speed, he could just have reached the position of the scouting line. If the enemy’s time of departure is unknown, the scouting line should be formed immediately and advance to the front as explained below.
If the distance steamed to the front on a course parallel but opposite to the assumed course of the enemy, is equal to the distance that the enemy could steam during the night at his assumed maximum speed, it is evident that, if the scout retires an equal distance during dark, the successive daylight scouting positions will be the same. In this case, the scouting line is said to be “ Maintained to the front.”
If, however, the scouts steam a greater distance to the front during the day than they retire at night, either by using greater speed or because daylight is longer than darkness, successive daylight scouting positions will be nearer the enemy’s starting point. In this case the scouting line is said to be “Advanced to the front ” an amount equal to the difference between the daylight steaming distance and the darkness steaming distance. In case successive daylight positions are farther from the enemy’s point of departure, the line is said to be “ Retired.”
Diagram 1 is a sketch of the Out and In Method as it might have been used by a Japanese squadron in searching for the Russian fleet before its arrival at the Saddle Islands.
The area of the Eastern Sea lying between China and the Loo Choo group of islands is, on account of its narrowness, a very suitable place for the use of this method of search.
>U Sima
^FORMOSA]
Dioqram No. l.
Showing
Oul'and In Method
Scale of Mile*.
Position 1 shows the location of a scouting line at daylight.
At this time all vessels of the scouting line steam to the sout - ward and westward on parallel courses at a speed such that the -daylight steaming distance will equal the distance that the Russian fleet could steam during the night at its assumed maximum speed.
At dark the scouting line will retire at the assumed maximum speed of the enemy, and at daylight all ships will occupy the same positions as at daylight of the day previous. In this case the hr would have been " Maintained to the front.”
It would not be advisable to advance this line to the front, toi below the Loo Choo Islands the area is much broader and Ins would necessitate a wider separation of ships on the scouting .me.
If no weather that would reduce the range of visibility was encountered the daylight positions on successive days would be tie
Sa In the diagram it is assumed that at five p. m. (Position 2) the ships of the scouting line encountered fog and, the range o visibility being greatly reduced, the line retired on the opposite course at a speed equal to the enemy’s assumed maximum speed.
The fog does not lift until after dark, so the scouting line must continue the retirement until daylight at which time the line is
in Position 3. . , f .
If the weather is clear the line can again move to the front,
and by steaming at a speed greater than the scouting speed of the previous day, it will be possible to advance the line to the front, possibly as much as has been lost the day before due to fog P If however, the fog has again settled down by daylight t e line must continue the retirement. If the bad weather conditions last for several days, it is possible that the line might have o retire as far as Position 4. Further unfavorable conditions would necessitate a retirement into the Korea Channel and probably a
change in the method of search.
As fog or unfavorable weather conditions may often necessitate
the retirement of the scouting line for whole days at a time, it is advisable to start searching at as great a distance to the front as is practicable with the ships available. This distance however, will often be modified by a consideration of logistics and strengti
of the enemy forces.
Retiring Search Method.
The Retiring Search Method is based on the ability of a searching ship to steam at a speed materially greater than the speed of the force for which the search is being conducted.
The searcher assumes from his latest information, a point and time of departure and a speed for the enemy force, and so directs his course and speed as to pass through successive meeting points for assumed enemy courses varying by a small number of degrees.
The point of origin of the search is a point at which the scout and enemy force would meet had the enemy force steamed from its last reported position, at the assumed time, at the assumed speed and on the assumed course.
If the enemy is not found at this point, the scout assumes a new enemy course and steams for the new meeting point. A moment’s thought will show that in theory the loci of successive meeting points is a spiral, the curvature of which depends upon the relative speeds of the scout and of the force for which the scout is searching.
In practice it is not necessary to change course more than once in four hours if conducting a search with one vessel and often only once a day if using a group.
In Diagram 2, A represents the position of a scout S when he learns that an enemy force E left B at seven a. m., two hours previous. .S' is certain that E will take some course within the angle a. S’s speed is 20 knots; E’s speed, 10 knots. .S' decides to scout from the northern limit. The first calculation must be to obtain the position 0 where, if E steamed on course BO, S could arrive at the same time. This point is called the meeting point.
If distances are not great this point may be determined by trial and error on the chart, but if great, should be computed.
5 arrives at 0 at 6.45 a. m. the following day, fails to find E and starts his search as follows: .S' having failed to find E at O assumes that E has taken a course further to the southward. He now locates the meeting point for a future time, say four hours, and steams at 20 knots for that point. S’s new course is such that he increases his distance from E’s point of departure at a rate equal to the estimated speed of E.
‘ For method of computation see “ Knapp and Logan.”
his speed, barring accident, can often be estimated within a limit of error of several knots.
In searching for an enemy fleet the large radius of visibility of its smoke is of much aid to the searchers.
The Retiring Search Method is advantageous when:
(1) The enemy’s speed and time of departure from a given point are closely known but destination doubtful.
(2) the number of scouts available is small, but their speed
high. 1
(3) Scouting begins close to and soon after the departure of the enemy from a given position. .
(4) When the scouting force starts from a position on the enemy’s flank.
In all cases, however, the scouting force must have a speed materially greater than the speed of the group for which the search is being conducted, and a sufficient supply of fuel to maintain such high speed during each daylight of the search.
In using a large number of scouts by this method three systems have been developed:
(1) Independent Retiring Search.
(2) Retiring Search Curve Patrol.
(3) Retiring Search Sector Method.
In the Independent Retiring Search each scout is given a different assumption as to the enemy’s speed or time of departure.
Each ship conducts an independent search on the assumptions given.
This method permits of the best use of each individual ship and is perhaps the most efficient for the search considered alone, but by its use the scouts become widely dispersed and the efficiency of cooperation for the purpose of strategical scouting is greatly reduced.
(2) In the Retiring Search Curve Patrol scouting is started by all vessels of the group from the same point, called the “ point of origin,” with the same assumptions as to enemy’s speed and time of departure, but at intervals of time such that the ships of the patrol are separated by not more than twice the range of visibility of the force for which the search is being conducted.
This patrol covers a portion of the search curve for lower speeds of the enemy or for a later time of departure.
At dark, if this method is to be continued the following day, all vessels retire at the enemy’s assumed maximum speed on a course parallel to that taken by the leader, which is the line from the enemy’s point of departure passing through his dark position. Courses parallel to that of the leader during the retirement, assure the proper spacing of the scouts at daylight.
This method can often be used when taking up a position for the Out and In Method, Case I (Diagram 4) or when retiring from a scouting position the occupation of which is no longer necessary, Case II (Diagram 5)- If the time available for forming a scouting line for the Out and In Method is great, a search curve patrol may be run to such position, thus perchance reducing the work of another group of scouts (see work of Squadron Three in the theoretical campaign, Diagram 3).
Case /.—Squadron X consisting of eight 18-knot cruisers at anchor in Guantanamo, receive instructions at noon, 2 August, as follows:
“ Enemy fleet and train, weakly screened, in Mona Passage, eight-thirty p. m., one August.
Our main body and destroyers, etc...............................
Squadron X search for enemy main body. Assumed destination Colon."
The squadron commander decides:
(1) To assume enemy’s maximum speed at 12 knots.
(2) To occupy at daylight, 4.30 a. m., as much of the enemy’s daylight curve as can be reached by ships of his squadron.
(3) To search during daylight 3 August, by retiring search curve patrol, point of origin, Lat. 160 10' N., Long. 74 20 W., scouting distance sixty miles.
(4) To retire during night of 3-4 August to scouting line one
seventy degrees Southern scout Lat. io° 20' N., Long. 750 50' W-, scouting distance sixty miles. .
(5) To scout during 4 August by Out and In Method. Course sixty-seven degrees. C-i will adjust course to shore line.
(6) To maintain this line to the front.
From the diagram, it will be seen that had the commander of Squadron X decided to use only the Out and In Method, he could not have formed his line until 4 August. The position would be on the line e-f, which is tangent at its center to the enemy’s maximum speed position circle for daylight 4 August.
Diaqram tloA. Retiring Search Curve Patrol Case l ?
