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The first sentence of a definitive U. S. doctrine of river warfare might very well read, “River warfare is not combat on the water, it is combat from the water.” The second—and every other sentence thereafter—is still anybody's guess.
Southeast Asia is an agricultural region where the majority of the people live by tilling the soil and fishing the coastal and inland waters. An insurgent effort in this region will, therefore, be directed toward those areas where control of the people and the fruits of their toil will permit the insurgent movement to gain the manpower and resources essential to its growth. The insurgent must be deprived of these assets, and to do this, the legally constituted governments must penetrate into the non-controlled areas to restore their administrative apparatus, reopen channels of trade between rural and urban centers, and undertake those political and economic reforms which will reduce or eliminate the basis of dissidence.
Naval power can make a major contribution to these endeavors. It can be used to patrol the sea areas off the coast, provide combat and logistic support for forces ashore, and can be applied on land at selected points with telling effect. All of this is being done in Vietnam today. Naval power also permits the control of the approaches to inland waters and consequently opens the way for the extension of this power deep inland. This is of vital significance in South Vietnam where the inland waterways systems contribute directly to much of the economic activity of the country. The Mekong delta area with its 2,500 miles of interconnected waterways, for example, contains over one-third of the population of the entire country, and in former years produced some one-and-one-half million metric tons of surplus rice. The fact that this surplus is no longer available attests to the effectiveness of Viet Cong control and the need for an early return of governmental authority throughout the area. To a comparable but more localized degree, the separate waterways along the coastal areas also affect the economic conditions there. In Hoi An, for example, Viet Cong control of the river leading to the offshore fishing grounds has resulted in the doubling of the price of fish on the local markets with consequent serious distress to the people of the vicinity who depend upon this food source for most of their protein.
In all of these tasks, it is evident that the role of naval forces is essentially complementary and must be intimately associated with the over-all political, military, social, and economic counterinsurgency effort. Despite this, the tasks involved need little elaboration when they are to be conducted at sea or from the sea. This is a purely naval environment where long established doctrines and practices apply. However, when naval forces move inland the operational problems which are encountered are less familiar.
The freedom of action which naval forces enjoy at sea becomes severely restricted. Currents, obstacles, fluctuating depths of water, and charts of varying reliability, all contribute to the difficulties of navigation. High river banks, dense vegetation, and the convolutions of the terrain provide concealment for an enemy and shield him from the effects of flat trajectory fires which ships are normally equipped to deliver. The meanders of the waterways and the presence of islands and shoal areas force ships and craft to move into channels where electrically controlled mines can be detonated with great effect, and where ambushing forces can open fire with heavy weapons at point blank range.
It is obvious that because of these conditions, waterways resemble roads or railways and can thus be considered simply as lines of communications. If waterways are so regarded, it will be evident that the tactical principles which govern their control and use for military operations are essentially the same as those which apply to land lines of communications. It follows that the type of equipment required for operations on the water, while differing in appearance from that used on land, will need to serve comparable purposes. The requirements for armor, armament, and transport capacity which are satisfied on the ground by a range of wheeled and tracked vehicles, will have to be met on the water by an array of ships and craft adapted to achieving the same ends. Moreover, ground forces will need to learn to look upon waterways as something other than obstacles to be crossed, while maritime forces operating inland will need to become familiar with the principles of ground combat which will influence the characteristics and utilization of the craft they employ.
Although river warfare is an aspect of land warfare, naval forces can contribute effectively to its prosecution. They have the ships and craft which can be modified to meet the unusual operational requirements. They have the training and other logistic facilities to provide the forces and the support needed for the task. And they have a fund of practical experience in amphibious warfare which, in many respects, can be readily adapted to riverine operations.
The basic purpose of military operations in counterinsurgency is to assist the legal government to exercise its authority over the whole of the national territory. In such situations, the dissident forces do not normally hold ground; indeed, they are most often interspersed throughout the population and appear only occasionally in any massed formation. Military operations seldom involve position warfare in the classic sense, since a sizeable military force can if it wishes deploy to any area with little difficulty. Moreover, military operations directed against hostile formations, while essential, are not in themselves decisive because the decision rests with the people from whom the dissident elements derive their support. Military operations will therefore be most rewarding when they contribute directly to the re-establishment of internal order and the restoration of normal civilian activity.
