DIPLOMATIC NOTES
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
The American Note of May is regarding the loss of American citizens on the Lusitania and the methods of German submarine warfare was answered by Germany on May 29 as follows:
BERLIN, May 29, via LONDON, May 31-1.08 a. m.
The undersigned has the honor to submit to Ambassador Gerard the following answer to the communication of May 15 regarding the injury to American interests through German submarine warfare:
The Imperial Government has subjected the communication of the American Government to a thorough investigation. It entertains also a keen wish to co-operate in a frank and friendly way in clearing up a possible misunderstanding which may have arisen in the relations between the two governments through the events mentioned by the American Government.
Regarding, firstly, the cases of the American steamers Cushing and Gulflight, the American Embassy has already been informed that the German Government has no intention of submitting neutral ships in the war zone, which are guilty of no hostile acts, to attacks by a submarine or submarines or aviators. On the contrary, the German forces have repeatedly been instructed most specifically to avoid attacks on such ships.
If neutral ships in recent months have suffered through the German submarine warfare, owing to mistakes in identification, it is a question only of quite isolated and exceptional cases, which can be attributed to the British Government's abuse of flags, together with the suspicious or culpable behavior of the masters of the ships.
The German Government, in all cases in which it has been shown by its investigations that a neutral ship, not itself at fault, was damaged by German submarines or aviators, has expressed regret over the unfortunate accident, and, if justified by conditions, has offered indemnification.
The cases of the Cushing and the Gulflight will be treated on the same principles.
An investigation of both cases is in progress, the result of which will presently be communicated to the Embassy. The investigation can, if necessary, be supplemented by an international call on the International Commission of Inquiry, as provided by Article III of The Hague agreement of October 18, 1907. When sinking the British steamer Falaba, the commander of the German submarine had the intention of allowing the passengers and crew a full opportunity for a safe escape. Only when the master did not obey the order to heave to, but fled and summoned help by rocket signals, did the German commander order the crew and passengers by signals and megaphone to leave the ship within ten minutes. He actually allowed them twenty-three minutes' time, and fired the torpedo only when suspicious craft were hastening to the assistance of the Falaba.
Regarding the loss of life by the sinking of the British passenger steamer Lusitania, the German Government has already expressed to the neutral governments concerned its keen regret that citizens of their states lost their lives.
On this occasion the Imperial Government, however, cannot escape the impression that certain important facts having a direct bearing on the sinking of the Lusitania may have escaped the attention of the American Government.
In the interest of a clear and complete understanding, which is the aim of both governments, the Imperial Government considers it first necessary to convince itself that the information accessible to both governments about the facts of the case is complete and in accord.
The Government of the United States proceeds on the assumption that the Lusitania could be regarded as an ordinary unarmed merchantman. The Imperial Government allows itself in this connection to point out that the Lusitania was one of the largest and fastest British merchant ships, built with government funds as an auxiliary cruiser, and carried expressly as such in the "navy list" issued by the British Admiralty.
It is further known to the Imperial Government from trustworthy reports from its agents and neutral passengers, that for a considerable time practically all the more valuable British merchantmen have been equipped with cannon and ammunition and other weapons and manned with persons who have been specially trained in serving guns. The Lusitania, too, according to information received here, had cannon aboard which were mounted and concealed below decks.
The Imperial Government, further, has the honor to direct the particular attention of the American Government to the fact that the British Admiralty, in a confidential instruction, issued in February, 1915, recommended its mercantile shipping not only to seek protection under neutral flags and distinguishing marks, but also, while thus disguised, to attack German submarines by ramming. As a special incitation to merchantmen to destroy submarines, the British Government also offered high prizes and has already paid such rewards.
The Imperial Government, in view of these facts, indubitably known to it, is unable to regard British merchantmen in the zone of naval operations specified by the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy as " undefended." German commanders consequently are no longer able to observe the customary regulations of the prize law, which they before always followed.
Finally, the Imperial Government must point out particularly that the Lusitania on its last trip, as on earlier occasions, carried Canadian troops and war material, including no less than moo cases of ammunition intended for the destruction of the brave German soldiers who are fulfilling their duty with self-sacrifice and devotion in the fatherland's service.
The German Government believes that it was acting in justified self-defence in seeking with all the means of warfare at its disposition to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition intended for the enemy.
The British shipping company must have been aware of the danger to which the passengers aboard the Lusitania were exposed under these conditions. The company in embarking them, notwithstanding this, attempted deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition aboard and acted against the clear provisions of the American law, which expressly prohibits the forwarding of passengers on ships carrying ammunition, and provides a penalty therefor. The company, therefore, is wantonly guilty of the death of so many passengers.
There can be no doubt, according to the definite report of the submarine's commander, which is further confirmed by all other information, that the quick sinking of the Lusitania is primarily attributable to the explosion of the ammunition shipment caused by a torpedo. The Lusitania's passengers would otherwise, in all human probability, have been saved.
The Imperial Government considers the above-mentioned facts important enough to recommend them to the attentive examination of the American Government.
The Imperial Government, while withholding its final decision on the demands advanced in connection with the sinking of the Lusitania until receipt of an answer from the American Government, feels impelled, in conclusion, to recall here and now that it took cognizance with satisfaction of the Mediatory proposals submitted by the United States Government to Berlin and London as a basis for a modus vivendi for conducting the maritime warfare between Germany and Great Britain.
The Imperial Government, by its readiness to enter upon a discussion of these proposals, then demonstrated its good intentions in ample fashion. The realization of these proposals was defeated, as is well known, by the declinatory attitude of the British Government.
The undersigned takes occasion, et cetera, JAGOW.
—N. Y. Times, 5/31.
GERMAN SUBMARINE SANK " GULFLIGHT
BERLIN, May 28.
The torpedoing of the American oil steamship Gulflight is now established as due to a German submarine, the report of the commander of the submarine in question having been received by the German Admiralty.
The commander reported that when he first saw the Gulflight she was being convoyed by two patrol boats, and he concluded that she must be a British vessel or was carrying contraband. The presence of the patrol boats, the commander reported, made closer investigation dangerous.—
N. Y. Times, 5/29.
The following was the reply of the United States to the German
Note of May 29:
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1915.
The Government of the United States notes with gratification the full recognition by the Imperial German Government, in discussing the cases of the Cushing and the Gulfiight, of the principle of the freedom of all parts of the open sea to neutral, ships and the frank willingness of the Imperial German Government to acknowledge and meet its liability where the fact of attack upon neutral ships which have not been guilty of any hostile act by German air craft or vessels of war is satisfactorily established, and the Government of the United States will in due course lay before the Imperial German Government, as it requests, full information concerning the attack on the steamer Cushing.
With regard to the sinking of the steamer Falaba, by which an American citizen lost his life, the Government of the United States is surprised to find the Imperial German Government contending that an effort on the part of a merchantman to escape capture and secure assistance alters the obligation of the officer seeking to make the capture in respect of the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman, although the vessel has ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed.
These are not new circumstances. They have been in the minds of statesmen and of international jurists throughout the development of naval warfare, and the Government of the United States does not understand that they have ever been held to alter the principles of humanity upon which it has insisted. Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers or crew.
The Government of the United States, however, does not understand that the Imperial German Government is seeking in this case to relieve itself of liability, but only intends to set forth the circumstances which led the commander of the submarine to allow himself to be hurried into the course which he took.
Your Excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of the steamship Lusitania, adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and your Excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the United States. It is stated that the Lusitania was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers and serving in virtual effect as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain.
Fortunately these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in your Excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws.
It was its duty to sec to it that the Lusitania was not armed for offensive action; that she was not serving as a transport; that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials.
It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.
Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the Lusitania or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.
But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy.
Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.
The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in, this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.
The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every government honors itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority.
Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy.
This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity, as well as upon the law founded upon this principle, that the United States must stand.
The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your Excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing now, as bet ore, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of war upon the sea may be changed.
The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either government any intimation or suggestion the other may be willing to have it convey, and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its services in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.
In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification .for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.
The Government of the United. States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.
The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality.
It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or right-fully to be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is of fact of belligerent nationality or is of fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.
RODERT LANSING, Secretary of State ad Interim.
—N. Y. Herald 6/11.
The German reply to the American Note of June 9 was despatched July g. After referring to Great Britain's alleged violations of international law, including her unwillingness to accept the Declaration of London, her declaration of a war area in he North Sea, her cutting off of German food supply, and interference with commerce to and from Germany, even through neutral ports, the Note proceeds to justify its submarine warfare as a measure of retaliation. Safety is assured American vessels, provided they be properly marked, notice of their sailing given in advance, and absence of contraband in their cargoes guaranteed by the United States Government. The latter part of the text is as follows:
BERLIN, JULY 8.
The case of the Lusitania shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads. In the most direct contradiction of international law all distinctions between merchantmen and war vessels have been obliterated by the order to British merchantmen to arm themselves and to ram submarines, and the promise of rewards therefor, and neutrals who use merchantmen as travelers thereby have been exposed in an increasing degree to all the dangers of war.
If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the Lusitania had caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing a torpedo this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel. After the experiences in sinking much smaller and less seaworthy vessels it was to be expected that a mighty ship like the Lusitania would remain above water long enough, even after the torpedoing, to permit passengers to enter the ship's boats. Circumstances of a very peculiar kind, especially the presence on board of large quantities of highly explosive materials [word omitted, possibly "dissipated "] this expectation.
In addition it may be pointed out that if the Lusitania had been spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to Germany's enemies and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of breadwinners.
In the spirit of friendship wherewith the German nation has been imbued toward the Union (United States) and its inhabitants since the earliest days of its existence, the Imperial Government will always be ready to do all it can during the present war also to prevent the jeopardizing of lives of American citizens.
The Imperial Government, therefore, repeats the assurances that American ships will not be hindered in the prosecution of legitimate shipping and the lives of American citizens in neutral vessels shall not be placed in jeopardy.
In order to exclude any unforeseen dangers to American passenger steamers, made possible in view of the conduct of maritime war by Germany's adversaries, German submarines will be instructed to permit the free and safe passage of such passenger steamers when made recognizable by special markings and notified a reasonable time in advance. The Imperial Government, however, confidently hopes that the American Government will assume to guarantee that these vessels have no contraband on board, details of arrangements for the unhampered passage of these vessels to be agreed upon by the naval authorities of both sides.
In order to furnish adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic for American citizens, the German Government submits for consideration a proposal to increase the number of available steamers by installing in passenger service a reasonable number of neutral steamers under the American flag, the exact number to be agreed upon under the same condition as the above mentioned American steamers.
The Imperial Government believes it can assume that in this manner adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic Ocean can be afforded American citizens. There would, therefore, appear to be no compelling necessity for American citizens to travel to Europe in time of war on ships carrying an enemy flag. In particular the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board.
Germany merely followed England's example when she declared part of the high seas an area of war. Consequently, accidents suffered by neutrals on enemy ships in this area of war cannot well be judged differently from accidents to which neutrals are at all times exposed at the seat of war on land, when they betake themselves into dangerous localities in spite of previous warnings. If, however, it should not be possible for the American Government to acquire an adequate number of neutral passenger steamers, the Imperial Government is prepared to interpose no objections to the placing tinder the American flag by the American Government of four enemy passenger steamers for passenger traffic between North America and England. Assurances of "free and safe" passage for American passenger steamers would then extend to' apply under the identical pro-conditions to these formerly hostile passenger steamers.
The President of the United States has declared his readiness, in a way deserving of thanks, to communicate and suggest proposals to the Government of Great Britain with particular reference to the alteration of maritime war. The Imperial Government will always be glad to make use of the good offices of the President, and hopes that his efforts in the present case as well as in the direction of the lofty ideal of the freedom of the seas, will lead to an understanding.
The undersigned requests the Ambassador to bring the above to the knowledge of the American Government, and avails himself of the opportunity to renew to his Excellency the assurance of his most distinguished consideration. VON JAGOW.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL VON TRUPPEL IN GERMAN PRESS.-" The kernel of the matter from the German standpoint" said Admiral von Truppel, in closing, "is contained in this question: "Can we hope, so far as we are able to foresee, to force England to its knees through submarine warfare against her commerce?
"If the answer is in the negative, our submarines can find better employment against hostile war ships, particularly in the hunting grounds of the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. Submarine warfare against merchantmen in that case could be modified or abandoned to obtain a more favorable neutrality from and the friendship of America, which would be of great value to Germany after the war.
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the law of self-preservation would justify us in the situation which England has forced upon us in using to the fullest extent our superiority in submarines, and we can calmly accept all the consequences of it."—N. Y. Herald, 7/3.
"NEBRASKAN" TORPEDOED
LONDON, May 26.
The American steamer Nebraskan, Captain Green, from Liverpool May 24 for Delaware Breakwater, was torpedoed May 25 by a submarine at a point 40 miles west-southwest of Fastnet, off the south coast of Ireland. The Nebraskan remained afloat and returned to Liverpool. The report of Ambassador Page and Lieutenant J. H. Powers, Naval Attaché, confirmed the statement of the Nebraskan's officers that the vessel was torpedoed. On July 16 the German Government sent the following explanation and expression of regret:
"On the evening of May 25, last, the submarine met a steamer bound westward without a flag and with no neutral markings on her freeboard, about 35 nautical miles west of Fastnet Rock. No appliance of any kind for the illumination of the flag or markings was to be seen. In the twilight, which had already set in, the name of the steamer was not visible from the submarine. Since the commander of the submarine was obliged to assume, from his wide experience in the area of maritime war, that only English steamers and no neutral steamers traversed this war area without flag and markings, he attacked the vessel with a torpedo in the conviction that he had an enemy vessel before him.