Enemy 's max speed position curve
daylight 3 August
mifemy vriox spec< Utosihon curve -Sunset 3 August
tnemy max speed position curve
ijtoylight 4 August.
o • Doyliqht position *.* Sunset position
Miies.
In using the retiring search curve patrol to gain his position for the use of the Out and In Method, he covers as much of the enemy’s maximum speed position curve for daylight 3 August as can be reached by that time, spacing his vessels at distances of sixty miles.
At daylight the leading ship starts the retiring search curve for enemy’s assumed maximum speed. The point at which this ship starts the curve is the point of origin. As each vessel reaches the point of origin, she takes up the retiring search curve as steamed by the leader.
At dark, 7.30 p. m., the ships will hold the line a-b. spaced along the line at sixty miles distance. If the assumed radius of visibility is not too great, the enemy must at that time be to the eastward of line a-b.
At dark all ships retire to their stations on line c-d. As each ship retires at a speed equal to or greater than twelve knots until daylight, it is known that the enemy lies to the eastward of this line at daylight.
At daylight, the Out and In Method is started on course sixty- seven degrees true.
Case II.—This case shows the value of the retiring search curve patrol in retiring from scouting positions which it is no longer necessary to hold.
A convoy of ten troop ships, under escort of three second-class battleships and six merchant scouts, is at anchor in Hampton Roads taking coal, stores and troops. This force is under orders to proceed to Guantanamo at the earliest possible moment. The merchant scouts are ready to sail by noon, 2 June; the convoy will not be ready until daylight, 3 June. Speed of scouts 18 knots; speed of convoy 10 knots.
At 1.00 p. m., 2 June, the commander of this force receives information by radio that an enemy force of six second-class battleships was sighted at 4.30 a. m., 2 June, in Lat. 350 00' N., Long. 55° 00' W. Heading to westward.
He decides: (1) To use his six scouts for protective recon
naissance some distance from the convoy, assuming that early information of the enemy will assist him in eluding the superior force. (2) To proceed at earliest moment at maximum speed on direct course towards Guantanamo.
At daylight, 4 June, his main force will be 1115—240 = 875 miles from Guantanamo. Assuming enemy maximum speed as 12 knots, the enemy force must be within 11X875 = 1050 miles of Guantanamo, if possible to intercept the convoy. This distance from Guantanamo upon the enemy’s maximum speed position curve for 4.30 a. m., 4 June, is in Lat. 340 35' N., Long. 66° 50' W. To threaten the convoy, the enemy must be to the southward of Lat. 34° 35' N. at this time.
If the six scouts are placed on this position curve forty miles apart, the northern scout in Lat. 34° 35'' N., Long. 66° 50' W., they will cover a sector of the position curve from the most northern position from which this enemy force could threaten the convoy.
At daylight the southern scout starts a retiring search to southward and westward, assuming enemy speed as 12 knots. The other scouts proceed along the daylight position curve to the point of origin, then take up the search curve steamed by the leader.
At sunset all scouts retire on course of the leader at 12 knots. The day of 5 June, the search curve patrol is again used. At dark of 5 June, the scouts retire to a scouting line one sixty degrees true and on 6 June will use the Out and In Method.
If the enemy is not discovered, he has reduced speed to such an extent that the interception of the convoy is impossible, or has passed to the northward of the scouts, in which case he cannot overtake the convoy.
The third form of the Retiring Search Method is known as the Retiring Search Sector Method. In this method the scouts take up positions on a radius from the enemy’s last reported position, and separated on this line by distances equal to the difference in assumed enemy speeds multiplied by the number of hours since the enemy left his last reported position.
In searching for an enemy whose limits of speed are assumed to be 8 and 12 knots, the group must cover a distance along the radius equal to 4X24 Xy = 9633 where y is the number of days steaming of the enemy from his last reported position.
If the enemy has only steamed one day before the line is formed, the distance will be 96 miles and, if six ships are available, they ’ will be separated by 16 miles. From this it is evident that the sooner the search begins after the time of the enemy’s departure from his last reported position the greater will be its efficiency.
Diaqram No.6-b.
!i/\ Enemy Sighted
Retiring 5earci) Sector TTletliod
o • Daylight position. *. Sunset portion.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"Trailing’
Parallel Course Method.
Movement of Fleet
- - Scouting Force?., F\ret Day.
- Second -
.. Third •
- • - Jap Merchant Steomer.
What has been said so far with regard to this method applies equally well to the independent method of search. The difference from now on is this: In the independent method each ship is given an assumption upon which the search is conducted without regard to any other ship, while in the sector method all ships search a given sector during each daylight, regulating their speed to finish the day’s search on a given radius. The radius limiting the sector to be searched is assigned by the group commander, and is limited by the arc that can be searched by the scout searching on the highest enemy assumed speed. This radius is a line of bearing from the enemy’s last reported position.
This limitation to a given sector maintains the scouting line on a slowly changing line of bearing and maintains concentration as much as possible. During the progress of the scouting the distances between the ships will be gradually increased, the increase in distance between two ships being in one day equal to the number of hours of daylight multiplied by the difference of assumed speeds. If the daylight was fourteen hours long and the difference of assumed speeds one knot, the scouting distance would be increased, during daylight, fourteen miles.
All scouts of this group arrive at the same radius at dark and retire during the night on the same course. The speeds during the night will vary slightly, as during this time the distance between ships must be increased by an amount equal to hours of darkness miiltiplied by the difference in the enemy assumed speeds.
Diagrams 6a and 6b show the variation in the work of a squadron of eight scouts when using the Independent Retiring Search and Retiring Search Sector Method, under conditions given in Case II.
In the sector method, the ships nearest the point of departure of the enemy steam at speeds slower than those of the more distant ships. It is therefore possible to maintain the concentration of a non-homogeneous squadron by this method by placing the fast ships on the outer arcs and the slower ones on the arcs nearer the enemy’s point of departure.
If the squadron is homogeneous, fuel may be economized in this method by causing the ship having searched the outer arc on one day to search the inner arc on the succeeding day.
Trailing.
Trailing is the general name applied to the methods of searching from the rear.
In practice it usually takes one of two forms, namely: Parallel course trailing and Diagonal course trailing.
(1) Parallel Course Trailing. (Diagram 7).—In this form scouts run on a series of lines, each parallel to the enemy’s assumed course, separated by a distance not greater than twice the range of visibility of the body for which the search is being conducted. The daylight speed is as high as possible, in order to overtake the enemy who, by hypothesis, is ahead. The night speed is the lowest assumed speed of the enemy, for if a higher speed is used the enemy might be passed during the night.
(2) Diagonal Course Trailing. (Diagrams 8, 9, and 10).— This form of trailing is used when the number of scouts available is insufficient to cover the desired front by the method just described. It is accomplished by the scouts steaming on a series of diagonal courses, returning to a point on their original line one or more times during daylight. The courses of the scouts are parallel.
The amount of front that can be covered is dependent upon the speed of the scouts; the assumed maximum and minimum speed of the enemy ; the range of visibility ; and the desired rapidity of overhauling the enemy. .
It is evident that the enemy will be overhauled in the shortest time if the scout steams on a course parallel to that of the enemy. Any variation therefrom, in order to increase the front searched, reduces this rapidity of overhaul. Each case must be considered separately in order to properly balance these two factors: front and rapidity of overhaul.
In Diagram 8 a scout at A could see an enemy nearer than E1 or A-E1 equals the range of visibility which, for a fleet, may be assumed at 30 miles. The scout steams on the diagonal course to B then returns to the original line A C at C. If Ex to E2 equals the distance the enemy would steam in the same time at his minimum speed and E„C equals the range of visibility, it is evident that the distance AC—60+ (enemy’s minimum speed X hours elapsed between time of departure and time of return of the scout to the original line). In order to overhaul the enemy, if he is steaming at his assumed maximum speed, AC must be greater than, enemy’s maximum speed multiplied by above mentioned time interval.
By his return to the original line, the scout has assured himself that he has not passed the enemy either on or to the left of line AC. He may now start off again on a course parallel to AB,
returning to the original line at a distance from C=6o miles + distance enemy could steam in elapsed time at his minimum speed.