Operational experience reveals that this effect is more readily attained when ground forces are deployed to tactical areas of responsibility. The concept which underlies this employment is simple. Balanced ground forces are placed under a single commander and are assigned a geographical area, the extent of which is determined by local conditions and the degree of influence over these conditions the military force can exercise. Once the military force has established itself in a relatively secure posture, it undertakes an offensive patrol effort backed by mobile reserve forces. These patrols penetrate throughout the area to seek out enemy elements and destroy them. When large enemy forces are detected or encountered, the mobile reserves are engaged.
In the early phases of such operations the co-operation of the local population is usually minimal, largely because of the fear of reprisals once the friendly forces move on. However, as the people see that the military presence is to be maintained, and that military operations are accompanied by the restoration of governmental authority and the initiation of programs to remove the basis of their dissatisfaction, their fears lessen and their collaboration in the pacification effort moves into an active phase. As this occurs, the area of friendly influence can be gradually expanded.
It is evident that the conduct of such military operations will involve the movement of forces by both air and surface means. However, while airpower permits a commander to move forces with little regard to the terrain, the return of normal civilian activity, which is of paramount concern, depends to a great degree upon the free use of surface communications. The enemy will be equally aware of this need and will seek to deny the use of surface communications to friendly forces, while at the same time he will use them to move his own troops and supplies, as well as to circulate his tax collectors, recruiters, and propagandists. In areas where surface communications are primarily waterways, river warfare thus becomes inevitable.
In ground warfare where overland movement is possible, routine administrative and logistic support in secure areas is most easily provided by wheeled vehicles travelling independently. When security conditions become uncertain, the vehicles are armed and formed into convoys. When contact with an enemy is imminent, movement is most often made in mechanized formations where armored vehicles predominate. Infantry is carried in armored personnel carriers, tanks are included in the formation, artillery is positioned to support the column as it advances, and close air support is made available throughout the movement. In all cases where a mine threat exists, mine clearing detachments are included in the formation.
Similarly, where waterways are the primary lines of communication, the movement and support of ground forces is most economically accomplished in secure areas by the use of larger transport craft operating independently. Where areas are less secure, transport craft are armed and are formed into convoys. When contact with enemy forces appears likely, smaller armored transport craft are Preferred. The smaller transports are organized into convoys provided with both escort and fire support craft. Again, as in land movements, full use is made of air support as well as of prepositioned artillery. Additionally, minesweeping units are habitually employed to precede all convoys.
It is evident that river warfare is distinguished from ground warfare only by the fact that it occurs in areas where waterways are the primary avenues for movement. River warfare is not combat on the water; it is combat from the water. Its essential peculiarity is that the ground forces are deployed for coin- at by floating conveyances. The tactics and techniques which govern ground operations in general are therefore equally applicable to ground operations in river war. When, however, ground forces are to be engaged in offensive operations directly from an inland waterway, and are to be embarked and supported by navy ships and craft for the purpose, a special organization and related operating procedures will be required. The composition of such a force will depend upon a number of considerations. Those which follow reflect the experience gained over a period of years in river warfare in Southeast Asia.
In a riverine environment the factor of terrain is paramount. River and canal banks are often high and covered with dense vegetation. Access from the water to the land is difficult, and landing areas capable individually of accommodating a force larger than an infantry battalion will seldom be found. Once the landing force is ashore there remains the problem of providing the troops with other than foot mobility and supporting their maneuvers when wheeled and heavy tracked vehicles such as tanks cannot be used. Mobility ashore can be improved by including in the landing force organization some tracked amphibian vehicles and small portable boats. These can effectively serve for patrol, river crossing, and short distance movement. Where more extended land operations are envisaged, reliance will have to be placed primarily upon helicopter transport.
Fire support for the landing force can be furnished by suitably armed river craft. Both high-angle and flat-trajectory weapons are required and these can be part of the regular armament of the river craft. Such armament may be supplemented by landing force supporting weapons temporarily emplaced on river craft. Fire support can also be provided by prepositioned artillery, or artillery which accompanies the landing force. Where conditions do not permit the landing of artillery, armored amphibian units may be used. Close air support will also have to be integrated in the scheme of maneuver. It should be anticipated that hostile targets will be difficult to identify from the air. Arrangements will be necessary to ensure positive differentiation of friend from foe and for the marking of targets for aerial attack. The use of air observers will also be required throughout an operation to assist in reconnaissance and facilitate the coordinated movement of separate ground units where the terrain and vegetation make it difficult for these to maintain contact on the ground.