"Some time after the shot the commander saw the vessel had in the meantime hoisted the American flag. As a consequence he, of course, refrained from any further attack. Since the vessel remained afloat be had no occasion to concern himself further with the boats which had been launched.
"It results from this, without a doubt, that attack on the steamer Nebraskan was not meant for the American flag, nor is it traceable to any fault on the part of the commander of the German submarine; hut is to be considered an unfortunate accident. The German Government expresses its regret at the occurrence to the Government of the United States of America and declares its readiness to make reparation for the damage thereby sustained by American citizens."
"ARMENIAN SUNK.—News received on June 30 that the Leyland liner Armenian, carrying a cargo of mules from this country to England, had been torpedoed off the coast of Cornwall, with the loss of a number of American citizens, occasioned the fear that the incident might still further aggravate relations between the United States and Germany. That fear, however, was dispelled by later reports, which made it clear that the Armenian had been challenged by the submarine and ordered to stop. Only when the order' was disobeyed and the vessel attempted to escape did the submarine open fire with shrapnel. It was under this bombardment that most of the lives were lost. The chase lasted an hour, the submarine all the time gaining on the Armenian. After the captain had surrendered his vessel, he and his crew were allowed time by the commander of the submarine to leave the ship, whereupon she was sunk by torpedoes.
Clearly, then, the submarine in this instance acted in strict accordance with international law, and the principal significance of the incident is that it disproves the German contention that submarines, in the nature of the case, are unable to obey the ordinarily accepted rules of warfare. The fate of the Armenian demonstrates that the new large type of German submarine, mounting guns, can fulfill the function of a commerce destroyer almost as effectively as a cruiser.
Later reports state that 29 were lost and 10 injured aboard the Armenian, chiefly Americans. The vessel was under operation by the Leyland Line, and not, it .seems, under direct charter by the British Government.— Nation, 7/8.
"ORDUNA" ATTACK. - A submarine attack made without warning on the British liner Orduna off the British coast was reported by passengers when the steamer arrived at New York to-day from Liverpool. The Orduna carried 227 passengers, including 21 Americans. The torpedo missed her, and none of a half-dozen shells tired at her when the submarine chased the steamer, took effect, those on the liner said. News of the attack on the Orduna upsets the theory of some Washington officials that Germany, while not yielding in the American diplomatic demands that unarmed ships be warned of attack in accordance with international law, is in practice observing that procedure. Acting on instructions received from ,Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, Collector of the Port Malone has visited the Cunard liner Orduna at her pier at West Fourteenth Street to investigate the attack made upon the ship by a German submarine, on July g, off the Irish coast.—Boston Transcript, 7/17.
DISPUTE OVER "FRYE" DAMAGES.-A controversy, distinct from that relating to submarine warfare, has continued regarding the method of awarding damages for the sinking of the William P. Frye by the Eitel Friedrich. Germany, while willing to make reparation for both ship and cargo, maintains in a note of June 7 that the Frye must go before the Hamburg prize court. Her contention is that Art. XIII of the Treaty of 1799 gives her the ript to stop American ships carrying contraband, and that in case of military necessity the destruction of the ship itself is thus justified.
Secretary Lansing in his reply of June 24 points out, however, that the same article provides:
“In the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall he permitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage…
“It seems clear to the Government of the United States, therefore, that whether the cargo of the Frye is regarded as contraband or as noncontraband, the destruction of the vessel was, as stated in my previous communication on this subject, a violation of the obligations imposed upon the Imperial German Government under existing treaty stipulations between the United States and Prussia.” . . . .
"The Government of the United States also dissents from the view expressed in your note that 'there would be no foundation for a claim of the American Government unless the 'prize courts should not grant indemnity in accordance with the treaty.' The claim presented by the American Government is for an indemnity for a violation of a treaty, in distinction from an indemnity in accordance with the treaty, and therefore is a matter for adjustment by direct diplomatic discussion between the two governments, and is in no way dependent upon the action of a German prize court.
"For the reasons above stated the Government of the United States cannot recognize the propriety of submitting the claim presented by it on behalf of the owners and captain of the Frye to the German prize court for settlement."
Following is the official text of the latest American note to Germany regarding submarine warfare, which was delivered to the Foreign Office at Berlin yesterday by Ambassador Gerard:
PRESIDENT'S NOTE TO GERMANY OF JULY 21
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO AMBASSADOR GERARD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, July 21, 1915.
You are instructed to deliver textually the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
The note of the Imperial German Government, dated July 8, 1915, has received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States, and it regrets to be obliged to say that it has found it very unsatisfactory, because it fails to meet the real differences between the two Governments and indicates no way in which the accepted principles of law and humanity may be applied in the grave matter in controversy, but proposes, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of these principles which virtually set them aside.
The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial German Government recognizes without reservation the validity of the principles insisted on in the several communications which this government has addressed to the Imperial German Government with regard to its announcement of a war zone and the use of submarines against merchantmen on the high seas—the principle that the high seas are free; that the character and cargo of a merchantman must first be ascertained before she can be lawfully seized or destroyed, and that the lives of non-combatants may in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being summoned to submit to examination; for a belligerent act of retaliation is per se an act beyond the law, and the defence of an act as retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal.
"Keenly Disappointed" by German Stand.—The Government of the United States is, however, keenly disappointed to find that the Imperial German Government regards itself as in large degree exempt from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in the present war with regard to neutral commerce.
The Imperial German Government will readily understand that the Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this government regards as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders. Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when they violate the right to life itself. If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers should dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in, it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offence against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected.
"Principles are Immutable."—The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstance and method of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval warf are which the nations of the world cannot have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea; but it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstance. The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them.
The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. The whole world has looked with interest and increasing satisfaction at the demonstration of that possibility by German naval commanders. It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it has aroused and remove the chief causes of offence.
In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the riqht of retaliation in defence of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the Lusitania or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act.
The Government of the United States, while not indifferent to the friendly spirit in which it is made cannot accept the suggestion of the Imperial German Government that certain vessels be designated and Agreed upon which shall be free on the seas now illegally proscribed. The very agreement would, by implication, subject other vessels to illegal attack and would be a curtailment, and therefore an abandonment, of the principles for which this government contends and which in times of calmer counsels every nation would concede as of course.
To Uphold Rights "At Any Cost."—The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the Government of the United States now solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time when co-operation may accomplish most and this great common object be most strikingly and effectively achieved.
The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may be in some measure accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be. The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever violated or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but is also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves, and holds itself ready at any time to act as the common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way.
In the meantime the very value which this government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly. LANSING.
GREAT BRITAIN
TRADE MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 22
On June 22 the British Government presented a Memorandum explaining the measures adopted for the restriction of trade with Germany and the concessions granted to American traders. The points made were, in brief, as follows:
(1) No confiscation of ships or cargo; measures taken to facilitate presentation of claims against Crown.
(2) Free passage to Germany of cotton sold before March 2 and shipped not later than March 31, or insured before March 2 and shipped not later than March 16.
(3) Payment of over 1430,000 to American claimants; settlement of all claims to date.
(4) Free passage of goods purchased in Germany and lying in neutral ports before March 1, or contracted and paid for and reaching a neutral port of shipment before March 16.
(5) Special treatment of dyestuffs, potash, beet seed, and other products essential to American industry.
(6) In view of greatly increased trade to United States from neutral ports, June 15 justified as final date for passage of goods from Germany; further extension of three months not justified.
(7) Delay in British prize courts due frequently to requests of claimants. Concessions that arc Lacking.—There is nothing in the memorandum submitted by the British Government to indicate that it will make any of the following concessions
(1) Permit and facilitate the shipment to the United States of goods bought in Germany after March t and shipped through a neutral port.
(2) Permit or facilitate the shipment to the United States of goods contracted for before March I and shipped through a neutral port if the goods had not been paid for before March T. and there are approximately $50,000,000 worth of goods embraced in this category.
(3) Permit the shipment now or hereafter of American cotton to Germany, even if consigned to a neutral port.
(4) Permit the shipment of non-contraband goods from the United States to Holland or a neutral country if such goods are destined for, or likely to be sent into Germany.
(5) Recognize the right of the United States as a neutral nation under recognized rules of international law to ship non-contraband goods to Holland, or any of the other neutral nations contiguous to Germany. The Neutral Blockade.—The United States Government has, and will continue, to freely admit that the British Government has a right to maintain a blockade of the German coast, if enforced effectively and made binding under the requirements of international law. But the United States Government has challenged, and it is understood that it will continue to challenge, any attempt to "blockade" a neutral coast like that of Holland, or that the British Government has any right to prevent innocent shipments coming to, or going from, the United States, by way of Rotterdam, in trade originating in Germany or having its destination there.—N. Y. Times, 6/25.
ITALY
TERMS OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE.—An Austro-Hungarian "White Paper" reproduced in the Vossische Zeitting of May 27 gives the following three clauses of the Triple Alliance treaty. This, instead of three separate instruments, seems to have consisted since December, 1912, of a single treaty with a special Austro-Italian annex in regard to Albania.
"Clause III.—In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more great powers not signatory of the present treaty and should become involved in a war with them, the casus faderis would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.
"Clause IV.—In case a great power not signatory of the present treaty should threaten the state of security of one of the high contracting parties and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against the great power, the two other contracting parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality toward their ally. Each of them reserves its right in this case to take part in the war if it thinks lit in order to make common cause with its ally.
"Clause VII.—Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the cast, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the powers signatory of the present treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all intentions and those of other powers. Should, however, the case arise that in the course of events the maintenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or 2Egean Sea becomes impossible, and that either, in consequence of the action of a third power or for any other reason, Austria or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two. powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interest and rightful claims of both parties."—N. Y. Times, 6/2.
Italy, in a note of justification delivered on May 25 to the neutral powers, further revealed the contents of Article I of the treaty, as follows: Article I of the treaty embodied the usual and necessary obligation of such pacts—the pledge to exchange views upon any fact and economic questions of 4 general nature that might arise pursuant to its terms. None of the contracting parties had the right to undertake, without a previous agreement, any step the consequence of which might impose a duty upon the other signatories arising out of the Alliance, or which would in any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests. This article was violated by Austria-Hungary when she sent to Serbia her note dated July 23, 1914, an action without the previous assent of Italy.—N. Y. Times, 5/26.
FATE OF ALRANIA
ROME, via PARIS, July 1.
The hoisting of the Montenegrin flag over the fortress of Scutari, Albania, is causing a greater feeling of discontent in the Italian capital than did the seizure of the Albanian towns of Tirana and Elbassan by Serbian forces.
The Italian Government is understood to have protested to both Serbia and Montenegro against the occupation of Albanian territory by their troops. Italy also has brought the matter officially to the attention of the governments of Great Britain, France and Russia,. which, with Italy, at the London conference of 1912 constituted Albania as an independent state and which also reached an agreement after the outbreak of the present war to settle definitely the Albanian question at the next peace conference. —N. Y. Herald, 7/1.
LONDON, Friday, July 9.
A dispatch to Reuter's Telegram Company from its Cettinje correspondent states that the government has officially announced that it will submit Albania's future to a decision of the powers.
GREECE AND THE BALKANS
RESULTS OF GREEK ELECTION
LONDON, July 5.
The Greek Cabinet, under Premier Gounaris, is apparently ready to defy popular opinion as expressed in the recent election, the returns of which made it evident that a vast majority of the nation is in favor of intervention on the side of the Allies.
The Athens correspondent of the Daily Telegraph sends a dispatch to-night that the Cabinet has announced that it has no intention of resigning, although the Venizelos party won the election with a clear majority of 180 in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead the government is making every endeavor to win over the Venizelos Deputies.
The Gounaris Ministry, which is avowedly against any participation by Greece in the war, has the backing of King Constantine and the Queen, sister of the Kaiser. Against the ministry is Eleutherios Venizelos, the Cretan lawyer, the most popular man in Greece, who resigned the premiership because of a clash with King Constantine. He is openly for intervention in order that Greece may co-operate in the settlement of the Turkish situation when the war is ended.
The convocation of the chamber has been postponed from June to the first week of July and later to August 16.—N. Y. Sun, 7/6.
ENTENTE OFFERS TO BULGARIA.—The Bulgarian reply of June 21 10 the note sent by the Entente Powers on May 29 was a non-committal request for further information.
LONDON, June 29.
An interesting indication of the negotiations of the Quadruple Entente with Bulgaria is given in an evidently inspired article published in the German press. No official confirmation of the accuracy of this German statement is given here. On condition that she immediately mobilize her army against Turkey, Bulgaria, it is declared, received the promise of Serbian Macedonia, the harbor of Kavalla with the hinterland of Thrace down to the line of Enos-Midia, and financial support for the purpose of carrying on the campaign. Besides this the Quadruple Entente pledged itself to broach to the Rumanian Government the question of the cession of Dobrudja.
At first it was not clear, says the German report, whether the offer of Serbian Macedonia included the whole of Macedonia or only the undisputed zone, which Serbia in 1912 agreed should in any event fall to Bulgaria, but which, as a matter of fact, she kept for herself after the second Balkan war. After ascertaining that the undisputed zone was meant, the Bulgarian Government drew up its answer, which is said to have consisted of the following series of questions:
1. What compensation has been promised to Serbia in return for the cession of the part of Macedonia offered to Bulgaria?
2. How far does the Quadruple Entente believe itself to be in a position seriously to make Bulgaria an offer in Serbian Macedonia?