For each return to the original line, the scout has covered a distance to the front equal to 60+distance enemy could steam at his minimum assumed speed during the period elapsing between successive positions of the scout on the original line.
The rate of overhaul for enemy’s assumed maximum speed is equal to 24 X enemy’s minimum speed + (y X 60) —24 x enemy’s assumed maximum speed, where y equals the number of returns to the scouting line and 30 miles is considered as the range of visibility. If minimum speed is 8 knots and maximum speed 12 knots and the scout makes two returns to original line, the overhaul per day is—
(24x8) + (2x60) - (24X 12) =312-288 = 24 miles per day.
The scout returns twice as shown. Each leg of his diagonal course would take -1/ =3-5 hours (14 being hours of daylight). At twenty knots he could steam 70 miles in 3.5 hours, or AB — yo
miles. y4X = 30 + 28=58. In triangle ABX, AB = Jo, Angle a = 34°. The scout’s course thus makes an angle with original line equal to 340. BX — ^g. The increase in front searched is then 39 miles for each scout.
At 12 knots the enemy would steam 288 miles in 24 hours.
At 8 knots, the enemy would steam 192 miles in 24 hours.
The scout must steam at 8 knots for 10 hours during darkness which = 80 miles. This reduction in speed must be made to avoid passing the enemy during darkness.
In order to gain on the enemy if he was steaming at 12 knots, the scouts must advance more than 208 miles during daylight (288 — 80=208). At 8 knots the enemy’s advance would be 112 miles; the difference, 208 miles minus 112 equals 96 miles, must be made up by visibility distance gained by returns to the original line. The gain for each return is 60 miles. It is necessary now to decide how much overhaul is required each day. Suppose the enemy was known to be less than 50 miles ahead of some portion of the scouting line and two days could be used to overtake him. In this case it would be necessary to return to the original line twice so that the advance of the scout would be 24X8= I92 +120 = 312, or 24 miles in 24 hours over the highest enemy assumed speed. The additional front covered and the angle of the scout’s course from that of the assumed course of the enemy is found from the traverse table, as above.
Trailing is effective during daylight as all the area covered is covered thoroughly. It may fail at night if the enemy’s actual speed is lower than his assumed lowest speed or if his course is changed so that the component of his speed along the assumed course is less than his lowest assumed speed.
Its other advantages are:
(1) Smaller chance of scouts being detected.
(2) Dispersion of enemy forces to the rear if attempting to drive off the scouts.
Its disadvantages are:
(1) Must be based on recent accurate information.
(2) Great amount of steaming to get in rear of enemy.
(3) Wide dispersion of forces.
In the preceding description of methods of using the scouting force the enemy has been assumed to be acting on the strategical offensive. The scouts were therefore at liberty to use methods
of search in each of which the line could retire if it so desired.
The case is quite different when the search has to be conducted on the strategical offensive. With one exception the methods of search that have been described are not suitable.
Searching, Strategical Offensive.
If our main body is advancing in the theater of war, the main body of the enemy is probably lying in a position in readiness. This assumption cannot be considered a surety and any system of search that failed to consider the possibility of the enemy main body advancing would be defective.
In order to be sure that the enemy main body does not pass the scouts during darkness, either the line must retire towards our main body during dark, at the enemy’s assumed maximum speed, or there must be two lines of scouts placed at a distance apart equal to the night steaming distance of the enemy at his assumed maximum speed, plus the night advance of the scouts.
This necessity for advancing the scouting line practically prohibits, on account of excessive speed required, any form of scouting other than the Out and In Method using one line of scouts, or two lines as stated above. •
These two methods will be compared both as regards number of ships and speed required under the following assumed conditions :
Front to be covered = 600 miles.
Own main body speed = 9 knots.
Enemy main body maximum speed = 12 knots.
Maximum speed of scouts = 23 knots.
Daylight= 14 hours. Night= 10 hours.
Out and In Method.
See diagram 11.
Enemy main body may approach during dark = 120 miles.
Scouting line must advance during 24 hours = 216 miles.
Scouting line advances during day 23X14 = 322 miles.
322 — 216=106 miles that scouting line can retire.
Scouts must, therefore, be placed so close together that their radii of visibility intersect seven miles ahead of the line joining their positions as shown in Diagram 11.
Assuming radius of visibility as 30 miles, the scouts will be separated by a distance
2V(30)2- (7)2 = 5B.3 miles. Diaqram II.
They will steam 23 knots an hour for 14 hours and 10.4 knots an hour for 10 hours. Each scout will steam 426 miles in 24 hours.
By the method of two lines, 20 scouts will be required. Each scout will steam 216 miles in 24 hours.
By using the Out and In Method, high speed is essential and if the enemy main body can make 15 knots the method is practically prohibited. Under the best circumstances the expenditure of coal will probably prevent its use.
In the above discussion, it has been assumed that the scouting force is not preceding the main body by a great distance. The difficulties of this method of search are many as has been shown. It seems probable, therefore, that the scouting force would precede the main body some days, accompanied by colliers, and after coaling on the enemy’s side of the ocean, search by retiring methods, first described, until their own main body approached.
Choice of Methods.
In the previous discussion of methods of search, the advantageous conditions for the use of each have been given. It may be possible in many cases, however, to use any of them.
There are several other factors in any given situation which may limit the methods that may be employed. These factors are: Area to be searched, number of ships, their speed, the amount of fuel on board, the availability of further fuel ’supply and the relative strength of the enemy reconnoitering forces.
The first point to be determined in any situation is the area to be searched. A careful estimate of the situation should be made to determine the enemy’s probable intentions and the alternate courses of action that appear possible for him to adopt.
If the enemy is known to have left a certain point at a known time, circles may be drawn representing the loci of his possible positions at each daylight for any assumed speed. Drawing these circles for his highest and lowest assumed speed for daylight and dark, an area is determined in which search is profitable.
Searching in an area that the enemy could not have reached at his maximum speed is manifestly wasted energy. Searching is only profitable during daylight and only under special circumstances can it be justified at night.
Each area covered should be searched thoroughly. Negative information is valuable. Indifferent search is wasted energy for no deductions can be drawn from such work.
The aid rendered by a well organized intelligence service is here very well marked for if the enemy’s exact force is known, his speed may be closely estimated and if his objective is known, the area to be searched may be greatly reduced. Such decrease in area increases the strength in the searching area and greatly augments the chance of success.
Having decided upon the area to be searched, it is necessary to select a method. Often it may be possible to use any one of several of the methods previously described.
In selecting from several available methods, attention should be paid particularly to logistics and concentration of force.
If the enemy’s reconnoitering force is much superior, the intervals between ships should be small and the scouting line supported by heavier ships.
It may be necessary to use several different methods in order to cover the entire area.
"Instructions to reconnoitering forces' should contain:
(1) All that is known of the enemy.
(2) Statement of the general situation.
(3) Indication of proposed direction of effort and objective.”1
The first evidence of the enemy will probably be one or more contacts along the scouting line with ships of the enemy reconnoitering force. The action of the enemy ships may indicate the nature of the action their main body is attempting for, if their main body desires to take the tactical offensive, perhaps these ships may pass on without engaging, hoping to obtain information of our main body.
It will usually be the case, however, that if one’s own main force desires to take the tactical offensive the enemy main force will not, in which case it is the duty of these enemy ships to engage.
It is important for the searching ships to avoid engagements, unless of markedly superior force, and such engagement is necessary in carrying out their mission of gaining information. If compelled to change course to avoid engagement, a scout should take such course as will soonest avoid the enemy and permit a return to the original plan of operations. The necessity for leaving station should always be reported to the ships next on each side and to the group commander, with a statement of the action to be taken with regard to the enemy.
* Bernhardi.
The force carrying on the search must not concentrate immediately upon contact with enemy reconnoitering ships, for the presence of enemy reconnoitering vessels is not a sure indication that the enemy main body is in the vicinity. If the enemy could count on such a concentration it would be easy for his main body to pass the line at a different point during such concentration.
The support for the scouting line may be directed to steam in the direction of these contacts, but such contacts must not weigh too heavily in making a decision, for they may be only a means to draw attention from the real point at which the enemy intends to pass.
Until the enemy main body is located the searching forces will probably have many uneasy moments, but it should be remembered that ships on search duty should continue in their own area until the enemy main body is located, or until their instructions have been changed.