The tactics employed ashore are those normal for ground combat. The time and space factors for the maneuver of foot troops will be increased, however. Observation and fields of fire will be limited, contact between units will be intermittent, and the capability of units to provide one another fire support will be curtailed. Ground operations will therefore be characterized as multiple small unit actions carried out in conformity to a carefully coordinated over-all plan. Reliance upon initiative and aggressiveness of small unit leaders will be high. At the same time, close adherence to the prescribed scheme of maneuver for the force as a whole will be mandatory.
In summary, a landing force organized for river warfare will be light and will require substantial support from non-organic sources. Great reliance will be placed upon air elements for fire support, observation, movement of reserves and other units, and for evacuation and supply. Maximum use of the fire and logistic support capabilities of the river craft will also have to be made. Finally, the troops must be alert to adapt any and all resources to overcome the physical difficulties imposed by the environment.
The foregoing considerations which affect the composition of the landing force for assault operations also affect the associated navy craft organization which will be required to move and support it. In addition, there are other considerations of more direct concern to the Navy which must be addressed if the river operation is to be viewed in its proper perspective. These considerations derive primarily from the concern over mines and enemy ambushes.
To meet these threats, river craft have to be formed into convoys. Each convoy must be preceded by a minesweeping group, and must have the means to deliver heavy fires against an ambushing force. Since combat incident to an ambush will most often be initiated by surprise enemy action and will be characterized by the exchange of heavy fires, positive control of the rivercraft formation is essential to minimize confusion and permit prompt counter-ambush measures. To meet these requirements, convoys should be formed into compact columns and normally move in midstream. Such formations can more easily follow channels swept of mines, are more easily protected by escort and fire support craft, and are more effectively controlled in the event of surprise attack. Craft in close formation also are better able to provide one another mutual support and can navigate with little difficulty either by day or by night.
The actual size of such a formation will depend upon many variables. These include the size and speed of the craft making up the convoy and the configuration of the waterway. Where this is particularly sinuous, short columns permit more effective visual control of the whole of the formation and enhance the capability to deliver massed fires. It is evident that it will be difficult to settle upon an optimum size for such a formation which has universal application. In general, however, the basic requirement is to ensure that the formation does not become so unwieldy as to lose tactical cohesiveness. Thus, if large numbers of transport craft are to be formed into a single convoy, it may be preferable to organize these into two parallel columns rather than lengthen the whole of the formation.
The Naval Assault Divisions, the famous Dinassaut which the French used so effectively during the Indochina War evolved from the considerations summarized above. These same considerations underlie the current organization of the River Assault Groups of the Vietnamese Navy. The validity of this concept has therefore been confirmed by more than a decade of river warfare and should be retained. For this reason the basic navy organization for river war should be the River Assault Group consisting of the mix of specialized craft required to lift and support a landing force of one infantry battalion reinforced. For this purpose four general types of river craft will be required. These include communications craft to provide at least a primary and an alternate command capability; armored transport craft to lift the landing force and its impediments; fire support craft to ensure the uninterrupted movement of the formation in a hostile environment and to support the landing force during its landing and later, when ashore; and patrol and escort craft to assist in screening the formation during its movement and providing the minesweeping group.
In terms of current experience, for offensive river operations where a landing force is required, a Riverine Task Force would be formed of one River Assault Group which includes the boats required to lift, escort, and support the ground unit, and a Landing Force which will not normally exceed one reinforced infantry battalion. When more than one battalion is to be landed, separate Riverine Task Forces will be formed for coordinated but independent movement. Command of the Riverine Task Force will be prescribed by higher authority subject to the following general considerations. If the river- me assault operation is to be conducted from large ships and craft on a major waterway where the effective operation of the Task Force is primarily dependent upon decisions falling within Navy cognizance, the command of the Riverine Task Force should be exercised by the commander of the River Assault Group, or other navy commander as directed. In the case where an operation is to be conducted in a restricted land environment and intimately associated with a maneuver ashore, as for example, where a landing will be a major contributing part of a major ground operation, or where several landing sites may be used subject to variables governed by a ground situation which cannot be accurately forecast, command of a Riverine Task Force may be assigned to the Landing Force commander.