3. What parts of Dobrudja is it intended to cede to Bulgaria by process of negotiation with Rumania?
4. What compensation is promised Greece in Asia Minor in the event of the cession of Kavalla to Bulgaria?
5. What is to be understood by the phrase hinterland of Kavalla?
The Bulgarian Government adds, says the German press, that it is forced to make these inquiries and obtain absolutely definite guarantees, because Bulgaria was exhausted by the wars of 1912 and 1913, and intervention in the present war would mean a great strain on the country.
The majority of the German papers unite in considering the Bulgarian answer ta be a snub to the Entente Powers. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the Italian dispatches still speak hopefully of Bulgarian intervention.—N. Y. Times, 6/29.
TIME LIMIT TO RUMANIA
(Dispatch to the London Morning Post)
BUCHAREST, July 12.
The Austro-Hungarian minister here, on Wednesday last, presented to the Prime Minister proposals offering Rumania certain concessions in exchange for definite neutrality and facilities for supplying Turkey with munitions of war.
She offers to cede to Rumania a part of Bukowina as far north as Sereth, and at the same time ameliorate the treatment of Rumanians in the monarchy, granting a university to Brashow, large admission of Rumanians in Hungary into the public service, and greater liberty of administration to the Rumanian churches.
An alternative proposal affects the entry of Rumania into the field of action on the side of the Germanic Powers.
A significant point is that there is fixed the term of one month within which either alternative arrangement must be agreed to. This is the time the Germans hope the Turks will be able to hold out the Dardanelles.
The proposals are being considered by the King and Prime Minister. In political circles they are regarded as a maneuver designed to delay diplomatic action by Rumania.—N. Y. Times, 7/13.
NEW BALKAN LEAGUE.—Much interest is attached to the reported meeting of representatives of the Balkan States at Athens early in July. This may mean a renewal of the Balkan alliance under the leadership of M. Venizelos, of Greece.
IRRESOLUTE NEUTRALS
(Extracts from article by E. J. Dillon in July Contemporary Review)
Bulgaria.—An eminent Bulgarian statesman put it to me: "We have much more to gain by the victory of the Germans and Austrians, who would make short work of Serbia and Greece and enrich us with the spoils, than by the success of the Allies, who are pledged to create a great Serbia and to contribute to the expansion of the Hellenic Kingdom. The principle of nationality laid down by the Allies condemns Bulgaria to vegetate within the narrowest geographical limits for all time." In this complaint there is truth, and in the policy complained of justice. The Bulgarian race is not numerous, and with the possible exception of Macedonia, it has no " unredeemed " territory. That is its misfortune. But to seek to remedy it by seizing and assimilating Serbs, Greeks, or Rumanians, would be a crime which in regenerate Europe is not likely to be tolerated.
Bulgaria's misfortune is that she is really ruled by an Austro-Hungarian officer, whose personal vanity has been stung to the quick by the action of the Powers, condemning to the theatrical old-clothes shop the Byzantine robes and paraphernalia which he was to have worn at Aya Sofia after his triumphal entry on a tame horse into Constantinople. One cannot severely blame Ferdinand of Coburg for his affection towards the land of his birth and youth, but it behoves diplomatists to bear in mind that for his part he would as lief trust his royal life to an average cavalry horse as favor any, arrangement which would bring Bulgaria into the field against Austria-Hungary.
The notions that because Bulgaria has a democratic constitution it is of little consequence who sits on the throne, and that war and peace no longer depend on the will of sovereigns, have been thoroughly exploded.
It is hardly too much to say that if a Russian, Serbian, or Montenegrin prince were reigning at Sofia in lieu of Ferdinand of Coburg, Bulgaria would long ago have resumed her place among the Balkan States, Turkey would never have dared to declare war, or if she had the Dardanelles would have been forced, Constantinople captured, and tens of thousands of valuable lives would have been spared.
Rumania.—As Bulgaria's attitude is influenced by the course of the operations against the Dardanelles, so Rumania's conduct has been regulated to some extent by military events in the Carpathians. With a powerful Russian army occupying Bukovina, the Rumanian invading forces would have, so to say, a right wing formed and ready to advance or support them. But since the Russian reverses in that province, and still more since the recent capture of Przemysl by the Austrians and Germans, Rumania, like a naked boy on the river's bank who stands shuddering at the thought of the coldness of the water, is afraid to take the plunge. And this is precisely the moral effect which was aimed at in Vienna and Berlin. It reinforces the work of corruption and intrigue which is being carried on by the agents of the two empires at Bucharest.
John Bratiano, the chief of the cabinet, is now virtually dictator of Rumania. Descended from an illustrious stock, he is penetrated with an overmastering sense of his own personal responsibility, from which the principal relief to be obtained lies in the indefinite prolongation of his liberty of choice. Finality in matters of momentous decision appears painful to him, and the standard of success which would fairly be applied to the policy of the ordinary statesman seems too lax for the man whose shoulders are pressed down with the weight of the kingdom as it is and the kingdom yet to come. Hence his anxiety to drive a brilliant bargain with the Allies and to leave no hold for hostile criticism at home. Like most patriots placed in responsible positions, he is bent on furthering what he considers the interests of his country in his own way, and, honestly convinced that the right way is his own, he has hitherto declined to share responsibility with the Opposition—which disapproves his Fabian policy—even though it numbers among its members a real statesman of the caliber and repute of Take Jonescu.
JAPAN AND CHINA
TREATY SIGNED, MAY 25
PEKING, May 25.
Two treaties between China and Japan, together with thirteen notes, were signed this afternoon at 3 o'clock in the Chinese Foreign Office. This act brought to a conclusion the negotiations which had been going on since last January, when. Japan, shortly after the fall of the German position of Kiao-Chau, presented her demands to China.
The only difference between the terms of the .ultimatum sent by Japan to China and the treaties signed to-day is the substitution of one for another mining right in South Manchuria.—N. Y. Times, 5/25.
U. S. NOTE TO CHINA AND JAPAN
PEKING, June 28.
Warning that the United States would not recognize any agreement between China and Japan which impaired American rights in China or endangered the so-called "open door"policy was conveyed to the Governments of both China and Japan in an identical note from Washington which was delivered about May is. The notes were handed to the foreign offices of both countries a week after China had acceded to the demands contained in the Japanese ultimatum, insisting upon concessions from the former nation.
The United States note was, in substance, as follows:
"In view of the negotiations which now are pending between the Government of China and the, Government of Japan, and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into, between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy, An identical note has been transmitted to the Japanese Government."
WASHINGTON, June 28.
The American note to China and Japan. sent early in May, was described by officials here as a caveat intended merely to conserve the rights of Americans in any ,future litigation. it was ref erred to as a legal precaution, and officials here wished it to be taken into consideration in the phrasing of any treaties or agreements which China and Japan might make as a result of the recent negotiations.—N. Y. Times, 6/29.
NAVAL NOTES
Naval developments in the following strategic areas will be considered separately and in turn:
PAGE
1. NORTH AND BALTIC SEAS 1364
2. MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 1372
3. THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC 1384
-1. THE FAR EAST 1384
BELLIGERENTS' WAR LOSSES
(On the left margin of this table of losses is a page reference to the Naval Institute War Notes.)
LOSSES OF BRITAIN AND IIER ALLIES.
BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES
{chart}
FRENCH WARSHIP LOSSES
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RUSSIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
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JAPANESE WARSHIP LOSSES
{chart}
ITALIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
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LOSSES OF GERMANY' AND HER ALLIES
GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES
{chart}
AUSTRIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
{chart}
TURKISH WARSHIP LOSSES
{chart}
TOTAL OF LOSSES
The Naval and Military Record of June 2 gives the total allied losses as 62 units of over 250,000 tons and the enemy losses as over 8o units of more than 200,000 tons. The tonnage of the allied losses has since been greatly increased by the loss of the Triumph and Majestic.
BRITISH NAVAL CASUALTIES—Mr. Asquith, replying to a question on June 15, said: " The casualties among officers and men of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and Royal Naval Division to May 31 are as follows, those resulting from the loss of the Bulwark and other accidents being included: Killed, 549 officers and 7696 of other ranks. Wounded 181 officers and 2262 of other ranks. Missing, 74 officers and 2785 of other ranks. Totals: 804 officers and 12,743 of other ranks, making altogether 13,547."—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/19
NORTH AND BALTIC SEAS
BRITISH SHIPS IN HOME WATERS
12 super-dreadnought battleships. 22 light cruisers.
(3 were due for completion 41 protected cruisers.
this year and are probably 198 destroyers.
now in commission.) 89 torpedo-boats.
11 dreadnought battleships. 70 submarines.
7 dreadnought battle cruisers. 7 mine layers.
37 pre-dreadnought battleships. 3 repair ships.
27 armored cruisers.
GERMAN SHIPS IN HOME WATERS
16 dreadnoughts. 30 light cruisers.
4 battle cruisers. 151 destroyers.
24 pre-dreadnoughts. 43 torpedo-boats.
9 armored cruisers. 38 submarines.
RUSSIAN SHIPS IN BALTIC WATERS
4 pre-dreadnought battleships. 80 destroyers.
13 armored and protected cruisers. 24 submarines.
2 light cruisers.
"OPHELIA CONDEMNED.—The German hospital ship Ophelia, which was captured in the North Sea on October t8 by the destroyer Meteor, was on May 21 condemned by the Naval Prize Court as a lawful prize. Leave to appeal was granted conditionally. The British Government asked for the condemnation of the vessel on the ground that although ostensibly a hospital ship She was in reality being used as a scout or spy by the enemy. Dr. Pfeiffer, who was in command of the Ophelia when she was seized, claimed her on behalf of the German Government. It was admitted, however, that she never had on board a single shipwrecked or wounded person. The president in delivering his reserved judgment, said his conclusions were that the Ophelia was not constructed, adapted, or used as a ship for the special and sole purpose of aiding the sick, wounded, or shipwrecked, and that she was in fact used as a signalling ship for military purposes, and forfeited her claim to protection. He therefore condemned her as a lawful prize.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/29.
DESTROYERS LOST.-It is a curious circumstance that, while in the first nine months of warfare no torpedo-boat destroyers were lost to the British Navy, at the beginning of the tenth month two vessels of this class should come to grief within a week of each other. The Recruit was sunk by a torpedo fired from a submarine on May 1., and the Maori by striking a mine off the Belgian coast On May 7. The propinquity of these two mishaps serves to remind us of the hazards to which the torpedo flotillas have been and must continue to be liable. It speaks very highly for the way in which these boats have been bandied that there have not been more losses. The amount Of work put in by the destroyers has been enormous. As the case of the Rodger, and the destruction of U 8 and U 12 showed, they have been the chief assailants of the enemy's submarines, keeping them so much on the move as to be too busy to interfere with more than a small number of our merchantmen, while the patrol work they have carried out has been of great value. Destroyers, in fact, have proved of utility in many ways not perhaps thought of by their creators. We could do probably with four or five times as many as we now possess and still find opportunities to employ others.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/15.
GERMAN SUBMARINE SUNK.--In the House of Commons on Wednesday (June 9), Mr. Balfour, whose statement was received with cheers, said: "I have to inform the House that within the last few days a German submarine has been sunk, and of her crew six officers and 21 men have been taken prisoners.
"As this raises again the question of the treatment of German submarine prisoners, in which the House has shown considerable interest, it may be convenient if I make a short statement on the subject. As stated in the answer given by my right honorable friend, the financial secretary to the Admiralty, on April 29, there is not, and for some weeks there has not been, any substantial difference between the treatment of German submarine prisoners and that of other prisoners of war. As there seems, however, some doubt in the public mind on this subject, I desire to say on behalf of the government that arrangements are being made under which the treatment will not merely be substantially, but absolutely identical. But this, I need scarcely say, does not indicate any change of opinion as to the character of the acts in which these prisoners have been concerned. We hold not merely that these .practices are in flagrant contradiction both of the letter and the spirit of the laws of war, but that they are in themselves mean, cowardly, and brutal. It must, however, be remembered that submarine attacks on defenceless vessels are very far from being the only violations of the laws of humanity of which the. Germans have been guilty. The government are, therefore, of opinion that the submarine problem cannot be treated in isolation, and that the general question of personal responsibility should be reserved to the end of the war."—Naval and Military
Record, 6/16.
BERLIN, June 17.
The Admiralty publicly announces 'the loss of the submarine U 1-4. Her crew was captured by the British.
The German submarines of U 14 class were built in 1911-12. Their displacement, submerge is 300 tons. They have a speed of thirteen knots above water and eight knots submerged. Their cruising radius is me miles. They carry three tubes.—N. Y. Times, 5/18.
An important new emotional factor has been injected into the question by reports printed here, that the destruction of the submarine U 14 was directly due to the humane conduct of her commander. She was fired upon and sunk by an English "fishing steamer " after her commander had signaled to the fishermen that they had five minutes in which to leave their vessel.
Pecalls Thordis Incident.—To this connection the Local Anceiger prints a column communication from " A Highly Placed Personage," bitterly recalling that King George had given the Distinguished Service Order to the merchant captain of the steamer Thordis for ramming and sinking a German submarine, while the Admiralty made him a lieutenant in the Naval Reserve, " thus rewarding, justifying, and encouraging ramming and other hostile acts by merchantmen." The communication adds: ”There is not the slightest doubt that England, by this official act of the King, forfeited all further claims upon our submarines to live up to the usual rules of naval warfare in the future."—N. Y. Times, 5/19.
"PRINCESS IRENE " DESTROYED—On May 27 the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement:
"H. M. auxiliary ship Princess Irene was accidentally blown up in Sheerness Harbor this morning. So far as is yet known, only one survivor was picked up."