It may be said that usually the resistance to a scouting force will be greater the nearer it approaches to the enemy main body. As has been pointed out this may not be true but if the force of the enemy screen becomes so great as to endanger our reconnoitering forces we must send in our support to clear up the situation.
It may often be necessary for the support of a scouting line to break through an enemy screen in order to determine what force, if any, lies behind. «
In case there is no support for the scouting line, the line may have to concentrate and reconnoiter as a group. Such procedure confines the area covered to very small limits and should only be attempted when all other means fail.
The enemy main body must be located at the earliest practicable moment. Stealth is preferable to force in obtaining this information and it is in such situations that aeroplanes or flying boats may be of immense value.
The necessity for the use of force in attempting to gain information of the enemy is greatly dependent upon the immediate value of such information to the commander-in-chief.
It will be readily seen that an enemy’s screen in the position anticipated by the commander-in-chief need not be developed with the same rapidity as a screen in a position far from the anticipated one.
A careful consideration of the value to the commander-in-chief of the development of a screen will furnish the best guide as to how much is to be sacrificed to gain information of what lies behind.
It must ever be kept in mind that during this phase of a campaign the strategic plan of operations of the commander-in-chief is governed by the information from the reconnoitering forces.
The question that one must ask himself upon encountering an enemy scouting line or screen is: What effect would the presence of the enemy main body in rear of this line have on the plans of my commander-in-chief ? •
If the answer to this question indicates a marked departure from the present strategical disposition such sacrifice as is necessary must be made to gain the information.
If the answer to the question indicates that no change would be made in the present disposition, then sacrificing ships to gain the information cannot be justified.
A commander of a group of scouts must have a thorough understanding of the general situation. There is a tendency to forget the general situation in the contemplation of the local one. Especially is this true when in contact with the enemy. The commander-in-chief often fails to receive valuable information because of the pre-occupation of scout commanders in the local situation.
A scouting force commander must be able to 'decide quickly and with good judgment. He must not fear responsibility and must at all times be ready to sacrifice such of his force as may be necessary to gain the desired information in time.
Energy, determination and an “infinite capacity for taking pains ” are necessary characteristics of a successful scout commander.
In the words of Clausewitz: “ Information is the foundation of all our ideas and actions.”
Strategical Scouting.
The second phase of scouting operations, “ Strategical Scouting,” commences with the location of the enemy main body and continues until the forces are within striking distance. It may last for days, or, if the forces are close when discovered, it may not exist at all.
Scouting operations during this phase assume a new form. The area of profitable employment of the scouting force becomes restricted. Most of the ships that have been employed on search duty lie well outside this area. At least one night’s steaming will be required before many of these ships can be of service.
The object of strategical scouting is to obtain information of the enemy upon which the commander-in-chief is to base his strategical operations. The chief points to be determined are: Enemy location, approximate strength, direction of movement, presence or absence of train or destroyers.
With modern naval forces it may be assumed that the portion of the reconnoitering force maintained near the main body for defensive screening will be stronger than that portion of the scouting force making the first contact with the main body.
Under these conditions it is reasonable to suppose that not more than one contact will be made until a considerable concentration of the scouting force has been effected.
When the opposing forces are separated so widely that no engagement can take place during the daylight of discovery or during the succeeding darkness, continuous tracking should be attempted only if no opposition is encountered.
If opposition is encountered, attempts at continuous tracking or even to make further contacts before a considerable concentration of the scouting force has been effected might, and probably would, result in a loss incommensurate with the value of the information gained.
If the first contact is made in the morning a sufficient force may possibly be concentrated by late afternoon to attempt a second contact. This contact should only be made, if possible to do so without undue risk. If the first contact is made in the afternoon no further contact should be attempted until the following daylight, unless no resistance is encountered during such observation.
The radio signal reporting the discovery of the enemy main body with the time of sighting, location, enemy’s estimated course and speed, should be sent broadcast and relayed to all ships of the scouting force.
Unless acting under special instructions all searching ships should, upon receipt of this message, change course towards such reported location and increase speed to the maximum, consistent with the logistic condition presented.
The commander-in-chief, or scouting force commander, if there be one, should be immediately informed of the location of each ship of the scouting force and of her anticipated plan of action.
The first report to the commander-in-chief should, if possible, contain additional information of the enemy’s approximate strength, presence or absence of train and destroyers.
Such of the scouting force of the interposing fleet as can reach the required positions should, during the night succeeding the first contact, be formed on an arc of a circle covering the courses assumed as probable for the enemy. The center of this arc is the enemy main body’s latest reported position, and its radius the distance the enemy could steam at his assumed maximum speed from the time at which he was in this reported position until the following daylight.
The spacing of the scouts on this arc varies with the number of ships available, the strength of the enemy screen and the probable accuracy of the assumptions as to the enemy’s course. The location of the enemy at daylight is of great importance.
In strategical scouting the hydroplane may play the decisive role. To drive all reconnoitering forces outside the limit of operations of an hydroplane would require a screen of great size and strength. Efficient hydroplanes may make it possible to obtain the desired information without risking valuable ships.
The efficiency of the hydroplane in moderate winds and seas is questionable and until further experiments are made the hydroplane must be considered only as a valuable aid and in no sense a substitute for scouting ships.
In general it may be said that during strategical scouting the interval of time elapsing between contacts depends upon the distance that separates the main forces or one main force and the opposing destroyers. If the distance is great, one contact in each daylight may be sufficient. As the forces approach the time intervals between contacts should decrease until strategical scouting merges into tactical scouting.
Tactical Scouting.
Tactical scouting comprises operations of the reconnoitering forces after the main forces are within striking distance. It has three phases:
(i) The destroyers of one force in striking distance of the other main body.
(2) The destroyers of each force in striking distance of the opposing main body.
(3) Both the main body and destroyers within striking distance of the similar forces of the enemy.
The relative position is of no value unless sufficient information is obtained to enable a force to profit by its position.
A force acting on the strategical defensive should plan its operations so as to make a destroyer attack upon the enemy before engaging in daylight action. The moral effect of a destroyer night attack, with torpedoes and floating mines, upon a fleet accompanied by a train will be great without a doubt. We must remember, however, that it will be next to impossible to make such an attack without the enemy acting similarly, for the absence of one’s reconnoitering force in contact with the enemy will probably so reduce one’s screening force as to make the denial of information impossible.
The moment a fleet accompanied by a train becomes convinced of its inability to avoid detection it will take the offensive with its destroyers at least.
To follow a night torpedo attack by a major engagement at daylight is practically impossible without subjecting one’s own main body to an attack by the enemy destroyers. Success in such an operation must be more or less luck, unless the enemy’s scouting forces have been destroyed or they have lost their mobility due to consumption of fuel, break-down, or injuries received in previous engagements.
It would appear that in future when two modern fleets are approaching to engage each will be subjected to a destroyer attack during at least one night previous to the main engagement.
The destroyers can be led to their prey only by an efficient scouting force. The information must be as exact as it is possible to obtain. From the time that the destroyers are within striking distance information must be as nearly continuous as possible. During this period information must be obtained even at the sacrifice of many of the scouting ships.
A successful destroyer attack will so reduce the enemy’s morale that the actual reduction in strength will be much greater than that represented by the material loss.
In avoiding this attack mobility is the greatest factor, and thus the fleet accompanied by a train is at a serious disadvantage.
The attack can only be avoided by successful screening. An attack can only reach home as the result of successful scouting.
It is in this phase of the operations that the double duty of the reconnoitering forces becomes most pronounced. To protect one’s self may require many ships. To keep in touch with the enemy will require many. The correct adjustment of the forces available to successfully accomplish both missions requires a master hand.
Information may be obtained by superior strength, stealth, superior speed or numbers.
In Strategical Scouting it is only necessary to develop the enemy at intervals, but in tactical scouting constant information is desired in order that the destroyers may attack as soon as possible after dark and may be fully aware of the formation of the enemy in order that they may attack the enemy’s best ships.
Such constant information can only be obtained by fighting if the enemy fleet is properly screened, unless by use of the hydroplane or submersible.