Riverine Task Force operations fall into two general categories. One involves the assault landing of a force for sustained opera- hons ashore. This may be an independent action. The more frequent situation, however, is when one or more Riverine Task Forces land their Landing Forces for co-ordinated operations with other ground forces which may have been deployed to the objective area by air or overland transportation. The second category is an operation of a temporary nature characterized by a swift incursion, a rapid action, and a planned withdrawal. This ls the normal pattern of action followed in a raid and in search and destroy missions. Such operations would normally be conducted by single Riverine Task Forces.
An Amphibious Task Force is currently capable of directing its combat power inland for a considerable distance; the depth of this penetration depending in general upon its ability to support the Landing Force. Thus, the Amphibious Task Force is well suited to the mission of initiating offensive operations in a riverine environment from the sea. This capability may be further extended in time and space if certain limiting factors are overcome. One of these is the depth of water at the seaward approach to the area of operations. Hence, an Amphibious Task Force called upon to operate in such areas will need shallow draft ships to provide the gunfire and logistic support which the Landing Force will need as it moves inland along the waterways.
Another limiting factor is that the boats of an Amphibious Task Force have been designed for ship-to-shore operations. They have good seakeeping qualities but lack the armor and heavy armament which operations in a hostile inland environment may require. Suitably modified craft could be provided for this purpose, but these would be less seaworthy and would thus reduce the flexibility of the Amphibious Task Force. This difficulty might be resolved by providing selected craft with heavy weapons mounts and detachable armor kits. The associated weapons and armor could be carried ashore separately and installed when the craft are prepared for inland operations. The minesweeping requirement could also be met by providing simple cables fitted with grapnels which, towed between two boats, would serve to sever the electric wires leading to the controlled type mines most frequently encountered.
It is envisaged that an Amphibious Task Force organized to include shallow draft ships and landing craft which could be readily modified for inland operations could proceed directly from a rear base area, gain a secure hold over the approaches to a hostile inland waterways system by conventional amphibious warfare techniques, and could then serve as an afloat base to support riverine assault operations. The Riverine Task Forces required for such inland operations could be assembled offshore, or the River Assault Groups formed from the boats of the Amphibious Task Force could proceed to designated locations inland to embark ground units which might be based ashore. When the extent of the inland penetration was such that the ships of the Amphibious Task Force could no longer serve as a base off the coast, selected shallow draft ships could be moved inland to provide intermediate afloat base facilities.
It is anticipated that ground units of battalion size could be based ashore while the afloat base would consist primarily of ships to provide the maintenance and logistic support for the craft of a River Assault Group and some ground unit equipment. Such bases should normally include only the minimum number of ships to reduce the vulnerability of the complex. The number of such bases would be variable but, in any event, all should be within mutually supporting distance of one another. Further security for the afloat bases could be provided by the organization of one or more helicopter-borne reserve elements.
Forces may also be deployed to operating areas without the prior formation of an Amphibious Task Force. The Navy may provide River Assault Groups and other craft for riverine operations from external sources or these may be organized and based on secure areas within a general area where offensive operations are contemplated. Similarly, ground forces may be deployed from outside the area of operations to the vicinity of river force bases for embarkation for a specific operation. Alternatively, ground forces may be based with River Assault Groups to conduct routine operations for extended periods.
Whether riverine assault operations are undertaken by an Amphibious Task Force or by other forces assembled for the purpose, the procedures required are the same. For convenience these will be discussed under four phases; a planning phase, a movement phase, an assault landing phase, and when appropriate, a withdrawal phase.
The closest and most detailed co-ordination among all participating forces in an amphibious operation is essential to success. This is equally true in a riverine assault operation. The Riverine Task Force is a closely knit, carefully integrated entity which is subject to surprise enemy attack from the time it leaves the place of its assembly. Thus, from the moment the Riverine Task Force is formed, to the time when it is dissolved, few if any actions or decisions may be made without affecting the force as a whole.
In planning for a riverine assault operation, the place of assembly of the Riverine Task Force and its composition are prescribed by higher authority. When sustained operations ashore are envisaged, and particularly when a riverine assault is to be conducted in coordination with a major ground operation, higher authority should also prescribe the objective area.