The steamship Princess Irene was one of two large steamers recently completed for the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, and intended for the Pacific Coast trade. The ill-fated steamer was built by Messrs. Denny & Co., at the Dumbarton shipyard, and completed this year. She was of 5934 gross tonnage, was fitted with geared turbines, and had oil-fired boilers.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/5.
TORPEDO-BOATS LOST.—The first British torpedo-boats to be lost during the war have been sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea. On June 10, the Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following: "I-us Majesty's torpedo-boats Nos. 10 and 12, whilst operating off the east coast, were torpedoed by an enemy submarine early this morning and sunk. The survivors, forty-one in number, have been landed." These vessels belonged to a group of 36 boats built between 1906 and 1908. Originally classed as "coastal destroyers," which name indicated their role, they were later reduced to the grade of first-class torpedo-boats, owing to their small size and indifferent sea-keeping qualities. No. so was built by Thornycroft's and No. 12 by Yarrow. They displaced 215 tons, had a length of 166/1 2 feet, and were fitted with Parsons turbines of 3750 horse-power, giving a speed of 26 knots. Oil fuel was burned exclusively. An armament of two 12-pounder guns and three torpedo-tubes was carried. The lists both of lost and survivors published by the Admiralty contained no officers' names.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
THE "ROXBURGH" TORPEDOED.—The Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement on June 24: "His Majesty's ship Roxburgh was struck by a torpedo on Sunday, June 20, in the North Sea, but the damage sustained was not serious, and she was able to proceed under her own steam. There were no casualties."
The Roxburgh is an armored cruiser of 10,850 tons displacement, launched in 1904. She carries four 7.5-inch and six 6-inch guns.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/26.
LONDON, July 1.
The torpedo-boat destroyer Lightning was damaged last night off the east coast by a mine or torpedo explosion. She is now in harbor. Fifteen members of the crew were lost.
The Lightning is the third of her class to be lost by the British since the war began. The others were the Recruit, on May r, and the Maori, on May 8. The Lightning was a boat of 320 tons, carried so officers and men, and was armed with one 12-pounder and five 6-pounders. She was built in 1895.—N. Y. Times, 7/2.
"U 30" RAISED.—The German submarine U 30, which was sunk off the mouth of the Ems through an accident, has been raised and only one man of the crew, who for thirty-six hours were on the sea bottom, is dead, according to despatches to the Telegraaf, of Amsterdam, of July 5. The underwater boat has been towed to Emden for repairs.
BLOCKADE RESULTS.—Since the beginning of the German submarine blockade there have been 24,442 arrivals and sailings of vessels of all nationalities in and from United Kingdom ports, and during that period 82 British merchant vessels, aggregating 252,686 tons, have been lost, five having been sunk or captured by enemy cruisers, two sunk by mines, and 75 sunk by submarines. During the same period 72 fishing vessels, aggregating 12,035 tons, have been lost, six having been sunk by mines and 66 sunk or captured by enemy ships.
From the date of the beginning of the war the British losses in shipping have aggregated 543,104 tons, 145 British merchant vessels of 524,080 tons aggregate, and 118 fishing vessels aggregating 19,024 tons having been sunk or captured. Of the merchant ships 86 have been sunk by submarines, 56 sunk or captured by cruisers, and 13 sunk by mines. of the fishing boats 24 have been sunk by mines and 94 sunk or captured by enemy ships. —London Times, 6/16.
The German war zone decree went into effect on February 18. Since then the weekly losses of ships and lives from torpedoes have been as follows:
Week Ending Vessels Lives Week Ending Vessels Lives
Feb. 25 11 9 May 20 7 13
Mar. 4 1 0 May 27 7 7
Mar. 11 7 38 June 3 36 21
Mar. 18 6 13 June 10 36 21
Mar. 25 7 2 June 17 19 19
Apr. 1 13 165 June 24 3 1
Apr. 8 8 13 July 1 9 29
Apr. 15 4 0 July 8 15 2
Apr. 22 3 10 July 15 12 13
Apr. 29 3 0 July 22 2 0
May 6 24 5
May 13 2 1,260 Total 235 1,641
—N. Y. Times, 7/23.
BALTIC
NAVAL ACTIVITY.—A Reuter telegram from Petrograd on Monday stated that the following was communicated from an authorized source:
"On June 3 the look-out stations on our coast and our submarines doing scouting duties revealed enemy activity near our coast, especially at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
"At the same time enemy torpedo-boats preceding large vessels approached the entrance to the Gulf, but they retired when they saw our forces approaching. Shortly afterwards the enemy sent out hydroplanes, which attacked our ships. The attacks of the hydroplanes were fruitless, all their projectiles missing our ships, and our artillery drove them away.
"On June 6 the enemy repeated an attempt to approach our shore, but attacked by our submarines, fell back. At the same time our transport Yenissei was attacked and sunk by an enemy submarine in the Baltic Sea. Thirty-two men were saved.
"On June 6 reports from our coastguards and scouting submarines state that mines had been successfully laid on the route of the enemy, and by means of these and of submarine attacks three of the enemy's vessels had been sunk or damaged."—Naval and Military Record, 6/12.
In the Baltic the Germans have taken Libau, and have apparently, under cover of the fleet, endeavored to land troops in the hostile territory. Thus they may hope to make good their footing across the border. To cover these operations, some of their vessels penetrated the enemy's waters further to the north, where they have been met by the light cruisers and torpedo craft of the Russians, and have apparently suffered loss both from submarines and mines. The Russians claim a large armored ship and three vessels of a class not described, while they have themselves had a mine layer sunk, but appear to have been able to prevent the success of the German admiral's undertaking.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
BALTIC ENGAGEMENT OF JULY 2
PETROGRAD, July 4 (via LONDON, July 5).
A detailed story of Friday's naval action in the Baltic is given in a Russian official statement issued to-night. This communication follows: "The Russian cruisers Rurik, Makaroff, Bayan, Bogatyr, and Oleg encountered the enemy at 8 o'clock in the morning between the Island of Oeland and the Courland coast. The enemy consisted of a light cruiser of the Augsburg class, a mine layer, and three destroyers.
"The sea was shrouded in a fog so dense that the ships frequently were wallowed up in darkness, and therefore the gunfire was inaccurate. The Russians, attempting to intercept the enemy's retreat, were attacked by the torpedo-boats, but were unharmed: In a half hour the Augsburg, finding the Russian fire too hot, abandoned her slower consort and fled full speed southward.
"The Albatross (the German mine layer) began to show signs of distress, and the torpedo-boats endeavored to assist her escape, throwing volumes of thick, black smoke out of their funnels and rendering the fog more dense, but at 9 o'clock the foremast of the Albatross was shot away, clouds of steam arose, and the doomed ship began to list to starboard.
"Hauling down her flag she made for the coast: As she was badly damaged and was entering neutral waters, the Russians ceased firing, and soon she was seen to go ashore behind the Oestgarn's lighthouse.
"The Russians cruised northward. At 10 o'clock they sighted a squadron of the enemy, including an armored cruiser of the Roon class; a light cruiser of the Augsburg class, and four destroyers: The Russians immediately joined battle and a half hour later the enemy began to retreat, while several submarines attacked the Russians unsuccessfully.
"The Rurile was sent at full speed after the retreating vessels, which were joined by another cruiser of the Bremen class. The Rurik soon had the satisfaction of seeing the effect of her salvos, for the enemy's fire weakened. The Roon's four 8-inch guns were silenced and fire broke out aboard. Obviously disliking further conflict the enemy disappeared rapidly in the fog.
"The Russians sustained trifling damage. No one was killed; fourteen men were wounded.
"Shortly afterwards the Russians were attacked by torpedoes from submarines, but were protected by Russian torpedo-boats which arrived to reinforce them. One of these torpedo-boats was damaged in driving off the submarine attack."—N. Y. Times, 7/5.
DANZIG BAY ENGAGEMENT.—An official communication issued by the Russian War Office says a Russian submarine with two torpedoes blew up a German warship of the Deutschland class July 2, which was steaming at the head of a German squadron at the entrance of Danzig Bay. One of the Russian destroyers, it is claimed, rammed a German submarine which was attempting to approach the Russian warships. The destroyer suffered slight damage in the collision.
The British Admiralty on July 8 stated that it was officially announced at Petrovad that the submarine which made a successful attack on a German warship of the Deutschland class of pre-dreadnoughts on July 2 in the Baltic was a British boat. This is the first announcement that British submarines were operating in the Baltic Sea. It is presumed that the British boat passed through the Cattegat from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea and then traveled eastward for 200 miles, as the Bay of Danzig, where the warship was attacked, lies in the southeastern part of that body of water the distance from an English port to Danzig is about 900 miles.—Army and Navy Journal, 7/10.
BERLIN, July 5 (via LONDON).
The Russian report regarding the destruction of a vessel of the Deutschland (battleship) class is untrue, according to a semi-official statement issued here. It also is denied that the mine layer Albatross lowered the German flag before running ashore on Swedish territory. The Russians are said to have fired 1500 shots at the Albatross of which only 25 were hits. An eye-witness of the naval battle asserts that nearly the entire stern of one Russian warship was shot away.
Revised estimates place the number of killed on the Albatross at thirty and three more men believed to be dying. Thirty other wounded sailors are now doing well.—N. Y. Times, 7/6.
HORTON SANK "POMMERN"
LONDON, July 21.
The commander of the British submarine which sank a German warship in the Baltic on July 2 was Max Horton, according to announcement by Thomas AilacNamara, Under Secretary for the Admiralty. The German battleship which was sunk is supposed to have been the Pommern. Commander Horton handled a submarine which sank a German destroyer off the mouth of the Ems last October.—N. Y. Sun, 7/22.
In Monday's issue of the Daily Telegraph, Mr. Hurd, dealing with the Russian success in the Baltic, shows that Germany's pre-" dreadnought" battleship strength has been practically reduced by 10 per cent, because she had only tell vessels of much lighting value, all her other pre-dreadnoughts having only 9.4-inch guns of forty calibers. She has suffered for her move into the Baltic as she suffered for her move into the North Sea last January, and as Mr. Hurd shows, she cannot afford these losses, for they undermine the nation's confidence in its fleet.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/10.
ADRIATIC
NAVAL STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA AND ITALY.—The Austrian Navy, by the present moment, includes four dreadnought's of the latest type and formidable gun power, nine older battleships Ill various stages of obsolescence, together with a few fairly modern armored cruisers; but she has no up-to-date battle-cruisers, either ,on the water or on the stocks—a curious deficiency for a naval power of her strength and ah ally of Germany.
Austria also possesses a squadron of five comparatively useless battleships of the oldest type, also two light cruisers and four torpedo gunboats, besides 20 torpedo-boats and some destroyers. Her navy is now in a state of transition, which places her under a heavy handicap which, however, is not peculiar to Austria, as in these fast moving times all navies are kept in a state of transition by the inventors and scientists. In addition to the above ships the Austrians have also some monitors and river gunboats, etc., on the Danube.
In respect to the naval position of Italy, that country, like Austria, is without battle-cruisers of the latest type, but she has six dreadnoughts of the most powerful class, and a second line of pre-dreadnoughts which number about 17 of all types; a group which entirely outclasses the pre-dreadnought and second line ships of the Austrian war fleet of the largest tonnage and armament. Sh6 also has from four to six ships of our second class cruiser type, whose largest guns consist of a group of twelve 6-inch weapons. These ships are of the Marco Polo class. Italy has, ill addition to the above groups of battleships, about six new dreadnoughts on the stocks, or in the completing stage, which are of the latest design and will carry, it is believed, the heaviest guns afloat in the ships of any navy. The battleship strength of Italy, both present and prospective, far exceeds that of her neighbor and opponent. The Italian Navy also includes about 40 torpedo-boats and between 30 and 40 very efficient destroyers and 20 submarines of a good model, as well as eight light cruisers, two of quite recent date, and six older cruisers of some value, and a number of old and new gunboats for shallow water work. Altogether therefore, the Italian fleet is a large and efficient group of warships, manned by a young and excellently trained personnel. In fact, the fleet of Italy is a great acquisition to the Allied side and in every way worthy to take its plate beside the navies of Great Britain, France and Russia. Its submarines, especially, will be very useful in the Adriatic.-United Service Gazette, 6/24.
AUSTRIAN ACCOUNT OF LOSS OF "GAMIIETTA."—Austrian newspapers publish an interview with the lieutenant of the Austrian U 5 on how he sank the French cruiser Leon Gambetta, on April 28. "I noticed the enemy's ship steaming with covered lights twenty miles off Cape Leuca," said the commander. "The moon was bright, but there were some clouds. I started and approached to within 700 yards before I fired the first torpedo. This was immediately followed by a second, arid both found their mark. There were two explosions, and I saw two columns of smoke rise as high as the masts. After the second torpedo I cruised round the vessel. Five minutes after being torpedoed the Leon Gambetta had a list of 35 degrees and sank in nine minutes. Then several lights were seen on the water. These belonged to five lifeboats the French had managed to launch. Their speed was remarkable. It was impossible to help in the rescue work without endangering my own vessel."—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/8.
AUSTRIAN RAID.—On May 24, the Italian Ministry of Marine says that the Austrian torpedo-boat S20, having approached the canal at Porto Corsini (on the Adriatic), was so seriously damaged by fire from Italian batteries that she was forced to be convoyed to Pola. The torpedo-boat destroyer Scharfschuetze, which was operating with the S 20, also was damaged, suffering the loss of many of her crew. The Austrian scout ship Novara was struck several times and also had several of her crew killed, including an officer. The Austrian destroyer Ozepel also suffered severe losses, due to the arrival of an Italian naval squadron during the action. The report also states that during a chase the Italian torpedo-boat destroyer Turbine, 330 tons, built in tgot, was sunk, after catching fire. Nine men of the Turbine were saved by the Italian fleet, and thirty-five more were picked up by the Austrians, including the commander.—Army and Navy Journal, 6/5.