This is the ideal moment for hydroplanes or submersible scouts. Practically invulnerable, either type should be able to obtain the required information with ease unless the defensive screen is of immense proportions. To maintain a screen of such size would require so much of the reconnoitering force as to greatly reduce the force assigned to the offensive role or would reduce the strength of the screen to such an extent as to make it vulnerable to ships.
To follow a night attack by a major engagement is in every respect desirable, but as has been pointed out such close approach of the main body brings it within the danger area of the enemy destroyers. To obtain the closest approach to the ideal it is necessary to afford our fleet such protection against torpedoes as will permit us to exchange destroyer attacks with the enemy confident in the knowledge that our destroyers can do more damage to the enemy than his destroyers can do to us.
Tactical scouting previous to a major action in daylight can only be effected by ships faster than any stronger ship in the enemy’s fleet, until the hydroplane and submersible have been developed for this.purpose.
Such information as can be obtained will be of great value to the commander-in-chief in making his tactical dispositions.
To be of value the information must be accurate, definite and continuous. It must not be delayed in transmission. It should
include the enemy’s strength, formation, disposition of destroyers, submersibles and train, approximate speed and course.
Screening.
In the discussion of types of naval campaigns in previous pages, an attempt was made to show that under usual conditions in oversea campaigns the reconnoitering force of one fleet is acting aggressively in the quest for information, while the reconnoitering force of the other fleet is attempting to deny information.
It has also been pointed out that exceptions will be found in cases where the fleet seeking a geographical objective is so superior that an engagement, even in the presence of its train, is desired, or when evasion having failed, a fleet so acting decides to take the tactical offensive, perhaps only with its destroyers, in order to prevent being brought to action in the presence of its train.
Assuming that the main forces and destroyer flotillas are of nearly equal power, it seems evident that the force acting on the strategical offensive in an oversea campaign will endeavor to avoid action until a temporary base has been established and its train deposited in safety. If this assumption is correct we should be able to decide upon the course of action to be followed by the reconnoitering force of such fleet in order to afford the greatest aid to its main body and train in the attempted evasion.
Successful evasion by the main body may be accomplished by (O Approaching the strategical objective by a route which it is hoped is not being searched by the enemy reconnoitering force. (2) Deceiving the enemy reconnoitering force. (3) Destroying the enemy reconnoitering force.
The first method might be successful, but such success would probably be accidental, for the limits of courses possible to ships whose speeds and radii of action are known, can be closely approximated.
The range of visibility of a modern fleet and train comprising probably more than one hundred vessels, is very great but even this will be increased by the size of the defensive screen which must always surround such a fleet to secure it from surprise and observation. " .
The first method is the only one an example of which is afforded by history—the Russian battle fleet en route east, but in this case the accompanying reconnoitering force was so small, and the radio
so inefficient, that no attempt was made to maintain a proper defensive screen.
An attempt to evade an enemy by this method is, and can only be, justified when the reconnoitering force of such fleet is so small or inefficient as to be only sufficient for a defensive screen.
The second method, “ Deceiving the enemy reconnoitering force,” may be advantageous if the deception of such force for one day may afford the main body a chance for evasion. .
This method is accomplished by forming a false screen at some distance from the main body and so directing its course and speed as to effect contact with the enemy reconnoitering forces before the main body makes a contact, and in such position relative to the main body that a concentration of the searching force to develop the false screen may afford the main body a chance to avoid detection.
The false screen must have sufficient force to deny information of what lies within until the searching force shall have concentrated a strong force to break the screen. This screening force should take the tactical offensive at every opportunity in order to defeat the searching force in detail. Such a screen should be composed of strong, fast vessels that may avoid all ships which are superior in power, and may, when their deception is discovered, rejoin their own main body with greater speed than is available to the searching force.
As a rule strategic movements cannot be concealed from an enemy by this method, for the possibilities of rapid communication by radio and cable permit of news from secret agents in neutral ports and on neutral ships being received with little delay.
Such a screen might deceive an enemy for a day or two and might cause a concentration of the searching force, thus leaving a hole in the searching force through which the main body might pass.
Its principal effect would probably be a moral one upon the enemy commander-in-chief. Colonel Furse says: “Indecision in a commander may not be part of his nature, and often originates .... from the state of ignorance in which he is kept with regard to the action and intentions of his opponent. The heavy responsibilities which rest on him may therefore produce an amount of caution which is quite strange to his ordinary character.”
If the first screen is developed and discovered to be false the commander-in-chief may hesitate to take immediate action when the real screen is reported.
It is evident that a reconnoitering force of some size is required for this method and the question as to its relative efficiency as a false screen or as a true offensive screen must be determined largely by the value of its possible success.
The third method, “ Destroying the enemy reconnoitering force,” is, if sufficient force is available, the most probable to meet with success. This method is the true offensive screening.
Offensive Screening.
In search operations the forces are advanced in the direction the commander-in-chief considers most probable to locate the enemy. This force must be well advanced in order to give the main body ample time to move to any portion of the theater of operations to interpose between the enemy and his proposed objective, after the desired information has been obtained.
The area to be searched is governed by information of the enemy received before actual contact is made.
In a large theater of operations the searching force must be widely dispersed to cover the possible directions of approach of the enemy.
In offensive screening the mission is the .destruction of the enemy reconnoitering force. This force must be located before it can be attacked. The main strength of the screen should not, therefore, be widely separated from its main body until the enemy searching force is located by advanced scouts.
An advance by the screen in strength, previous to the location of the enemy searching force, might be but a blow in the air. If it failed to find the enemy searching force it might continue the advance in the wrong direction, thereby affording the searching force the opportunity of locating the main body without opposition. The enemy scouting line must be first located by advanced scouts. .
The advanced scouts having located the enemy scouting line, the screen should advance to engage. A greatly superior strength should be brought into each action, if possible. The ideal is to be so superior as to crush the opposing ships without sustaining any damage. This can hardly be hoped for but as has been pointed
out, successful search requires dispersion, successful screening concentration. If, therefore, the ships of the screen are fast enough to act together in overpowering enemy scouts some concentration should always be possible.
The loss or injury of a ship is a greater disadvantage to the searching force for the area assigned to the injured ship must be left unsearched or other ships must increase their areas, thus decreasing the efficiency of their search.
Every victory will increase one’s morale and will decrease that of the enemy. The loss of any ship in the searching force will cause a wider dispersion of the remaining force. If evasion by the main body becomes impossible and offensive action is decided upon these successful engagements will have greatly facilitated one’s own scouting operations.
The advanced scouts must be faster than any ships of the enem)' searching force if possible. In fact successful screening requires ships that are faster than the ships of the searching force and of equal or greater strength. The screen must be faster than any force of superior strength that the enemy might send against it.
Defensive Screen.
In the general discussion of screening it was pointed out that a defensive screen, used alone, can only be justified when the reconnoitering force accompanying the fleet is very small, weak or inefficient.
The surest way to escape detection is to destroy the enemy searching force bv an offensive screen. The complete destruction of the enemy searching force is, however, an ideal conception and its accomplishment very improbable.
The development of the automobile torpedo carried in destroyers, which are becoming faster and more able to undertake distant operations each year, has made it necessary to maintain with each main body a force sufficiently fast and strong to prevent enemy ships from locating and observing the main body during daylight and of giving information of the approach of hostile ships at night.
The offensive screen or the scouting lines provide a measure of security but neither is necessarily sufficient to secure the main body against observation or destroyer attack. Each must there
fore be supplemented by a special service of security near the main body.
This special service is called tactical or defensive screening. Its objects are (1) During daylight to prevent enemy vessels approaching within sighting distance of the smoke of the main body. (2) To give ample warning of the approach of any force of superior power in order that support may be sent in time to prevent such enemy force gaining information of the main body.
During darkness.— (1) To warn the main force of the approach of enemy destroyers or major ships.
(2) To aid in the destruction of any attacking destroyers.
From the nature of the two duties enumerated it will be clear that the performance of both duties by the same force is impracticable.
The tactical or defensive screen is formed by surrounding the main body by a screen of ships through which an enemy must break to gain information and through which he must pass a second time to escape.
A screen of this nature should surround any large fleet, especially at night. It must, however, be much stronger if it is the only protection, that is, if no scouting force or offensive screen has previously cleared the area.
