U.S. Navy
Distributed Lethality: Don’t Drink the Kool-Aid
Naval Surface Forces’ new distributed lethality (DL) strategy seems to be a fine idea and one that is arriving at just the right time. Before the Navy lunges, bass-like, at this particular shiny object in the water, however, some hard questions should be asked and answered to ensure this is not a house being built on a foundation of sand.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy’s broad strategy has shifted from sea control to power projection. Rather than dominating all the world’s oceans, as may have been necessary in the past, power projection delivered precise strike from the sea in support of the various combatant commanders’ land operations. Simultaneously, with the disappearance of near-peer adversaries, the fleet’s size was allowed to decline precipitously. Necessarily and inevitably, the majority of the surface-ship combat power coalesced into the carrier strike groups (CSGs), which became the isolated bastions from which this strike-capacity was largely generated.
Today, distributed lethality’s architects are convinced that unchallenged CSG power projection is quickly becoming a thing of the past. CSGs, they believe, are increasingly vulnerable to new threats presented by emerging competitors, and a return to sea control is necessary to preserve the fleet’s strike capabilities.
Distributed lethality speaks to a much broader, more offensively oriented distribution of increasingly lethal ships of every kind—including those not previously considered to be true combatants. In addition, fixed-wing aircraft will return to sea control missions, as will submarines. It is believed this approach not only will complicate an enemy’s targeting solutions, but also will facilitate the fleet’s ability to defeat enemy forces as they sally into blue water. In the end, distributed lethality will provide enhanced security for both carrier and expeditionary strike groups, ensure strike capacity, and facilitate a return to an active defense of the sea lines of communication.
Before distributed lethality is implemented, though, the following questions need to be asked and answered:
• From where will the additional ships (and aircraft) necessary for making DL a reality come? There currently are 93 combatants in service. How many more will DL require? While the 2016 shipbuilding plan calls for 141 combatants by 2025, it also specifies that the funding requirements necessary for the nuclear-powered Columbia-class ballistic submarine will preclude full execution of other existing shipbuilding plans.
• Although the shipbuilding plan includes acquisition of 43 littoral combat ships (LCSs)/frigate hulls by 2025, what realistically is the future of this acquisition? More important, owing to weight and moment issues, it is unlikely that LCS will ever support meaningful antisurface weapons.
• What will it take to make amphibious warfare ships into meaningful DL players? Certainly it will take much more than simply bolting on missile launchers. Further, does DL suppose that these ships no longer would require the defensive coverage heretofore provided by traditional combatants? Also, will amphibs be expected to depart the amphibious operations area at some point to support DL?
• Can the SM-6 missile, which is being touted in DL circles as having an antisurface capability, be even a stop-gap substitute for a hoped for surface ship, heavy-weight antiship cruise missile? Moreover, how many SM-6s can be expected to be diverted from air defense tasks?
• As for stationing F-35Bs on amphibs, specifically for sea control operations, what evidence is there that this will be effective? Amphibs and aircraft carriers are fundamentally different in too many ways to enumerate here.
• If LCSs and submarines are becoming DL players, who will do mine warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance?
• Where are the oilers necessary to support this wide, sustained dispersion?
• What do the aviators, submariners, and Marines make of distributed lethality? At a national level, are the combatant commanders on board with deemphasizing strike in favor of sea control?
While the new administration promises more money for defense, it also favors enormous infrastructure programs, major tax cuts, and no changes to Medicare and Social Security. How much can or will Congress fund? Of any plus up achieved, how much will actually go to the fleet? The Congressional Research Service estimates that an additional $4.6 to $5.1 billion in shipbuilding funds will be required annually to simply carry out the Navy’s current plan.
While DL may make sense on many levels, “hope is not a strategy.”
Captain Eyer served in seven cruisers, commanding three: the USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), Shiloh (CG-67), and Chancellorsville (CG-62).