MONFALCONE CAPTURED.—On June 10 it was announced that the Italians had captured the Austrian town and port of Monfalcone, a shipbuilding center for smaller vessels of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. By the capture of Mon falcone, Italy has secured an important arsenal, a dockyard, in which several torpedo craft were under construction, and big stores of munitions and grain. Monfalcone had been thrice bombarded by light Italian warships on May 31, June 5, and June 7, but it was not until a strong attack from the land side, supported by a vigorous artillery fire, that the city was occupied.
Monfalcone, where are important shipbuilding yards, is on the northernmost bay of the Gulf of Trieste, and is only 15 miles northwest of the city of that name. It is about io miles from the Italian frontier, and is thejunction of the railway which enters Italy at Cervignano and continues to Venice, and that which runs northward through Giirz and along the valley of the Isonzo. It is most probable that Austrian warcraft were in course of construction at Monfalcone, though doubtless destroyed by the retreating enemy.—Naval and Military Record, 6/16.
ROME, June 15 (Dispatch to the London Daily News).
Refugees from Gradisca now at Florence say two cruisers and one transatlantic liner were under construction in the yards at Monfalcone, which fell into Italy's hands June to. Work on these vessels was proceeding night and day, and 3600 hands were employed.
When prior to the Italian occupation, bombs were dropped by airmen on the place, the shipyards were set on fire and the workmen were seized with panic and fled. The Austrians sank lighters loaded with stones and sand in the canal, thus obstructing the entrance.—N. Y. Times, 6/16.
"MEDUSA" SUNK
VENICE, June 18.
Details have been received of the recent remarkable engagement on June 17, between an Italian and an Austrian submarine, in which the Italian boat was vanquished.
The Italian boat, the Medusa, having a displacement of 300 tons and a crew of fourteen men, was lying submerged, and the Austrian boat was not far away, also tinder water. Neither had any intimation of the presence of the other.
The Medusa came to the surface first, swept the horizon with her periscope, and finding the way clear, emerged. Shortly after the Austrian boat decided to come up. She sent up her periscope and saw the Italian not far away. Recognizing an enemy, she immediately attacked, and one shot from her torpedo was sufficient to send the Medusa to the bottom.
One report has it that an officer and four members of the crew of the Medusa escaped and were made prisoners by the Austrians.—N. Y. Times, 5/19.
The Austrian submarine U is was bombarded and sunk in the Adriatic by a French aeroplane July 1, as officially reported by the French Minister of Marine. The U 11 was lying on the surface and apparently failed to notice the aviator as he circled overhead. The aeroplane shot downward to within 45 feet of the submarine's deck, and two bombs were dropped, both of which struck the submarine near the turret and exploded before it could submerge. The submarine sank almost instantly. Wreckage was afterward found about the scene. The U 11 was one of the newest of the Austrian submersibles and displaced about 86o tons. She is supposed to have had aboard a crew of 25 men. This is the second time in history that an aeroplane has sunk a submarine. The previous event was the sinking of an Italian submarine by an Austrian airman.—Army and Navy Journal, 7/10.
"AMALFI” LOST
Roma, July 8.
The Italian armored cruiser Amalfi was torpedoed and sunk at dawn yesterday morning by an Austrian submarine while taking part in a reconnoissance in the Upper Adriatic. Official announcement of the disaster is made by the Ministry of Marine. Most of the members of the crew were saved.
The text of the statement, which bears yesterday's date, follows:
"A reconnoissance in force was accomplished last night (July 6) in the Upper Adriatic. The Amalfi, which took part in the reconnoissance, was torpedoed at dawn this morning by an Austrian submarine and soon listed heavily to port.
"The commander, before giving orders to the crew to jump overboard, cried Long live the King, long live Italy!' The entire crew, drawn up along the stern, echoed the shout, giving a remarkable exhibition of courage and discipline.
"The commander, who was the last to leave, slipped overboard shortly before the Amalfi sank. Nearly all the officers and crew were saved."
The Amalfi, which was completed in 19o8, had a displacement of 9958 tons and was 426 feet long. Her complement in time of peace was 684.
The cruiser, with her sister ship, the Pica, wag characteristically an Italian craft, having been designed by Cerlando, the inventor of the dreadnought type, the first one of which he built for England in 1904-06. A feature of the Amalfi was her guns. They were placed at the unusual height of 22 feet above the water; all were electrically controlled from a single base, and all had central pivot mountings.—N. Y. Times, 7/8.
"GARIBALDI" TORPEDOED
ROME, July 19.
An official statement issued from general headquarters to-day says:
"At dawn July 18 a division of our old armored cruisers approached Cattaro and bombarded and seriously damaged the railway near by.
"While our vessels were retiring they were attacked by enemy submarines, and the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi, after having avoided the first attack, was struck by a torpedo and sunk. The crew remained calm, and nearly all were saved."
The Garibaldi, although classed as either a battleship or an armored cruiser, was in reality a gigantic gunboat on account of her small but heavy main battery and her large secondary battery of all sorts. She was an experiment designed by Orlando, the inventor of the first British dreadnought, although not built by him, as was her sister ship, the Varese. Another sister ship is the Francesco Ferrucio. All three were built with the prime idea of conducting operations against land fortifications while protecting themselves against lighter craft that might be sent against them.
The Garibaldi was laid down in 1898 and finished in 1901. She was 344 feet long, 59 feet beam, and her maximum draft was only 25 feet. She had a displacement of 7400 tons, and was manned by 517 officers and men. Her speed was 20 knots and she cost about $1,200,000.
Ragusa, near where the Giuseppe Garibaldi was sunk, is a fortified seaport of Austria-Hungary, in Dalmatia, on a peninsula of the Adriatic Sea, 38 miles northwest of Cattaro.—N. Y. Times, 7/20.
ADRIATIC CLOSED TO MERCHANT VESSELS
WASHINGTON, July 8.
Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page to-day notified the State Department, in a cablegram sent from Rome yesterday, that the Italian Government had closed the Adriatic Sea to navigation by merchant vessels of all countries, but that safe convoy would be furnished for ships wishing to enter ports on the Adriatic belonging to Italy or occupied by Italy or Montenegro. The report read in part:
"The Italian Government informs me that from July 6 the blockade declared by it on the 26th and 28th of last May has been extended to all the zones of the Adriatic Sea north of the line Otranto-Aspri-Ruga (Strade Blanche). Navigation in this sea north of this line is considered forbidden to all merchant vessels of all countries.
"A safe convoy will be delivered by the Ministry. of War or by its agents to ships wishing to enter ports on the Adriatic Sea belonging to or occupied by Italy or Montenegro.—N. Y. Times, 7/8.
MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEAS AND DARDANELLES
The naval powers are represented in the Mediterranean as follows:
FRANCE
4 dreadnoughts.
18 pre-dreadnoughts. 84 destroyers.
(All carry 12-inch guns.) 153 torpedo-boats.
20 armored and protected cruisers. (Most of these are small and probably
n light cruisers. suitable only for harbor defense work.)
(Several of these were abroad 70 submarines
at the opening of the war.)
GREAT BRITAIN
3 battle cruisers. 6 submarines.
4 armored cruisers. (3 at Malta; 3 at Gibraltar.)
16 destroyers and depot ships. 16 torpedo-boats.
2 gunboats.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
3 dreadnoughts. 19 destroyers.
(Only the dreadnoughts and 3 11 submarines.
of the pre-dreadnoughts are 58 torpedo-boats.
armed with 12-inch guns. (These torpedo-boats are only
The others carry 9.4-inch 200 tons or smaller; armed
weapons.) for the most part with 3-
12 pre-dreadnoughts. pounders.)
2 armored cruisers.
12 light cruisers.
(Including 3 nearing completion
at the outbreak of the
war.)
THE RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET
Warships Tonnage Horsepower Guns Torpedo Tubes
10 battleships 150,522 153,215 336 29
2 cruisers 13,350 39,000 60 4
22 destroyers 15,500 297,500 58 48
14 torpedo-boats 2,082 30,080 30 32
2 torpedo-boat transports 6,839 4,137 20 …
II submarines 4,873 13,590 7 30
4 gunboats 5,059 5,937 11 …
7 transports 28,046 14,872 … …
1 despatch boat 400 3,300 6 2
2 yachts 3,820 7,780 16 …
12 port vessels 13,373 7,808 22 …
-
243,864 577,219 566 150 warships
THE TURKISH FLEET
1 battle cruiser 22,640 70,000 34 4
3 battleships 29,320 31,400 94 6
I coast defence ship 2,400 2,200 22 …
2 protected cruisers 8,220 34,300 28 4
2 torpedo gunboats 1,540 10,200 24 6
9 destroyers 3,930 4,500 56 20
15 torpedo-boats 1,990 30,000 18 8
-
70,040 182,600 276 48 warships
-N. Y. Herold, 3/6.
AUSTRALIAN SUBMARINE SUNK
TURKS REPORT THAT IT WAS TRYING TO APPROACH CONSTANTINOPLE
LONDON, May 11.
The Admiralty tonight issued the following statement:
"A Turkish official communication coming by way of Berlin and Amsterdam says the Australian submarine AE 2 has been sunk by Turkish warships while trying to enter the Sea of Marmora, and that the crew of three officers and 29 men were taken prisoners.-N. Y. Times, 5/12.
"GOLIATH" TORPEDOED BY DESTROYER.-It was suggested in the official communique that the Irresistible and Ocean were destroyed by floating mines, and that the Bouvet met her fate in a similar manner. Since March 18, the menace of the floating mine seems to have been met. Then on May 12, the Goliath, when protecting the French flank just inside the Straits, was torpedoed by a destroyer in a night attack. There have been no further details of this affair published from the British side. The Turks, however, have stated that the successful boat was the Muaveitet-i-Millet, one of a quartette built by the Schichau Company, at Elbing, in 1909, a comparatively modern 35-knot vessel. Mr. Churchill, in the House of Commons, in the only official announcement made about the matter, did not explain how the. Goliath was at the time protecting the French flank, but presumably she was there to defend the boats engaged in landing supplies, or was prepared to open fire on the enemy if they made a night attack on the trenches. The loss of the Triumph appears to have occurred in somewhat similar circumstances when she was protecting or supporting the left of the Dominions' contingent. The misfortune seems to have happened on May 12, and as the submarine which successfully torpedoed her was chased until dark, it was manifestly a daylight attack.--Army and Navy Gazette, 5/29.
H. M. S. " TRIUMPH " SUNK
LONDON, May 27.
The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:
"While operating yesterday (May 26) in support of the Australian and New Zealand forces on shore on the Gallipoli Peninsula, H. M. S. Triumph (Captain Maurice Fitzmaurice, R. N.) was torpedoed by a submarine, and sank shortly afterwards.
"Tile majority of the officers and men are reported as saved, including the captain and commander. "The submarine was chased by the destroyers and patrolling small craft until dark."—Naval and Military Record, 6/2.
"MAJESTIC" SUNK
LONDON, May 27.
The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:
"An enemy submarine torpedoed and sank H. M. S. Majestic (Captain H. F. G. Talbot) this morning while supporting the army on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
"Nearly all the officers and men were saved.—Naval and Military Record, 6/2.
THE LOST BATTLESHIPS.—}ES Majesty's ship Triumph, which was torpedoed by an enemy submarine last week, was one of two 20-knot battleships (the other is the Swiftsure), which were purchased from the Chilean Government in January, 1903. Her normal displacement was 11,800 tons, and her complement 700. She had four 10-inch guns, fourteen 7.5-inch, fourteen 14-pounders, one 12-pounder, 8 cwt., four 6-pounders, and four Maxims, besides torpedo-tubes. The Triumph was designed by Sir E. J. Reed and built by Messrs. Vickers.
His Majesty's ship Majestic (Captain H. F. G. Talbot), sunk on the day after the Triumph, was one of nine battleships of the class named after her, all of which date from 1894-1896. At the time they were built they were the finest ships in the world, and are still most serviceable vessels. The Majestic was a Portsmouth ship, completed in 1895. She was of 14,900 tons displacement, carrying four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, with a nominal speed of 17.9 knots.
The Majestic is the fifth British battleship to be lost in the Dardanelles, the others being the Irresistible and Ocean, sunk on March 18, the Goliath, sunk on May 13, and the Triumph, sunk on May 25. The French battleship Bouvet was also lost on March i8. The Irresistible, Ocean, and Bouvet were mined, or struck by a Leon torpedo, which is a kind of locomotory mine. The Goliath was torpedoed, apparently at night, by a Turkish torpedo-boat. The Triumph and Majestic were torpedoed by a submarine. Hostile submarines could draw supplies from Turkish ports on the Mediterranean, and the many islands of the Archipelago of Turkey in Asia afford harborage. The naval operations in the Dardanelles must necessarily take place in waters peculiarly dangerous.—United Service Gazette, 6/3.
TURKISH VERSION.—The nature of the duty which necessarily falls to our ships while supporting the troops ashore is such as to expose them to torpedo attack under conditions that strongly favor the attackers. From the—for once—straightforward and lucid Turkish account of the Triumph's loss it appears that the ill-fated ship, accompanied by two destroyers, was moving very slowly with nets out. Light cruisers and more destroyers were near at hand. These precautions suggest that the submarine danger was clearly realized. That in spite of the attendant destroyers the enemy submarine was able to approach within range and fire her torpedo with perfect accuracy shows her to have been most ably handled.—Naval and Military Record, 6/2.