In order to deny information to the enemy the screen must be supported by a force superior to the support of the enemy scouting line. These supports must be placed at such a distance from the main body that they may intercept an advancing enemy before he has seen the m'ain body smoke. It is evident that to accomplish this, the support must occupy a central position and must be warned of the enemy’s approach by lookout or picket ships. -
As this screen accompanies and surrounds the main body its formation must be simple and must vary greatly with the force available.
If the support is strong enough to defeat any probable recon- noitering force the enemy may send out, the area covered should be, during the day, the largest consistent with proper outposts and support. The screen would be preferably of such an extent that, if at dark no destroyers are within the screen the chance of a successful destroyer attack by the enemy will be small.
If the force is too weak to deny entrance to enemy reconnoiter- ing ships the screen should be compact, merely large enough to give notice of the enemy main body approach in sufficient time to permit its own main body taking up battle formation before the enemy fleet can get within range.
The chance of getting home a successful night destroyer attack is dependent upon information of the position and movements of the enemy main body. A force constrained by paucity of numbers to assume a tactical screen yields this opportunity to the enemy.
This use of the scouting force is opposed to active reconnaissance and is almost useless in gaining information of the enemy. It is the service of security as its main objective is to prevent surprise.
To use the entire reconnoitering force as a defensive screen tends to destroy morale by placing the entire force in a defensive attitude. It should only be adopted when the force available is small and weak.
Its tactical composition is dependent on force available, enemy scouting force, enemy destroyers, radius of visibility, etc. “ In principle this screen should—
(1) Be suited to existing or expected conditions. ,
(2) Be simple in formation.
(3) Consist of two lines, pickets and supports.”
During daylight the ships of the screen should be spaced as far apart as is necessary to maintain a complete circle of observation around the main body at a distance exceeding the range of visibility by at least one hour’s steaming distance. At intervals of thirty miles this would require twelve ships.
The distance of this screen would prevent its closing in to a station for night screening without confusion. If thef change was made previous to dark the enemy vessels might follow to within observation distance unopposed.
The day screen is in itself a protection against night attack, for if the main body position is not determined during daylight it will be the merest chance if the enemy destroyers are successful in their search in the dark.
Such success remains a possibility, however, and in order to protect the fleet from surprise a screen should be formed around the fleet distant about ten thousand yards, by converted yachts,
revenue cutters, gunboats, tugs, or empty auxiliaries, if available.
The moral effect- of a screen will be very beneficial to the main body, and the screen, while of not much intrinsic value, will confuse an attacking force and thus aid in saving the main body.
General.
This discussion of scouting and screening operations is now completed, but before closing a few of the principal points will be recalled.
hi Searching.—Mission to gain information of enemy main body.
Decide upon area to search. Be careful not to search un- • profitable area.
Decide upon method; maintain concentration; watch logistics.
Avoid engagements.
Remain in designated area until enemy main body is reported, then head for reported position at maximum speed.
In Strategical Scouting.—Locate enemy main body at intervals. Every twenty-four hours if very distant. Decrease intervals as distance between forces decreases.
When making contacts daily or twice a day use method of position circle.
In Tactical Scouting.—Gain information for use of the destroyers as often as necessary. Sacrifices must be made to gain sufficient information for successful destroyer attack.
In Offensive Screening.-—Mission is the destruction of enemy searching force. Ships should take the tactical offensive unless very much inferior.
In Defensive Screening.—Mission is to prevent observation or surprise attack. Ships should take tactical offensive unless of inferior force.
No one, who has experienced the feeling of helplessness that comes over a commander who lacks information, can fail to appreciate Colonel Furse’s saying, “ In nothing more than in war knowledge is power.”
Orders for a Theoretical Campaign.
The campaign orders in the following pages are given to show the statement of orders for several different methods of search and scouting.
The assumptions upon which the campaign is based are as follows:
(0 A Japanese squadron of six merchant scouts, speed 20 knots, is scouting between China and the Loo Choo Islands by the Out and In Method as indicated in Diagram 1.
(2) Three ships, speeds 20, 18, and 17 knots, are at the Bonin Islands as a flank guard.
(3) The Japanese main body and a squadron of six 18-knot cruisers are at Tsushima. The cruiser squadron is coaling and will not finish in time to leave before 4 a. m., 2 June.
(4) At 5 a. m., 1 June, the Russian fleet is sighted by Japanese lookouts (fishing vessels) passing through Ballintang Channel, heading to the eastward.
(5) This information is received by the commander of the merchant scout squadron by radio at 9 a. m., by the commander- in-chief at Tsushima at 4 p. m. Orders from the commander-inchief are received by the force at Bonin Islands in time for them to sail at 10 p. m.
(6) The commander-in-chief’s instructions are :
Merchant scouts search from line bearing 70 true from Lat. I9° 50', Long. 122° 00' to the eastward.
Cruiser squadron sail as soon as coaled and search for enemy’s van to the westward of the Bonin Islands.
Flank guard search for the enemy’s southern flank, from line bearing iio° true from Lat. 19° 50', Long. 122° 00'.
(7) The commander of the merchant scout squadron assigns stations on a line bearing 70 true from Lat. 19° 50', Long. 1220 00' covering assumed speeds from twelve to seven knots. He informs his force that he will scout to a radius bearing 420 true from the above position, during the following daylight. Each ship will regulate speed to arrive at that radius at 7 p. m.
(8) The cruiser squadron proceeds at 4 a. m., 2 June. During the afternoon the commander issues his campaign order sending a copy to the merchant scout commander. The cruiser squadron will run a twelve knot search curve patrol during 3 June from Lat. 270 30', Long. 1290 30'.
(9) The flank guard commander directs his ships to search independently, each ship proceeding to the meeting point .on the limiting line at maximum speed and then searching to the northward and eastward. The 20 knot ship will search on as-
sumed enemy speed of twelve knots, the 18-knot ship on io-knot assumption and the 17-knot ship on 8 knot assumption.
(10) At dark, 2 June, the merchant scout commander having been informed of the intention of the cruiser squadron for 3 June, decides to concentrate his force more by reducing the difference in enemy’s assumed maximum and minimum speeds. As the cruisers will cover the 12 knot assumption he decides to use assumed speeds of 11, 10.5, 10, 9.5, 9, 8.5 knots. He assigns these speeds to his vessels for the days of 3 and 4 June.
(11) During 4 June the cruiser squadron continues the patrol until 3.30 p. m., at which time they have arrived at the position desired for commencing the Out and In Method, and at that time this squadron changes courses simultaneously to 200° true.
(12) The ships of the flank guard have continued their independent search.
(13) At 3.30 p. m., 4 June, two merchant scouts sight a heavy smoke bearing to the southward and by 4.30 have reported the position of the enemy main body to all ships of the Japanese fleet.
(14) During this time the Japanese main body has been moved from off Tsushima to a point to the northward of the island of Amami-O-Sima and a radio chain has been established with the scouting detachments.
Note.—The speed and formation (cruising) considered in this diagram are those actually used by the Russian fleet on its passage from the Saddle, Islands to Tsushima.
X fleet delayed several hours by accident to engines of one ship.
(15) A concentration of the scouting force is immediately started. The Japanese destroyers directed to proceed to attack. The main body moved to intercept the Russian fleet.
Information Radiogram from Merchant Scout Squadron Commander.
To Commander-in-Chief. Southern Scouts,
Hogi Maru, Flagship.
Lat. twenty-seven fifty, Long, one twenty-four fifty.
One June, nine a. m.
Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL, one June, five a. m., heading eastward.
Southern scouts will scout to eastward from line bearing seven degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty, by retiring search sector method.
Oku.
Radiogram to Ships of Merchant Scout Squadron.
To Squadron Five. Southern Scouts,
Hogi Maru, Flagship.
Lat. twenty-seven thirty, Long, one twenty-four forty.
One June, nine thirty a. m.
Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL, one June, five a. m., heading eastward.
Squadron Five move towards Lat. twenty-three forty-five, Long, one twenty-two twenty. Speed eighteen knots.
Oku.