The landing site should be selected by the Landing Force Commander in agreement with the River Assault Group Commander. The site selected must further the execution of the scheme of maneuver ashore as well as permit the maneuver of the rivercraft directly involved in the landing of troops and the execution of fire support missions. The extent and nature of the landing site will also determine the sequence of embarkation of landing force units and the organization of the transport of craft for the movement phase.
The Riverine Task Force should include a group whose purpose is to precede the formation and to clear a mine-free channel for the force. Casualties from mines must be anticipated despite this precaution. Plans must include actions to be taken in that event. Such plans should specify how and by whom rescue operations and casualty evacuation are to be conducted, and what disposition is to be made of disabled craft. Wherever possible, plans should include the use of heliborne units to provide local security for disabled craft, and to assist in rescue and casualty evacuation.
Plans to counter the ambush threat will depend upon whether the Riverine Task Force is to force passage in the event of ambush or whether it is to take deliberate action to land and destroy an ambushing force. When the mission of the Riverine Task Force involves the assault landing of a force at a specified time and place, uninterrupted movement of the force to the objective areas will usually be required. Plans should include the designation of ships and craft to take ambushing forces under fire, and instructions on the use of air support.
In the event the mission of the Riverine Task Force specifies the destruction of ambushing forces encountered en route, plans for landing detachments for this purpose will be required. Such plans should also provide detailed instructions on the use of air and waterborne gunfire support and of heliborne troops if available, as well as details on the re-embarkation of detachments landed and their subsequent mission.
In all cases, plans for the movement of a Riverine Task Force should provide for the continuous aerial surveillance of both sides of the waterway, and for the delivery of immediate air and surface fires against any hostile target appearing on either bank. Plans may also prescribe fires from lead elements of the Riverine Task Force against likely ambush sites, enemy observation points, or assembly areas.
Plans for the assault landing will include instructions for the delivery of preparatory fires by external supporting units such as air or shore-based artillery, and by gunfire support aircraft of the Riverine Task Force. Supporting fires available for the assault landing and to support the landing force ashore will also be prescribed. The organization of the landing force into waves for the assault landing will require detailed plans. These must take into account whether reserve landing force elements are to land in accordance with a time schedule or on call. In general when the river is wide, reserves may be held for on-call landing. In the majority of cases, however, the expeditious landing of all troops in the Riverine Task Force will be required to permit the development of maximum combat power ashore, to minimize congestion of river craft off the landing site, and to permit the vulnerable transport craft to move to areas where they can be more easily protected from the enemy. Plans should also include the movement of reserve elements and reinforcing and support units by helicopter whenever such aircraft are available.
In an amphibious operation, the organization of the Landing Force for embarkation varies from the organization for landing; in riverine operations they are the same. The organization of the Landing Force for embarkation in a riverine operation thus corresponds to the organization of the Landing Force for the assault phase in an amphibious operation. This organization depends upon several factors which include the scheme of maneuver ashore, the number and type of transport, escort, and fire support craft available; logistic support requirements; and the duration of the movement phase. With the exception of the last factor, all are familiar considerations, normal to amphibious operations. The duration of the movement phase, however, is a factor of importance primarily in a riverine operation. Troops crowded into small boats moving at a modest speed in the humid heat of the tropics quickly lose their combat effectiveness. Thus, when movements of prolonged duration are required, boats should never be loaded to capacity.
A Riverine Task Force will usually be organized into four groups for the movement phase. These include a minesweeping group, a command group, a transport group, and an escort/fire support group.
The Minesweeping Group includes sufficient craft to clear the main channel, and as far toward the banks as the draft of the sweep craft permit. This is important to reduce the mine threat where plans call for an immediate landing attack on the flank of an ambushing force.
The Command Group should include the commanders of both the Navy and Landing Force components of the task force together with the air and artillery control parties. These should all be embarked on the same ship or craft. Situations which affect the movement and maneuver of the Riverine Task Force arise very quickly on inland waterways, and the actions to be taken in these circumstances cannot all be preplanned for automatic response. Therefore it is desirable for the senior commanders to be together to agree without delay on actions to be taken to meet an unforeseen situation, or to alter a previously agreed plan. Provisions need also be made for an alternate command group to be organized with similar representation in the event the primary command group is unable to function.
The Transport Group consists of the craft embarking the Landing Force. Each boat normally embarks a tactical unit together with its weapons and prescribed supplies and equipment. The transport group usually is organized in accordance with the formation prescribed for landing.