FRENCH MINE LAYER SUNK.—An official note issued at Paris, June 7, said:
"During the night of June 3-4 the French mine layer Casablanca struck a mine at the entrance to the Aegean Sea. The captain, one officer, and 64 of the crew were rescued by a British destroyer. It is possible that other survivors may have succeeded in gaining the coast and are prisoners in the hands of the Turks."—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
The Casablanca was a vessel of 495 tons. She was 262 feet long and had a complement of 128 men.—N. Y. Times, 6/8.
TURKISH CRUISER RAISED.—A despatch from Odessa June 8 reports that the Turkish armored cruiser Medjidieh, which was blown up by a Russian mine near Odessa in the early part of April, has been raised and brought into Odessa for repairs.—Army and Navy Journal, 6/19.
"BRESLAU" ATTACKED—It was officially stated in Petrograd on June 12 that on the previous night "near the Bosporus two Russian torpedo-boat destroyers encountered the Breslau, whose searchlights showed up one of our turbine destroyers, which at once attacked the cruiser. A very violent exchange of shots took place, and it was observed on board our vessel that several shells struck the cruiser. Explosions were heard on board her, and a fire was noticed in her bow. Owing to the darkness, however, it was impossible to see how seriously the enemy had been damaged. On board the destroyer which attacked an officer and six men were wounded." A Reuter message from Athens on June 15 said that "according to credible information the cruiser Breslau, during her encounter with the Russian squadron in the Black Sea on June II, suffered damage and the loss of 12 officers and 8o men killed. Several torpedo-boats and two colliers are said to have been sunk."—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
RUSSIAN SUBMARINE ACTIVE
PETROGRAD, July 3.
An official statement issued by the Admiralty to-day reads:
"A Russian submarine in the Black Sea to-day torpedoed and sank a steamer of 2500 tons. It then set fire to and sank a sailing ship of 1500 tons. Subsequently a small steamer was sent to the bottom. Three vessels were in the neighborhood of Kesken and were laden with coal and provisions.
"The submarine also shelled another steamer anchored in the river, and several coal-laden barges and a tug were driven ashore.
"Near the mouth of the Bosporus the submarine came into action with an armored schooner. After an exchange of shots this vessel, with two others of a similar type were run ashore."—N. Y. Times, 7/4.
WORK or BRITISH SUBMARINES.—A Turkish. headquarters report received via Berlin on May 24 stated ,that the twenty-five-year-old Turkish gunboat Pelenk-i-deria was sunk on the previous afternoon by a hostile submarine. The crew, with the exception of two killed, were uninjuyed. The Pelenk-i-deria, which was built in 189o, had a tonnage of 775 and carried two 4-inch Krupp guns, six 3-pdrs., and three 4-inch tubes. This is a still further success for the Allied submarine flotilla, and the identity of the boat will be awaited with interest. The ships known to have been sunk by E Li are four in number: (1) A gunboat of the Berk-i-Satvet class (built in 1906, of 740 tons, with two 4-inch, six 6-pdrs., two machine and two other guns), on her passage to the Sea of Marmora; (2) a transport on April 29; (3),a gunboat on May 3; and (4) a very large transport full of troops on May 10. In addition, she compelled a small steamer to run herself aground on May 13. An account cabled to the Daily Chronicle by its correspondent, Mr. Renwick, says that E Li had eight torpedoes on board, and not one was wasted. The vessel ran many risks, not only from the mines which are always floating down stream in the Straits, but she had also to run the gauntlet of the land batteries' and of the submerged torpedo-tubes under the rocky shores of the Straits. The Turco-German outlooks at certain of these points were aware of the submarine's presence. Her skillful commander, however, took her safely through the mine-fields, past the torpedo-tube stations, and past the batteries, several of which opened fire on her.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/21.
"E 11" OFF CONSTANTINOPLE.—On May 27 the Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following statement:
"A message has been received from vice admiral,: East Mediterranean, reporting that submarine E ii (Lieutenant Commander Martin E. Iasmith) has sunk in the Sea of Marmora a vessel containing a great quantity of ammunition, comprising charges for heavy howitzers, several gun-mountings, and a 6-inch gun. She also chased a supply ship with a heavy cargo of stores, and torpedoed her alongside the pier at Rodosto.
A small store ship was also chased and run ashore. Submarine E 11 entered Constantinople and discharged a torpedo at a transport alongside the arsenal. The torpedo was heard to explode.
A telegram from Constantinople on June 1 reports that a British sub- Marine has torpedoed two Turkish transports, one of which was laden with troops, in the Sea of Marmora. One of the vessels was steamer No. 62, belonging to the Mahsussien Company. Like the other transport that was sunk, it was carrying troops to the Dardanelles.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/5.
TALE OF "E 11”
LONDON, June 28.
The Chronicle publishes the following account, by one of the crew, of the exploit of the British submarine E II, for which Lieutenant Commander Nasmith received the Victoria Cross and each of his men the distinguished service medal:
"We left Imbros one morning about 3 o'clock and steamed toward the Dardanelles and dived' as day was breaking and—well, got through the Narrows O. K., arrived on the other side and saw two battleships. We were getting ready to torpedo one of 'cm when they spotted us, opened fire on us, and nipped, bunked, ran away.
"We then journeyed on for a mile or two and then went to the bottom and rested until about 8 p. m., when we came up. It was dusk; so we looked around. Nothing in sight. We broke the surface and entered the Sea of Marmora and bumped around for a few days without sighting a thing until Sunday morning, when we were diving outside of Constantinople and saw a big gunboat, and at 6.25 a. m. we gave her a 'tin fish.' By 6.30 a. m. she was no more; but before she sank, while she was listing over, they opened tire on us.. The second shot hit our periscope and done it in.' That gunner must have been a cool card, eh?
"On Monday we sighted a steamer, came to the surface alongside her and told her to stop. She stopped, and the men were so anxious to get clear that one boat capsized. No lives were lost: There was a Yankee correspondent aboard who tried to bluff; no good, though, 'cos an officer and two men boarded her and discovered she had a 6-inch gun, several gun mountings, and 15-inch ammunition aboard. So we blew her up.
"A few minutes after we sighted another steamer and told her to stop. She wouldn't. We chased her into the harbor, and when she was securing alongside a pier we torpedoed her.
"Soon after we sighted another steamer and chased her till she ran ashore. We were about to board her when some cavalry came up and opened fire. We replied and dropped a few, and then dived and torpedoed the ship.
"Next day (Tuesday) our skipper decided on entering Constantinople. To make a long story short, we got into the harbor without mishap and fired two torpedoes, one of which sank a transport loaded with troops, and the other exploded on shore somewhere. We learned afterward that it caused some panic. The troops refused to go on another transport, the shops closed, and people ran up the hills—in fact, it caused uproar for a time.
"The following Friday morning we saw five transports escorted by destroyers. We banged the first and biggest one, which sank in about three minutes.
"A few days later we went back to our old corner, where we sank those other three and caught a supply ship napping.
"A few days after we torpedoed a German transport, and then we got no more blood for a time until last Monday morning, on our way back; just before entering the Narrows, we sank another transport. That was our farewell smack.
"When we broke surface that evening we found a mine hanging over our bows. We chucked it off as quick as possible, when our escort came up, gave us three cheers, and off we went."—N. F. Times, 6/28.
GERMAN COMMANDER AT DARDANELLES.—Some interesting details in regard to the German naval commander at the Straits are given in the Berliner Tageblatt. According to this journal, the " Defender of the Dardanelles is none other than the late naval aide-de-camp and favorite of the Kaiser, Admiral von Usedom, or Usedom Pasha, as he is now called. Von Usedom, who appears to have been elevated in March to the rank of an adjutant-general of the Kaiser in consequence of his " brilliant conduct of the Dardanelles defences," is one of the best known of higher German naval officers. He served on the active list from 1871 to 1910. As captain of the cruiser Hertha in the Far East in two he led the German contingent during the march of the Allies to Pekin, under Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, and carried out the latter's celebrated command, " Germans to the front!" On his return from China the Kaiser made Usedom commander of the Imperial yacht, in which he served from 1902 to 1904, and, after subsequent service as superintendent of the Imperial dockyard at Kiel, he joined the personal suite of the War Lord, always ranking as one of his most intimate advisers on naval affairs. At the Dardanelles von Usedom is served by another German naval officer, Captain von Janson, as chief of staff. Presumably the officers of the Goeben and Breslau are also associated with Admiral Usedom Pasha, as well as a number of other naval officers who have been sent to the aid of Turkey. The Turks claim, indeed, that the Goeben, firing across the Peninsula, has disabled one of the cruisers in the Allied fleet.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/29.
OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES.—Those who were, and are, au courant with the geographical position and with the political and military conditions prevailing in this area, have always known that a successful attack upon the Dardanelles could be best made by one of two general methods:
(1) By a surprise dash up the Straits before the permanent defences were properly organized and garrisoned, and before the whole of the European and Asiatic coasts of the Dardanelles had been turned into vast entrenched areas.
(2) By a combined land and sea attack made in such a way that a force or forces landed on one or both sides of the Straits would threaten the forts from the rear, and therefore minimize the effect of their fire directed against ships.
In the circumstances the adoption of the first of these alternatives, which might have been feasible some years ago, was impossible, because it was clear from the first that the Turks and the Germans must have made the fullest preparations to defend the Dardanelles, not only before the entry of Turkey into the war, but also between that time and the moment when the Allied naval operations began, during the latter half of the month of February. Moreover, throughout the Turco-Italian and the Balkan campaigns the strength of the forts upon the Dardanelles was greatly increased. In addition, even had it been possible for a given number of ships to dash through the Straits and to enter the Sea of Marmora, their position—once arrived there—would have been highly perilous. Practically cut off from all means of support, they would have been compelled to face and to overcome the numerous obstacles which must exist in and near that sea itself. Moreover the reinforcement or the retreat of a fleet once temporarily successful would have created problems of the greatest difficulty, even had it been possible to solve them at all. In other words, it is one thing to be able to push open a door which has not been adequately barred, and quite another to hold it or to push it in the opposite direction when it has once again been closed and properly bolted behind you.
As I have already said, we do not know whether it was at first intended to adopt perhaps a modified form of the first of these alternatives, or whether landing operations on a large scale were always part of the scheme. In the latter case, unless the existence of possible diplomatic conditions, which do not come within the scope of this article, necessitated a demonstration, it seems unfortunate that the enemy had so much time in which to improve his defences and to create conditions which have necessitated the adoption of a third and a more or less different plan from either of those discussed above. That plan is that the operations at the Dardanelles have now become, and that they constitute, a land campaign which has already developed into one of enormous magnitude. Thus, instead of landing parties threatening the rear of the forts at the same time as the fleet was endeavoring to push its way up the Straits a force destined at least to conquer the Peninsula of Gallipoli, has had to be disembarked. In a word, the all-engrossing interest in the operations has been at least temporarily transferred from the events on the sea to those on the land. Here the Allied armies have been, and are, fighting a great battle, or a series of battles, with the apparent object not only of minimizing the task of the fleet, but also of enabling that fleet to glide, rather than to fight, its way through into the Sea of Marmora.
In the case of the operations under review, the whole situation is such that it reacts almost entirely against the belligerents who depend upon the fire of the ships for the accomplishment of their object, and in favor of those in occupation of the shores. In greater detail this state of things is due to all or some of the following causes:
(1) The Dardanelles are so narrow that throughout their greater part the power of real maneuvering is denied to all ships except those of a very small size. Whilst the length of the Straits is some thirty-three miles, their breadth varies from about four miles at the widest point, situated as it is only just inside the entrance, to about 1300 yards measured between Kilid Bahr, on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, and Chanak on the Asiatic coast. The average width may be said to be about two or three miles, but throughout the reach, which extends from Kephez Point to Nagara Point, places separated by about five and a half miles, the breadth of the channel is nowhere more than about three miles, and this only in one spot, situated just above the former place. Consequently, as all the forts of the most predominating importance defend this winding part of the Straits, in which the current is so rapid, it is clear that big ships can hardly do otherwise than remain practically stationary or else steam more or less straight ahead, along the only course which is open to them.
(2) For the same reasons, that is, owing to the narrowness and to the winding nature of the channel, the great guns of ships, the range of which is many miles, cannot be utilized to the fullest advantage. In other words, they cannot come into action with direct fire until the ships themselves are within the range of shore guns, even though that range is far less than that of the ships big guns.
(3) The Turks, owing to the narrowness of the channel, can make use of all kinds of weapons which would be valueless were the range greater. This means that they can develop the fire of guns which do not form part of the regular defences of the Straits. Mobile batteries of guns and howitzers can be placed in the countless and secluded valleys in which it is difficult to discover their positions, and to rain lead upon them from the sea. Again, these positions once revealed, the guns in question can or could be moved to some other locality from which their fire is equally effective. The existence of these conditions may not involve serious perils for large and armored ships, and for their crews who are protected by that armor, but they have extremely detrimental and dangerous consequences for small vessels and their crews—vessels which must be utilized for the purpose of reconnaissance work, and for the mine sweeping which repeatedly has to be carried out.
(4) The Dardanelles channel is a locality in which mines can be used to the greatest advantage. The whole area can be rendered impassable by means of " contact " mines, by the use of " observation " mines, or by the launching of " floating" mines. Whilst the uneven and rapidly flowing current creates certain difficulties in the case of "contact” mines, the narrowness of the channel greatly minimizes those which always accompany the use of the complicated machinery necessary to explode "observation" mines from the shore. Moreover, as we already know, the ever-recurring danger of "floating" mines, drifted down by the current from the Sea of Marmora or elsewhere, is one against which it is, and must be continually, necessary to guard.