Rear Admiral Oku directs a general movement of his squadron towards the position he expects to occupy at daylight 2 June, but does not give his plan to his subordinates until it is approved by the commander-in-chief. His plan might not meet with the approval of the commander-in-chief, who must, in this case, direct the task of each scouting group in order to ensure the maximum efficiency and coordination. Rear Admiral Oku by directing a general movement of his squadron towards the enemy has given all the instructions required for the present and has avoided the possibility of having to countermand an order. Countermanded orders create confusion and lack of confidence in the superior.
The commander-in-chief upon receipt of Rear Admiral Oku’s radiogram issues a combined order as follows:
Campaign Order ' No. —.
FORCES.
(a) Southern Scouts. Rear Admiral Oku. Squadron Five.
(b) Central Scouts.
Rear Admiral Nigi. Squadron Three.
(c) Flank Guard.
Rear Admiral Suki. Division Nine.
(d) Main Body. Squadrons One and
Two.
Destroyer Flotilla.
(e) Radio Chain.
Captain Fugi. Division Eight.
Japanese Imperial Fleet,
H. M. S. Makasa, Flagship,
Off Tsushima.
One June, four, eleven a. m.
1. Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL, one June, five a. m., heading eastward.
2. This force will seek decisive engagement with enemy fleet.
3. (a) Southern Scouts search eastward from line bearing seven degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty.
(b) Central Scouts search for enemy’s van to westward of Bonin Islands.
(c) Flank Guard search northward from line bearing one ten degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty.
(d) Main Body will proceed at eight a. m, two June, towards position Lat. twenty-nine. Long, one thirty.
(e) Radio Chain maintain communication between scouting forces and main body.
4. Train remain at TSUSHIMA.
5. Use cipher “ X ” and one hundred and thirtieth meridian mean time.
Makasa with main body. Tigi,
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.
Copies to Navy Department, Rear Admiral Oku, Rear Admiral Nigi, Rear Admiral Suki, Captain Fugi. By radio.
s -—?— Quill, Lieutenant, Radio Officer.
By this arrangement of the searching force, it will be noticed that the searching forces are, during the search, continually drawing together, thus concentrating as much as possible before the enemy is discovered.
Rear Admiral Oku receives this combined order at noon and issues the following campaign order:
Southern Scouts,
Hogi Maru, Flagship.
Campaign Order Lat. twenty-six, twenty-five,
No.—. Long, one twenty-four, zero five.
One June, four, one p. m.
1. Enemy fleet and train in Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty, at five a. m., one June.
Our main body will proceed at eight a. m., two June, towards Lat. twenty- nine, Long, one thirty. Squadron Three will search for enemy s van to westward of BONIN ISLANDS. Division Nine will search northward from line bearing one ten degrees true from enemy’s five a. m. position. Division Eight will maintain radio communication.
2. This force will search for enemy main body.
3. 'Assume enemy speed in knots as follows:
(a) E-i, twelve.
(b) E-2, eleven.
(c) E-3, ten.
(d) Hogi Maru, nine. _
(e) E-4, eight.
(f) E-5, seven.
(x) Be in position on line bearing seven degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty, and start searching to eastward at five a. m., two June. Use retiring search sector method. Sector for daylight two June, thirty-five degrees.
4- — . . .
5. Use cipher “ X ” and one hundred and thirtieth meridian mean time.
Oku.
Rear Admiral, Commanding Southern Scouts.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Nigi, Rear Admiral Suki, Commanding Officers, Squadron Five. By radio.
s -- , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
Upon receipt of Rear Admiral Oku’s campaign order each ship of squadron five should change course and speed to arrive in position at the specified time. Each ship should report to the squadron commander the position he expects to occupy at 5 a. m., 2 June.
At 5 a. m., 2 June, each ship of this squadron should report her position to the squadron commander.
Rear Admiral Nigi commanding squadron three does not issue a campaign order at this time as his squadron cannot get underway before 4 a. m., 2 June. He signals “ Be prepared to get underway at 4 a. m., 2 June. Speed, eighteen knots.”
Before getting underway he should call his commanding officers on board and inform them of his general plan, but he should issue no campaign order for search operations at this time.
Rear Admiral Suki receives the Commander-in-chief’s combined order at 8 p. m., and immediately signals “ Prepare to get underway at ten p. m. Maximum speed.”
He then writes the following campaign order and, having called his commanding officers on board, delivers it in person.
Flank Guard,
Campaign Order H. M. S. F-i, Flagship,
R°-—• Bonin Islands.
One June, four, nine p. m.
1. Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL, one June, five a. m.
Our main body will proceed at eight a. m., two June, towards Lat. twenty- nine, Long, one thirty. Squadron Three will search for enemy van west of BONIN ISLANDS. Squadron Five will search eastward from line bearing seven degrees true from enemy’s five a. m. position. Division Eight will maintain radio communication between scouting force and main body.
2. This force will search for enemy main body.
3. Assume enemy speed in knots as follows:
(a) F-i, twelve.
(b) F-2, ten.
(c) F-3, eight.
(x) Search northward from line bearing one ten degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty. Use independent retiring search. Proceed at maximum speed when ready.
4- —
5. Use cipher “ X ” and one hundred and thirtieth meridian mean time.'
Suki.
Rear Admiral, Commanding Flank Guard. Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Oku. Rear Admiral Nigi. By radio. Commanding Officers, Division Nine, delivered on board. • s , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
During 2 June, squadron five is searching the area prescribed for the day. Division nine is steaming to the southwestward towards the meeting points on the prescribed line for commencing the search. The radio chain is moving eastward to maintain communication. Squadron three finishes coaling at 4 a. m. and sails from Tsushima in accordance with the combined order previously issued.
At 8 a. m., 2 June, the main body sails from Tsushima in accordance with the following campaign order which was issued on board the flagship on the evening of 1 June.
Main Body,
H. M. S. Makasa, Flagship,
Off Tsushima.
One June, four, eight p. m.
1. Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL at five a. m., one June.
Squadron Three will search for enemy’s van to westward of BONIN ISLANDS. Squadron Five will search eastward from line bearing seven degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty. Division Nine will search to northward from line bearing one ten true from same position. Division Eight will maintain radio communication.
2. This force will seek decisive engagement with enemy fleet.
3. (a) Squadron One.
(b) Squadron Two.
(c) Destroyer Flotilla.
(x) Be prepared to get urlderway at eight a. m., two June, speed twelve knots.
4- — ......
5. Use cipher “ X ” and one hundred and thirtieth meridian mean time.
Tigi,
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.
Copies to Division Commanders and Commanding Officers, Squadrons One, Two and Destroyer Flotilla. By guard boat.
s --- , Lieut. Comdr., Flag Secretary. •
Rear Admiral Nigi, in command of Squadron Three, finding he has ample time to reach his station to westward of the Bonin Islands before the enemy could possibly arrive, decides to aid squadron five by running a search curve patrol during 3 June, assuming the enemy speed as twelve knots. He issues the following campaign order sending a copy to Rear Admiral Oku by radio for his information.
Campaign Order No.—.
Central Scouts, •
H. M. S. C-i, Flagship.
Lat. thirty-one twenty-five,
Long, one twenty-eight, forty. Two June, four, three p. m.
1. Enemy main body and train in BALLINTANG CHANNEL, one June, five a. m. No further news of enemy. Our main body sailed from TSUSHIMA at eight a. m., towards Lat. twenty-nine, Long, one thirty. Squadron Five is searching from line bearing seven degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty. Division Nine is searching to northward from line bearing one ten degrees true from same position. Division Eight is maintaining radio communication.
2. This force will search for enemy main body.
3- (x) Use retiring search curve patrol. Order of ships as per margin. Scouting distance thirty miles. Scouting speed eighteen knots. C-i will leave point of origin, Lat. twenty-seven twenty, Long, one twenty-nine thirty, at five a. m., three June. Obtain scouting distance by that time.
Campaign Order No. —.
FORCES.
(a) C-i.
(b) C-2.
(c) C-3.
(d) C-4.
(e) C-5.
(f) C-6.