The Escort/Fire Support Group is organized to protect the Riverine Task Force from the time it leaves a secure base area until it returns, and to provide heavy fire support during the movement phase and the assault landing phase. Fire support craft will be stationed at the head and rear of the transport group. Other fire support craft will be interspersed within the transport group itself. The escort craft will take position on the flanks of the formation.
In the event of ambush, designated fire support and escort craft will open fire immediately and move to interpose themselves between the transport craft and the hostile force ashore to cover the movement of the transport craft out of the killing zone. Other escort and fire support craft move to the side away from the ambush site to maintain surveillance over the opposite bank of the waterway and stand ready to open fire on any enemy forces observed.
Throughout the movement phase, escort craft maintain station on the flanks of the formation and keep both banks of the waterway under surveillance. If airborne observers are available, these will advise of any suspect areas ahead of the formation; such areas may be fired upon if orders so permit or they may simply be kept under close observation until the formation clears the area.
As the Riverine Task Force approaches the landing site, preparatory fires are delivered on it by air and ground forces external to the Riverine Task Force. As in the amphibious attack, predesignated fire support craft mark the limits of the landing site. These craft may beach if conditions permit the better to observe and deliver their fires as the troops land. Other fire support craft move into their assigned positions to execute fire support missions. Escort craft move toward the opposite bank of the waterway to keep the area under surveillance and fire on any hostile elements observed. Other escort craft move to designated areas to protect the transport craft when these are assembled after their troops have been landed. The minesweeping group will remain in its position ahead of the formation, or if the River Assault group is to return to base after the landing, the minesweeping group may move to the rear of the formation, ready to conduct sweep operations during the return movement.
When the transport craft of the first wave reach positions opposite the landing site, identified as the area between the flank fire support craft, they turn independently and move toward shore. When the troops are landed, the craft retract and move to an assembly area by routes prescribed to avoid interference with succeeding waves of the landing force.
If the Landing Force is to operate ashore for a limited period, the River Assault Group, less the craft required for command and gunfire support of the Landing Force, is assembled at a temporary anchorage to await the time of re-embarkation. If the Landing Force is to remain ashore, the Riverine Task Force is dissolved once the Landing Force is firmly established, and the River Assault Group returns to base.
A withdrawal in a hostile environment is a delicate operation in that the enemy will usually have precise information on the location of a friendly force and an excellent idea of its composition and relative combat power. Plans for the withdrawal need therefore, to be detailed, and provisions need to be included or close support of the withdrawal operation throughout its duration. This may be provided by external air and surface fire support forces or by the fire support means of the Riverine Task Force itself. If possible, alternate landing sites should be used for the re-embarkation of the Landing Force to avoid the necessity of returning by the same route used in the advance ashore. This is often possible in a search and destroy operation where the Landing Force is relatively small and the area to be covered is large. In any event the procedure used in re-embarking the Landing Force is the same as that used in the assault landing, but in reverse.
This brief review of how the Amphibious Task Force may engage in riverine operations, and what procedures govern the conduct of such operations, reflect both past and current experience in Southeast Asia. As operations in Southeast Asia continue, patterns of enemy activity may alter and other techniques may be required to defeat him. Further, as experience is gained and interest is aroused, the development of specially designed craft for river warfare should be anticipated.* This, too, will have its impact on the tactics and techniques required for this type of operation. As a result, it is evident that what has been presented here is only another modest step in the evolutionary process which must precede the elaboration of a definitive U. S. doctrine of river warfare. The point is that U. S. Naval Forces already have the capability of making effective use of a primitive environment for the application of military force. What needs to be done now is determine how this capability may be improved so that naval forces may move from the sea directly inland and extend their power deep into the complex of waterways which are the main lines of communications in many world areas.
*See A. G. Nelson and N. G. Mosher, “Proposed: A Counterinsurgency Task Force,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1966, p. 36.
A graduate of Syracuse University in 1940, Colonel Croizat commanded a machine gun company on Guadalcanal and an Amphibian Tractor Battalion on the Marshalls, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. He was Head, Strategic Plans Section, Marine Corps Headquarters, from 1956 to 1959; Chief of Staff, FMF Seventh Fleet in 1960-1961; U. S. Military Advisors Representative in SEATO from 1961 to 1964; and Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division (rear) from 1965 until his retirement on 30 June 1966. He is now a Consultant, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.