(5) The narrowness of the Dardanelles renders it a particularly favorable area for the employment of torpedoes fired or launched from the shore. These weapons of war can either be sent on their way from proper torpedo-tubes or by other methods of a more impromptu nature.
Having thus described the extremely unfavorable position of a fleet desirous of entering the Sea of Marmora, I will now allude to some of the reasons why the task of such a fleet can be greatly furthered by a force or forces landed on one or both sides of the Dardanelles. To begin with, although the Turks have had plenty of time to prepare a perfect network of defences, and to turn the areas which earlier might have been stormed with comparatively small losses into veritable forts, the actual distances to be traversed by a force disembarked on the Asiatic side, and particularly on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, are comparatively small. This Peninsula, which may be described as a long, narrow tongue of land, nowhere measures more than about twelve miles in width, and this only in one particular and small part, which is situated just above the Narrows. Its breadth, at the extreme northeastern end and along the Lines of Bulair, is only three miles. Further to the southwest, and measured along a line extending from Maidos to Gaba Tepe, the breadth is only about five miles. This means that the whole land attack can be covered, and the ground more or less prepared for the infantry advance, by the guns of the fleet.
The special and unique positions of the forts on both shores of the Dardanelles also render their attack from the land side or sides a particularly desirable, or more correctly, an absolutely necessary undertaking. Thus, whilst numerous batteries have no doubt now been placed in favorable positions, and whilst the backs of the forts have probably been protected by earthworks, the greater number of the defences situated on the European as well as upon the Asiatic coast are actually commanded from the hills located in rear of Maidos and of Kilici Bahr. Indeed, from various points on these hills it is possible, so to speak, to look down upon, if not actually into, many of the eleven European redoubts of which we have heard so much during the last few weeks. Moreover, the great and heavy guns of these forts are so arranged, and must be so arranged, that they can only be directed towards the sea and not towards the hills which overshadow them.
True it is that there still remains the defences of the Asiatic coast, which are in themselves of the utmost importance, not only in relation to the sea, but also because their guns can probably throw huge missiles on to, and right across the Peninsula of Gallipoli. To threaten these Asiatic forts from the rear would in some ways be a much more difficult undertaking than to occupy the Gallipoli hills. They cannot be dominated in the same way as can those upon the European side, and, in addition, the distance to be traversed by a landing force, instead of being only at most five, would be about twenty miles. But as the. Asiatic coast is much lower than the European, it is clear that an army once occupying the hills which I have described above will be able not only to silence and finally to occupy the Kilid Bahr forts, but also to make its influence most unpleasantly felt in the defences which respectively lie to the north and to the south of the town of Chanak.
The difficulties would have been great enough had it only been necessary to land small parties of infantry. But as a large expeditionary force, composed of all arms, and especially strong in heavy artillery, is obviously required to undertake what is practically a siege, the absence of any proper and sheltered base creates a most complicated naval and military problem. The weight of modern munitions is incredible, the consumption is terrific. The weather at the Dardanelles is always treacherous and uncertain. Thus whilst one expects it to be fine and warm from the beginning of May, even in summer there are sometimes awful winds lasting occasionally for three or even five clays. These winds, and especially those all-important ones which blow from the south, get up very quickly, and affect not only the surface, but also the height of the usually tideless waters. This weather factor, when coupled with others which have to be taken into consideration, must make the construction and the maintenance of adequate piers upon an open and unsheltered coast extremely difficult. In a word, the future alone will prove the justification or want of justification of the formerly accepted principle that a well-protected harbor is a necessary possession to an army which has to draw its supplies and ammunition from across the sea.
From whatever direction or in whatever area they may be undertaken, it is impossible to exaggerate the local difficulties which must be overcome in accomplishing the task allotted to the Allied armies upon the Peninsula of Gallipoli. As a traveler who has ridden and tramped across the rough districts of Albania, and of Asia Minor, I can say as a result of my personal experience, that it is by far the worst area of land upon which I have ever set foot. Almost the whole district, and especially that part which borders upon the Straits between the Lines of Bulair and Eski Ilissarlik, is covered by hills which in places rise to a height of nearly moo feet above the level of the sea. On the extreme southwest there is Atchi-Baba, and to the northeast of Kilid Bahr and Maidos there are Saribair and Khoja Chemen Dagh, the latter attaining an elevation of 950 feet. These positions must be occupied before an advance can be made to the shores of the Narrows. The hills or mountains run not in any regular or well-defined direction, but they consist of a group or of a series of groups of peaks. Through and between these hills there run an equally confusing number of valleys—valleys which for the most part stretch across rather than up and down the Peninsula.
The whole area is practically roadless, and much of it is covered by prickly scrub—bushes so thick and terrible that they tear and damage one's person from head to toe. The slopes of these hills and the sides of these valleys, if indeed they can be called slopes at all, are so almost perpendicular that at times it is necessary to scale them on hands and knees. Every hill and knoll must be seized from, and defended against, a brave and determined enemy, whose cause is entirely favored by the nature of the area in which his troops and his snipers are located.—H. CHARLES WOOD, Fortnightly Review, June.
THE LANDING AT V BEACH, DARDANELLES
(From Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatch of May 20)
The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines:
As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier River Clyde (Commander Unwin, R. N.) carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.
The River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complements and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the River Clyde was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that z000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.
The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.
V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village, and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort, the ground forms a very regular amphitheater of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach Are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheater, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of too feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some to yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.
At the southeastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, lands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheater, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort has been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theater. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than Bahr to the foot of the northwestern headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheater, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy porn-pools to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.
Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.
As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the commander. The River Clyde came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing were to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of lire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.
Now came the moment for the River Clyde to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work, and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.
A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets, which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporized pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, porn-porn, and machine-gun fire.
For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier General Napier, Captain Costeker, his brigade major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between to and IT a. m., about moo men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.
Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine guns on the River Clyde, which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempts on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing. Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the old fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/10.
GERMAN SUBMARINES AT DARDANELLES.—Some further particulars are now available of the voyage of Lieutenant Commander Otto Hersing's boat to the Dardanelles. He left Wilhelmshaven on April 25 and reached the Straits on May 25, when he torpedoed the Triumph. Life conditions in the submarine were not bad, he asserts in an interview, and as she mostly traveled on the surface the officers and crew, except the engineers, had frequent chances of obtaining fresh air. Those who have kept in touch with the progress of submarine construction will not be surprised at the length of this run, for it has been known for some time that the newer boats can go anywhere provided they have the means of renewing their supplies. There does not seem to be any great difficulty in arranging for this, although we arc not told, of course, at what places or in what way Hersing's vessel, which is now described as U 51, obtained her stores of oil and other commodities. The Neueste Nachrichten, we notice, has suggested to the United States people that as the distance from Wilhelmshaven to the Dardanelles is about 5000 miles, while that between Bremen and New York is only 3600 miles, German submarines, in the event of America making war on Germany, could cross the Atlantic and torpedo American men-of-war. There is nothing impossible in this threat, though whether it is probable, supposing war came about, is another matter, dependent, as we have said, on the matter of supplies. In going to the Dardanelles, Hersing's boat may have put in at various lonely places on the pasts of Spain or Morocco, for instance, and received there by arrangement a sufficient quantity of oil to carry her to an Austrian port. In crossing the Atlantic, however, she would have to rely mainly on her captures, a more risky matter unless a project was completed with a neutral vessel or two to carry supplies to certain rendezvous.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/3.
"U 51" REPORTED SUNK.
LONDON, Saturday July 17.
The German submarine U 51 has been sunk in the Black Sea by Russian warships, according to information received from Varna, a Bulgarian port on the Black Sea, by the Athens correspondent of the Exchange Telegraph Company.
The U 51 was the submarine which made the voyage from Germany to the Dardanelles. She was commanded by Captain Otto Hersing.—N. Y. Times, 7/17.
An English naval officer who arrived in New York on June 29 is quoted by the New York Times as saying that no German submarine reached the Dardanelles by steaming through the Straits of Gibraltar. He pointed out that so dangerous a trip would have been decidedly unmilitary, since the Germans have established a submarine base and factory on the Bosporus near Constantinople and are turning out under-water craft there as in their own home factories. The parts for the submarines are manufactured in Germany and sent by rail to Constantinople via Austria, Rumania and Bulgaria, despite the surface neutrality of the two latter countries. Naturally, he says the battleships of the Allies withdrew from the Dardanelles when the submarines were put into operation. Regarding the shipping of submarine parts, Simon Lake, the submarine inventor, said in the Times a few days ago that during the Russian-Japanese war ten years ago he made submarines here and shipped them to Russia for use in Asiatic waters:—Army and Navy Journal, 7/10.
SMYRNA BASE DESTROYED.—The risk of German submarines doing much damage in the Mediterranean and about the Suez Canal has been much lessened by the destruction of the oil-fuel base discovered near Smyrna, which has terminated their activity outside the Dardanelles, and so long as the Allies are able to prevent them from getting out of the Sea of Marmora they are not likely to do much further mischief.—Shipping Illustrated, 7/10.
PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC
GERMANY
American Waters
Karlsruhe, light cruiser (unofficially reported wrecked).
ENGLAND
East Indies. Royal Australian Navy.
1 battleship. 1 battle cruiser.
2 light cruisers. 3 light cruisers.
Persian Gulf. 3 destroyers.
4 small craft. 2 submarines.
Cape of Good Hope. West coast Canada.
3 cruisers. 2 submarines.
1 gunboat. West coast of America.
New Zealand. 2 gunboats.
3 cruisers.
1 sloop.
FAR EAST
Naval powers in the Far East are represented as follows:
FRANCE
2 armored cruisers. 1 gunboat.
1 destroyer. 4 river gunboats
GREAT BRITAIN
1 battleship. 10 river craft.
2 light cruisers. 6 sloops.
2 cruisers. Some other small craft.
8 destroyers. (The armored cruisers have a
4 torpedo-boats. speed of from 20 to 25 knots, and
3 submarines. the destroyers, 26 knots.)
JAPAN
2 dreadnoughts. 13 light cruisers.
13 pre-dreadnoughts. 52 destroyers,
2 battle cruisers. 27 torpedo-boats.
13 armored cruisers. 15 submarines.
The disposition of these ships is problematical. The more powerful ships of France and Great Britain are probably operating in other areas.
FALKLAND FIGHT.—The following was written by Vice Admiral Sturdee’s flag lieutenant on board the British Invincible to a friend in England; "We arrived at Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands at it o'clock, the day before yesterday, and we all started to coal, getting in stores, etc., and of course there was lots of signaling to be done, and lots to arrange, and I was busy all day till very late. About 7.30 a. m. yesterday, I was sitting in my dressing gown and feeling very sleepy, drinking a cup of tea, when a signalman came in and reported, Sapper Hill reports two men-of-war approaching.' So I tore into the admiral's cabin and told him, then flew to my cabin, and got into some clothes. We had colliers alongside and steam was not up, at least it was at two hours' notice; so there was a proper bustle and scurry, and we told the colliers td shove off at once.
"Meanwhile, on came these two, the Gneisenan and the Leipzig. Then came the Scharnhorst, the Dresden, and the Nfirn berg over the horizon. They never knew the Invincible and Inflexible were anywhere but in the North Sea, and as soon as they saw us they turned and ran. Well, we got out of the harbor in an hour and a quarter, and off we went after them. We got within ten miles of them at noon, so we slowed down to let the men have some food before the fight. At a quarter to one we went on at full speed, the Glasgow and ourselves, followed about three miles, astern by the Carnavon, Cornwall, and Kent. The last three couldn't keep up.
"At one o'clock we opened fire slowly, just trying the range, and we hit the Niirnberg or the Leipzig, I don't know which it was. Anyhow, she steered away, and I signaled to the Kent to chase her. The Glasgow turned around, too, without signal, and went after her.
"We were going about 26 knots and closing the enemy fast. The Dresden and Leipzig turned away, so it left the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau to fight a duel with us. After the German small cruisers left, the Scharnhorst turned around and opened fire on us; so did the Gncisenau, and they shot fiendishly well.
"Germans Score Hits.—We went on hammering away for some time, getting closer and closer, and they were hitting us pretty badly. I thought one foremast had gone once. The admiral and I were half way up so as to get, a good view. One of the legs of the mast was shot away. Shell-fire is unpleasant, to put it mildly. Exploding shells, when they hit the ship, are worse, as one wonders how many she will stand. The admiral was wonderfully cool and collected, and I bobbed my head at every shell, and got a stiff neck from doing it. Well, we turned then, and they turned too; but it threw their fire off, the shell hitting the ship and bursting, splinters flying, and the ship catching 'fire here and there, and the awful din, all rather upsetting to the nerves. They turned again, so off we had to go after them and at it again; then the Scharnhorst suddenly heeled over and went down bow first, her engines still going, colors flying, and guns firing.
"Gneisenau's Hard Fight.—The Gneisenau hesitated, or seemed to, as she passed her flagship. We were still shooting at them, and then she came on, hammer and tongs; still we went on till 6 p. m., when she turned right around and ceased firing. She still had her colors flying, so we went on till I reported to the admiral that all her men were assembling on the forecastle and she was turning over. Away she went, and some 300 were left swimming and hanging on to the wreckage in the water.
"It was the most awful sight I have ever seen. The water was just about freezing and they were all calling out; one could hear them three-quarters of a mile off. We steamed up and lowered what was left of our boats and we picked up seven officers and 98 men. The Inflexible picked up a lot more, but they were drowning right and left, too weak to hold on. Some were wounded, of course. One couldn't help being upset about it. I counted 24 men sinking in one small patch; the water was very clear.