4- —
5. Use cipher “ X ” and one hundred and thirtieth meridian mean time.
Nigi,
Rear Admiral, Commanding Central Scouts.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Oku, Rear Admiral Suki, Commanding Officers, Squadron Three. By radio, s , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
Rear Admiral Oku receives Rear Admiral Nigi’s campaign order at 5 p. m., and upon plotting the track of squadron three for 3 June, finds that on 3 June it is not necessary for him to cover higher assumed enemy speeds than eleven knots. He decides to use the retiring search sector method for 3 June, covering enemy assumed speeds from eleven to eight and a half. At 6 p. m. he issues the following campaign order.
Southern Scouts,
Hogi Maru, Flagship.
Cathpaign Order Lat. twenty-four twenty-five,
No.—. Long, one twenty-eight fifty-five.
Two June, four, six p. m.
1. No further news of enemy. Our main body proceeding towards Lat. twenty-nine, Long, one-thirty. Squadron Three will on three June run a retiring search curve patrol from Lat. twenty-seven twenty, Long, one twenty-nine thirty. Assumed enemy speed twelve knots. Division Nine continuing search operations.
2. This force will continue search for enemy main body.
3. Assume enemy speed in knots as follows:
(a) E-i, eleven.
(b) E-2, ten and a half.
(c) E-3, ten.
(d) Hogi Maru, nine and a half.
(e) E-5, nine.
(f) E-6, eight and a half.
(x) Be in position on line bearing forty-two degrees true from Lat. nineteen fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty, and start searching to eastward at five a. m., three June. Use retiring search sector method. Sector for daylight, three June, twenty-three degrees.
Oku,
Rear Admiral, Commanding Southern Scouts.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Nigi, Rear Admiral Suki, Commanding Officers, Squadron Five.
s , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
Division nine continues its independent search. This division is outside of radio communication at dark 2 June, so makes no report.
At 5 p. m., 3 June, Rear Admiral Nigi sends a radio to his squadron as follows: “ Retire at seven p. m. Course sixty true, speed twelve knots.” At 7 p. m. he issues the following campaign 'order.
. Central Scouts,
• H. M. S. C-i, Flagship.
Campaign Order Lat. twenty-six thirty-five,
No.—. Long, one thirty-four forty-five.
Three June, four, seven p. m.
1. No further news of enemy.
Our main body is in Lat. twenty-nine, Long, one thirty. Search operations continue.
2. This force will continue search for enemy main body.
3. (x) Retain present order of ships. At five a. m. four June continue search curve patrol. Enemy assumed speed twelve knots, speed eighteen knots. After daylight increase distance to forty miles.
Nigi,
Rear Admiral, Commanding Central Scouts.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Oku, Rear Admiral Suki, Commanding Officers, Squadron Three. By radio.
s------ , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
Rear Admiral Oku, commanding southern scouts, signals by radio: “ Retire at seven p. m. Course sixty-five true, speed twelve knots,” and at 7 P- ni. issues the following campaign order:
Southern Scouts,
Hogi Maru, Flagship.
Campaign Order Lat. twenty-five zero five,
No.—. Long, one thirty-four fifty-three.
Three June, four, seven p. m.
1. No further news of enemy.
Our main body is in Lat. twenty-nine, Long, one thirty. Search operations continue.
2. This force will continue search for enemy main body.
3. Assume enemy speed in knots as follows:
(a) E-i, eleven.
(b) E-2, ten and a half.
(c) E-3, ten.
(d) Hogi Maru, nine and a half.
(e) E-4, nine.
(f) E-5, eight and a half.
(x) Be in position on line bearing sixty-five true from Lat. nineteen, fifty, Long, one twenty-one fifty, and start searching to southeastward at five a. m. four June. Use retiring search sector method, sector for daylight four June, sixteen degrees.
Oku,
Rear Admiral, Commanding Southern Scouts.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Nigi, Rear Admiral Suki, Commanding Officers, Squadron Five. By radio, s , Lieut., Flag Secretary.
During 4 June, the western ships of the merchant cruiser squadron (squadron five) sight and report the enemy fleet.
“ Enemy fleet and train, weakly screened, in Lat. twenty-seven thirty, Long, one thirty-six, at four-thirty p. m., four June. Heading to eastward. Estimated speed nine knots. Destroyers present.”
Oku.
Upon receipt of this message the commander-in-chief issues the following campaign orders:
Campaign Order No. —.
Japanese Imperial Fleet,
H. M. S. Makasa, Flagship.
Off Omami-O-Sima.
Four June, four, six-thirty p.m.
FORCES 1. Enemy main body and train weakly
(a) Scouting Force. screened, in Lat. twenty-seven thirty, Long.
Rear Admiral Nigi. one thirty-six at four-thirty p. m., four June.
Squadrons Three and Heading to eastward, estimated speed nine Five, Division Nine, knots.
(b) Destroyer Flotilla. 2. This force will seek a decisive engage-
(c) Main body. ment with enemy main body.
(d) Radio Chain. 3- (a) Scouting force observe enemy
main body.
(l>) Destroyer Flotilla proceed at increased speed and attack mam body during darkness, at first favorable opportunity.
^(c) Mam Body will steam at maximum speed to intercept enemy
(d) Radio chain maintain communication between main body.
4- —
5- Makasa will be with main body, meridian mean time, cipher “ C.”
Copies to Navy Department, Rear Tugi. By radio.
s > Quill, Lieut., Radio Officer.
Upon receipt of this campaign all ships of the scouting force, following campaign order.
enemy main
scouting force and
s ?
Use one hundred and fortieth Tigi,
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief. Admirals Nigi, Suki, Oku, Captain
order and position reports from Rear-Admiral Nigi issues the
Campaign Order No.—.
1. Enemy main body and train weakly screened in Lat. twenty-seven thirty, Long, one thirty-six at four-thirty p. m., four June, heading eastward, estimated speed nine knots. Our main body moving to intercept enemy. Destroyer Flotilla proceeding at increased speed to attack. Division Eight maintaining radio communication.
2. This force will locate and observe enemy main body.
3. (a) C-i Lat. twenty-seven fifty, Long, one thirty-eight zero five.
(b) C-2 Lat. twenty-eight twenty-five, Long, one thirty-seven fifty.
(c) C-3 Lat. twenty-eight forty-five, Long, one thirty-seven twenty-
five.
(d) C-4 Lat. twenty-nine zero five, Long, one thirty-six fifty-five.
(e) C-5 Lat. twenty-nine twenty, Long, one thirty-six fifteen.
(f) C-6 Lat. twenty-nine twenty-five, Long, one thirty-five forty.
(g) E-i Lat. twenty-six twenty, Long, one thirty-seven fifty-five.
(h) E-2 Lat. twenty-six zero, Long, one thirty-seven thirty-five.
(i) E-3 Lat. twenty-five twenty, Long, one thirty-six thirty-five.
(j) Hogi Maru Lat. twenty-eight fifty-five, Long, one thirty-four thirty.
(k) E-4 Lat. twenty-eight zero five, Long, one thirty-three fifteen.
(l) E-5 Lat. twenty-seven, Long, one thirty-three zero five.
(m) F-i Lat. twenty-seven twenty-five, Long, one thirty-eight fifteen.
(n) F-2 Lat. twenty-six fifty-five. Long, one thirty-eight ten.
(o) F-3 Lat. twenty-five twenty, Long, one thirty-five twenty-five.
(x) Be in positions assigned and start scouting at five a. m., five June.
Scouting Force,
H. M. S. C., Flagship.
Lat. thirty-one,
Long, one forty.
Four June, four, eight p. m.
Speed maximum, course towards Lat. twenty-four thirty-five, Long, one thirty-two zero five, except E-s and F-3, which ships will run retiring search curve, assumed enemy speed twelve knots.
4- —
5. Use one hundred fortieth meridian mean time. Cipher “ C.”
Nigi,
Rear Admiral Commanding Scouting Force.
Copies to Commander-in-Chief, Commander Squadron Five, Commanders Divisions Seven and Nine.
Extracts to Commanding Officers concerned, Destroyer Flotilla Commander.
s--- , Quill, Lieut., Radio Officer.
* The enemy fleet is sighted at 6.30 a. m., 5 June, and upon receiving the reported position, course and speed of the enemy, the scouting force concentrates for tactical scouting without further orders as shown in diagram 13.