"The Glasgow and the Cornwall sank the Leipzig, and the Kent sank the Nurnberg, so we had a great victory. We were pretty badly knocked about, and you never saw such a mess of twisted iron and huge holes, and the wonderful thing, it is really almost beyond belief, we hadn't got one casualty. Commander Townsend was knocked down and bruised his head, but that was all. It will take some repairing. We were hit 34 times by 8-inch shells, and they do make a mess of things, I can tell you."—N. Y. Times, 7/4.
"MACEDONIA" RECAUGHT.—The Admiralty on April 30 made the following announcement: "The German steamship Macedonia, which escaped from Las Palmas, Canary Islands, a few weeks ago, has now been captured by one of our cruisers." The Macedonia, which acted as collier and supply ship to the German commerce destroyers in the Atlantic, was brought to Las Palmas in October last by the Spanish warship Cataluna. On March 16 she mysteriously disappeared, taking advantage of the absence of her guardship, and getting away before dawn. The Macedonia is a vessel of 4,347 tons, owned by the Hamburg-American Line.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/8.
"KENT" IN PORT
VICTORIA, B. C., July 5.
"Sink 'er Allen" is the expressive term by which Captain J. D. Allen, of H. M. S. Kent, is popularly known to the crew of his warship. After a cruise of about nine months, during which period she sunk the German cruiser Nurnberg in the battle of the Falkland Islands and assisted in the destruction of the Dresden off the Juan Fernandez Islands, the Kent has steamed into Esquimalt, B. C., for repairs.
It was learned that when the Kent's captain received orders to chase the Nurnberg, off the Falkland Islands, he spoke to his men, telling them in the blunt words of a sailor and a fighter that not only must the fleeing German vessel be caught, but that she must be sunk.
"We must sink 'er," he exclaimed, and the sailors echoed, "You're jolly well right! We will sink 'er!”
"Tear up anything that will burn and throw it in the fires," was the captain's command. Companionways, boats, chicken coops, furniture, everything combustible on board the ship, with the sole exception of the best furniture in the officers' quarters was sacrificed. The only reason it did not go was because it was not necessary.
The Kent did better than on her trial trip twelve years before and came within range. The rest was "up to" Captain Allen's maneuvering and the marksmanship of the gunners. Both proved equal to the occasion. The British ship was struck thirty-six times, but while this was happening the German had been incapacitated and slowly was sinking.
From the captain to the humblest able seaman full credit is given for the bravery of the. German crew. They stood to their guns to the last.
Taking the circumstances into account, however, the Kent's losses were insignificant. Only seven or eight casualties was the total, but the ship's armor was penetrated several times above the water-line and her decks were pitted—N. Y. Herald, 7/16.
An interesting and instructive letter from an officer concerning the doings of the cruiser Kent, and how she came to corner the Dresden, was published in the Morning Post on June 29. What this letter shows more than anything else is the very meager knowledge at present revealed to the country of the work of the navy. We knew that the Kent caught the Dresden and helped to sink her on a certain date. What we had not learnt but only suspected, was the amount of hard work and toil put in by the cruisers in chase of her, from the time she escaped from the Falklands on December 8 to the time when she was destroyed three months later. On March 4, for instance, the Kent received orders to make for a certain spot. She steamed 17 knots day and night for 36 hours, but not a sign of a ship was there. " However," says the officer in his letter, "we were not downhearted, and we steamed about in the vicinity looking out in every direction until about 3 p. m. on the afternoon of the next day, we were rewarded by seeing the Dresden about eight miles away." 'Then everyone's whole energy was directed to catching her, but she escaped in the darkness. Tired out but dauntless, the officers and men of the Kent made for the nearest place to coal, and worked all day and night getting it on board in order to leave at the earliest pOssible moment. On March 14 they had their reward in the enemy's destruction. At least it may be said that the Dresden was sunk as much by the engineers and stokers in the British vessels as by the gunners whose shells actually struck her.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/10.
IN THE VALLEY OF THE TIGRIS.—Excellent work continues to be done by the British forces in the valley of the Tigris. General Townshend has occupied the important town of Amarah on that river, 64 miles north of Kurnah, and received, the surrender of the Governor of Amarah and his force of 700 soldiers. The captures to date include 8o officers and 2000 men, a large quantity of war material, 12 large steel barges, and one large and three small river steamers.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
CONQUER GERMANS IN SOUTH AFRICA
PRETORIA, July 9 (via LONDON).
General Botha, commander of the forces of the Union of South Africa, has accepted the surrender of all the German military forces in German Southwest Africa.
The Germans surrendered unconditionally, following the issuance of General Botha's ultimatum, which expired at 5 o'clock yesterday (Thursday) evening.
With the exception of the necessary army of occupation, the citizen army will be brought home as quickly as possible.
LONDON, July 9.
The surrender of the entire German force in German Southwest Africa closes one of the most important campaigns of the great war and releases for service elsewhere the South African contingent.
The campaign against the most important German African colony was considered so vital that all the resources of the South African Union were used in it, but its successful conclusion probably means that, despite the fact that German East Africa remains unconquered, a contingent will be dispatched to France, while additional forces will continue the campaign in East Africa The final disposition of German Southwest Africa has not been officially announced, but it is generally believed here that it will become a part of the South African Union.—N. Y. Times, 7/10.
“KONIGSBERG“ DESTROYED
LONDON, July 12.
The Admiralty announces that the German cruiser Konigsberg, which in the fall of last year took refuge from the British fleet in the Rufiji River in German East Africa, has been totally wrecked by British river monitors. The Konigsberg was a vessel of 3348 tons and had a speed of about 23 knots. She was a protected cruiser.
The announcement of the Admiralty follows:
"Since the end of last October the Konigsberg had been sheltering some distance up the Rufiji River in a position which rendered attack against her most difficult,. Only shallow-draft ships being able to get sufficiently close to engage the cruiser effectively.
"Two months ago the Admiralty decided to send two river monitors, namely, the Severn, Captain Eric Fullerton, and the Mersey, Commander Robert A. Wilson, to assist the commander-in-chief of the Cape station, Vice Admiral H. King Hall, in these operations.
"The position of the Konigsberg was accurately located by air craft, and as Soon as the monitors were ready the operations were begun. On the morning of July 4 the monitors entered the river and Opened a fire, to which the Konigsberg replied immediately, firing salvos with five guns with accuracy and rapidity. The Mersey was hit twice, and four men were killed and four wounded by one shell.
"As the KOnigsberg was surrounded by a jungle the aeroplanes experienced great difficulty in locating the fall of our shot. She was hit five times early in action, but after the Monitors had fired for six hours the aeroplanes reported that the Konigsberg's masts were still standing.
"A salvo then burst on her and she caught fire heavily between her masts. She continued to fire with one gun intermittently for a while, but for the last Part of the engagement she did not fire at all, either on account of lack of ammunition or the disablement of her guns. Although not totally destroyed as a result of this engagement she probably was incapacitated.
The commander-in-chief reports that the task of the monitors was an extremely difficult one on account of the jungle and the trouble of accurately spotted shots, but that they were assisted by H. M. S. Weymouth, Captain Donis Crampton, on which ship the commander-in-chief flew his flag and which followed them across the bar of the river and engaged the small guns on the banks, while H. S. Pioneer, Acting. Commander T. W. Biddlecombe, Royal Australian Navy, engaged the guns at the mouth of the river.
"To complete the destruction of the Konigsberg the commander-in-chief ordered a further attack on .July 11, and a telegram now has been received stating that the ship is a total wreck. In this last engagement our casualties were only two. men wounded, on the Mersey.”- N. Y. Times, 7/13.
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES
50-MILE MOTOR BOATS TO ROUT SUBMARINES.--,The C. C. Smith Boat and Engine Company, of. 1205 Lexington 'Avenue, announced July 6 that it had been asked by the British, French, and Russian governments to submit estimates for the construction of powerful motor speed boats, of sufficient strength to permit the Mounting of two or more light guns, the boats to be used; it is understood, in running down German submarines in the waters around England and France and in the Baltic. The British Government, it is understood, wants a fleet of at least 100 of these craft, while the Russians, it is said, want 30 or 40.
Travelers from Berlin, however, who had access to officials in authority there, said yesterday that it was admitted by competent authorities in the German capital that 14 German submarines had been lost up to three weeks ago. The conjecture is that many of these may have come to grief in the meshes of the British cable netting. Traveling at a speed of six to eight knots under water these ships would thrust their way inextricably into the tangle of steel before they could be brought to a stop and freed.—N. Y. Times, 6/19.
UNITED STATES TAKES SAYVILLE WIRELESS
WASHINGTON, July 8.
The government to-day took over the Sayville, L. I., wireless station, the only privately operated, direct means of communication between the United States and Germany. Secretary Daniels announced that Captain Bullard, in charge of the naval radio, had this afternoon taken over the station and would continue its operation with naval forces.
Secretary Redfield in a letter to Secretary Lansing recommending that the United States take over the Sayville station, said investigation had shown that the new sending station, for which license was asked, had all been erected since the beginning of the war, with apparatus made in Germany; that the company was entirely German owned, working with stations in Germany under government control and that Professor J. Zenneck, a captain of marines of the German Navy, and wireless expert, had been assigned by the German Government to conduct experiments there. To grant a license to such a station, Secretary Redfield said, the department had concluded would be an unneutral act.—Boston Transcript, 7/8.
MR. HURD'S SUM MARY OF WHAT GREAT BRITAIN HAS ACHIEVED.-
(1) Our supreme fleet, assisted by the French fleet (much weaker than that of Germany alone, and hopelessly inferior to the navies of Germany and Austria-Hungary combined), has won command of the sea and given our Allies freedom of maritime communication, enabling them to replenish their stores of war munitions. If we had not rendered this service, could our Allies have maintained the struggle?
(2) We have placed our unsurpassed financial resources at the disposal of our Allies; without our aid Belgium could not have continued to fight; Serbia would have been bankrupt; France and Russia would have been embarrassed. If we had not rendered this service, could our Allies have maintained the struggle?
(3) The United Kingdom has been the only country in Europe from which our Allies could draw munitions of war. Belgium, occupied by the enemy, has had an army in the air since August last; France has had some of her most flourishing industrial departments overrun by the enemy; Russia, which is not a great manufacturing country, has required every description of munitions of war. We have directly or indirectly supplied all these needs. If we had not rendered these services, could our Allies have continued the struggle?
(4) Within nine months of the opening of hostilities British military forces were actively engaged against the enemy in eight theaters of war:
(a) France; (b) the Dardanelles; (c) Egypt; (d) the Persian Gulf; (e) German Southwest Africa; (f) German East Africa; (g) the Cameroons; and (h) Kiao-chau, where we co-operated with Japan, not to mention the action taken against German islands in the Pacific.
(5) In the opening months of the war we not only poured an increasing number of well-equipped troops into France, and then into the Gallipoli Peninsula, but we raised the new armies.
If we had not landed a single soldier in France or in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and had recruited no new armies, we should have the satisfaction of knowing that we had taken no mean part in bringing Germany nearer to defeat.
One valid criticism which can be directed against the government is that its military effort was pursued without proper regard to the more essential and valuable services which this country could render as the source of supplies for our Allies. The case has been well put—with an element of exaggeration—by the Statist:
. . . . Russia, France, and Belgium all need immense supplies of munitions…
"Instead of recognizing all this and preparing to fulfill the expectations entertained respecting us, we, under military initiative, decided to call out great armies almost as large as those of France. It will be recollected how the Prime Minister stated at Newcastle the other day that 217,000 coal-miners had been enlisted, while only 70,000 had been brought in from other occupations to take their place. Thus, when the speech was made, we had working in our mines 147,000 coal-miners less than before the war broke out. Yet coal is essential for the navy, for the mercantile marine, for every factory in the country, leaving out of account domestic uses altogether. And with all that in view, and the demand for unheard-of amounts of war munitions, we deliberately reduced our mining staffs by 147,000 men, and those men, remember, the very cream of the coal-mining population…
"If we had maintained civilian control of the government we might have been compelled to increase the army. We might have found it necessary to put a million or so men in the field in France. But it is very improbable that we should have found ourselves without men enough to supply ourselves and our Allies with munitions of war."—ARCHIBALD HURD, Fortnightly Review, June.
SUBMARINE BLOCKADE LEGITIMATE. Rules Suggested by Italian Writer.—
According to an article in the March Rivista Marittima (La Leggi della Guerra Marittima nel Conflitto Anglo-Germanico), submarine blockade must be recognized and legalized as a necessary form of naval warfare. To safeguard 'the rights of life and property, rights which the writer considers "not comprised in the limited rights of nations, but in the larger rights of humanity," the following rules are suggested for the control of such blockade:
Article I. Blockade of enemy territory by means of mines and submarines is allowed.
Art. II. Belligerents are required to give proper notification of the zones covered by such blockade, and to use mines constructed in accordance with international conventions.
Art. III. A vessel that violates said blockade, having received due notification, as shown by the date of its clearance papers, shall be confiscated and may be destroyed.
Art. IV. A vessel that is unaware of the existence of the blockade, shall be warned and permitted to return to waters outside the blockaded zone.
Art. V. The destruction of a merchant vessel, either neutral or enemy, shall take place only after a reasonable time has been granted for securing the safety of passengers and crew. The captain shall take care to save his ship's papers.
Art. VI. A merchant vessel, stopped by a submarine, shall at once comply with the order and send its papers in its own boat for inspection.
Art. VII. National prize courts, and international tribunals, in case of appeal, shall be competent to pass on the legality of operations carried on by submarines.